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ABSTRACT 
 
From 'Baggage' to Not 'Non-Persons': Levy v. Louisiana 
And the Struggle for Equal Rights for 
'Illegitimate' Children 
 
by 
 
Sherrie Anne Bakelar 
 
Dr. David Tanenhaus, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
This study focuses on "illegitimate" children, who are more visible 
than other children within the historical record because of the many laws 
related to their existence.  By examining this group of children, it is 
possible to improve upon the framework that shapes our understanding 
of childhood and provide a starting point for future studies that will 
continue to illuminate children's history.  Although illegitimacy laws are 
as ancient as Western civilization, the key moment for the United States' 
laws related to nonmarital children came in the spring of 1968 and the 
pivotal decision of Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).  In that case, 
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that nonmarital children deserved the 
same legal rights as marital children.  While Levy marked the beginning 
of a series of court cases involving nonmarital children, the case itself 
drifted into obscurity, its importance reduced to Justice William O. 
Douglas' majority opinion.  In an effort to rescue this significant case 
from the shadows, an analysis of the complete court record for Levy, 
occupies a prominent position within this work.  This close historical 
 iv 
    
analysis provides a glimpse into American culture during the late 1960s, 
a time when a fundamental shift was occurring within society, creating a 
more complete picture of how that shift affected the understanding of 
childhood and children's rights.  
 v 
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PREFACE  
 
SEMANTIC KNOTS AND OTHER NOTES                                                                                                                             
 
This thesis is, at its heart, a study of children born outside the 
boundaries of traditional marriage as it is defined in the United States.  
The terms used to describe these children and differentiate them from 
those born within the prescribed borders of a traditional, heterosexual, 
monogamous, marriage have changed over time.  Whether scholars refer 
to them as "bastards," "natural children," "illegitimate," or any other 
euphemism designed to define them as different, the exact word matters 
little.  Today, the acceptable term for these children is "nonmarital."  
Regardless of the label used, the fact that society set them apart from 
other children is more important than the exact term used.  Researchers 
of children, women, and other related subjects often begin discussions of 
these children and their families by tying themselves into semantic 
knots.  This study avoids this question of language.  It is sufficient to 
acknowledge that "illegitimate," as the word is used in this work, began 
as a legal term, related to inheritance rights.  In the rhetoric that forms 
the bedrock of this work, that term became burdened with cultural and 
social weight beyond its limited, legal meaning.  In turn, this extra 
meaning greatly affected these children's lives.  Because this work will 
explore that burden in some respects, and "illegitimate", as it is used in 
this study, even beyond the quoted rhetoric, is employed to make a 
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historical point and is not meant to detract from the children who are 
labeled as such.  When possible, however, "nonmarital" will be used. 
Beyond semantics, what truly matters is that, more often than not, 
these children struggled to live within a society that defined them, and 
their mothers, as somehow lesser beings, not worthy of full legal 
protection, equal inheritance, or even unconditional love.  Through the 
course of this project, it has proven impossible to separate these children 
from their mothers.  While it should be noted that unmarried fathers also 
raise children alone, this study will not touch upon them; they deserve 
their own spotlight.  Therefore, although the attempt to illuminate the 
history of these children has acted as the impetus of this project, and it 
still lies at the core, in the end, this is a history about an entire family.  It 
is the story of an unmarried mother who chose to raise her children 
alone despite the disapproval of society.  It is a story about the world she 
and her children inhabited and the changes her death brought to the 
United States, ultimately improving the standing of all children labeled 
"illegitimate". 
 The study's structure is straightforward.  The first chapter 
introduces the legal case, Levy v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decision.  This is followed by an examination of the 
literature that has been written regarding the Levy case.  The second 
chapter traces ancient legal and religious traditions related to children 
born outside of a traditional marriage in order to emphasize the weight of 
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custom that the Levy decision attempted to change.  Chapter Three 
explores French and Louisiana law to present a legal context for the case.  
Chapter Four then moves beyond the legal context in order to analyze the 
social and cultural composition of the United States in the mid-twentieth 
century.  It also examines the unspoken racial context of the case.  This 
exploration of the contextual background illustrates the strong traditions 
that Levy challenged.  Afterward, Chapter Five presents a detailed 
analysis of the Levy arguments presented before the Supreme Court.  As 
part of this analysis, the thesis touches upon the long-standing 
discrimination shown toward Asian-Americans and their search for equal 
treatment within the United States' legal system, as seen specifically in 
Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Oyama v. California 
332 U.S. 633 (1948).  A number of these cases expanded the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of both the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In turn, these cases served as 
precedents for Levy. 
After a close reading of the case itself, the final chapter addresses 
Levy's legacy.  Yet, because Levy slipped into obscurity, there is little 
legacy to explore.  The chapter includes a brief survey of the legal cases 
that built upon Levy, such as Weber v. Aetna 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the 
more well-known nonmarital children's rights case, before concluding 
with an examination of how Levy led to the creation of the intermediate 
scrutiny test.  Prior to Levy, the high court used two tests to decide the 
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constitutionality of statutes in relation to the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The first, more lenient of these, was a rational basis, or minimal 
scrutiny, test.  Under this level of examination, state or local statutes 
that classified people differently were presumed to have a rational basis 
and passed constitutional muster.  The second level, residing at the other 
end of the spectrum, was strict scrutiny.  Under this test, governments 
had to demonstrate a compelling reason why the classification in their 
statute was necessary.  Otherwise, the court would strike down the law 
in question as unconstitutional.  According to most major law 
encyclopedias and casebooks, the creation of the intermediate scrutiny 
category, lying between the two other tests, formally began in 1976, with 
the gender discrimination case, Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  
However, the beginnings of intermediate scrutiny, as Justice William 
Brennan pointed out, can be found nearly a decade earlier, in Levy.1  
Beginning with birth status, the Supreme Court most often used this 
new test to decide cases involving gender classifications.  As Levy faded 
from view, its significant role in the history of the development of 
intermediate scrutiny was forgotten.  
                                                 
1 Kermit Hall, ed., The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 
2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 501-502; Kathleen M. Sullivan and 
Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 15th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2004), 815-
816; David S. Tanenhaus, ed., Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
(Macmillan Reference USA, 2008), 2:484. William J. Brennan, "A Tribute to Norman 
Dorsen," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 27, (1992): 310-311, note 6. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LOOKING FOR CHILDREN…AND FINDING THEM  
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
In the inaugural issue of the Journal of the History of Childhood 
and Youth (2008), Peter Stearns discusses four concerns that he sees as 
central to the study of the history of childhood.  In addition to a call for 
more comparative childhood history and greater attention to class, race, 
and other categories of analysis when studying children, Stearns urges 
childhood historians to focus on young children, not just adolescents.  
However, the most pressing concern for the childhood historian, he 
believes, is discovering sources that hold the voices of children.1  For a 
variety of obvious reasons, children have left little behind in the 
historical record.  Because of this, childhood historians must search 
between the lines of primary sources, looking for children's reflections to 
create a fuller picture of children's history.  By focusing on more visible 
groups of children, it is possible to improve upon the framework that 
shapes our understanding of childhood and provide a starting point for 
future studies that will continue to illuminate one of the more elusive 
groups within society.  Exploring our legal and cultural relationship with 
nonmarital children, who are more visible within the historical record 
because of the many laws related to their existence, allows this study to 
                                                 
1 Peter N. Stearns, "Challenges in the History of Childhood," Journal of the History of 
Childhood and Youth 1, no. 1 (2008): 35. 
 2 
     
address questions related to how "family" has been defined and redefined 
in American culture. 
Although illegitimacy laws are as ancient as civilization, one of the 
key moments for the United States' laws related to nonmarital children 
came in the spring of 1968 and the pivotal decision of Levy v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 68 (1968).  In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that 
illegitimate children were people too and entitled to the same legal rights 
as legitimate children.  Levy marks the beginning of a series of ten court 
cases stretching from 1968 to 1986, which continued to improve the 
legal status of nonmarital children, as well as their parents, who were 
once considered irretrievably degraded.2  Additionally, exploration of the 
Levy case provides an opportunity to further our understanding of the 
legal climate that existed in the late 1960s, a moment in time when a 
fundamental shift was occurring in American culture.  Because the Levy 
family was African-American, this case initially appears to be another 
prime example of the legal struggle for equality.  The presence of an 
amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief written by the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund supports this belief.  Further, in the 1960s, the 
stereotypical illegitimate child was African-American and many people 
                                                 
2 John Witte Jr., Sins of the Father: The Law and Theology of Illegitimacy 
Reconsidered, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 158.  The ten cases are:  
Levy v Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee Company, 391 U.S. 
73 (1968); Weber v Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Gomez v Perez, 
409 U.S. 535 (1973); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 
(1973); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 
(1977); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Pickett v Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Reed 
v Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986). 
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considered the problem of illegitimacy to be a "Black problem."  However, 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attorney, Norman Dorsen, who 
argued the case on behalf of the Levy children, did not construct his 
winning argument around the fact that the Levy children were African-
American.  Instead, he fought against the ancient traditions of legal 
discrimination that affected all nonmarital children, regardless of race.  
He did this by arguing that birth status was equivalent to race in that a 
child had no say in how they were born.  Dorsen's argument made the 
Levy children's birth status more important than their race.  To support 
this argument, Dorsen cited precedent from several cases argued on 
behalf of Japanese-Americans.  In this way, Dorsen's argument became 
universal, divorcing the status of illegitimate from that of race and 
rendering immaterial the fact that the Levy children were African-
American. 
The history of the Levy children's case is a sad one.  After feeling 
unwell for several days, their mother Louise Levy sought help from the 
Charity Hospital of New Orleans in the spring of 1964.  Doctor W. J. 
Wing, the resident assigned to her case, listened as she described her 
symptoms, which included "tiredness, dizziness, weakness, chest pain, 
and slowness of breath."  He then made a cursory examination, which 
included an x-ray but failed to include a blood pressure check, and sent 
her home with sodium butisol, a barbiturate used as a sleeping pill, and 
Alertonic, a vitamin B complex.  Seven days later, on March 19, Louise 
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revisited the hospital and complained to Dr. Wing that the medicine was 
having no effect.  Instead of conducting a more thorough exam, the 
doctor accused her of not taking her medicine and ordered her to see a 
psychiatrist in May.  Once again, Louise returned home.  On March 22, 
her family brought her to the hospital for the last time, comatose.  As her 
condition deteriorated, the doctors conducted extensive tests, many of 
them for the first time.  Finally, they discovered the cause underlying the 
discomfort Louise had been feeling for weeks.  Her kidneys had failed.  
On March 29, Louise Levy passed away.  She left behind five illegitimate 
children ranging in age from five to seventeen years old.3 
Because they were illegitimate, the Levy children had lost their 
only means of support when their mother died.  Luckily, their aunt 
Thelma took them in and continued to provide for them, though she was 
legally not required to do so.  It was their aunt who also first approached 
the law firm of Levy, Smith and Pailet, concerned that Louise's death 
may have been avoidable and that negligence had been shown on the 
part of the Charity Hospital as well as on the part of Dr. Wing.  No blood 
or urine tests had been performed the first two times Louise sought help, 
either of which would have shown her failing kidneys while there was 
still a possibility of prolonging her life.  The dismissal of Louise's 
worsening condition on the nineteenth with an appointment to a 
psychiatrist also suggested that there was just cause to pursue a claim of 
                                                 
3 Appendix, Levy v. Louisiana 391, U.S. 68, 7-9. 
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wrongful death.  The attorney, Adolph J. Levy, no relation to Louise Levy 
or her children, concurred and filed a motion in October 1965 with the 
New Orleans Parish District Court.  The children's suit was seeking a 
total of $60,000 dollars for pain, suffering, and the loss of their mother.  
The first version of the lawsuit only took issue with Louise Levy's 
wrongful death.  However, the defendants, the Charity Hospital, Dr. Wing 
and his insurance company, and the State of Louisiana, insisted that 
illegitimate children could not file for wrongful death benefits.  Afterward, 
Adolph Levy amended the case and countered this argument with two 
points.4 
He first established that the mothers of illegitimate children were 
just as central to a child's life as the mothers of legitimate children.  
Louise Levy was a good mother to her children regardless of their status.  
The damages they sought were not just for wrongful death but for loss of 
support and loss of love and affection as well.5  Although all five children 
were born out of wedlock, the brief stated, Louise had certified on their 
birth certificates that they were hers.  The mother's certification was a 
necessary step, unique to Louisiana law; most other states only required 
a father to certify his relationship to an illegitimate child.  She had 
treated all five the same as "any good mother would treat her own 
legitimate children," Adolph Levy insisted.  The children had attended 
                                                 
4 Appendix, Levy, 28.  
5 Ibid., 27-28.  
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Catholic Mass every Sunday and each child was enrolled in a Catholic 
parochial school even though Louise could have sent them to public 
school without expense.  Adolph Levy stressed that Louise had stayed 
home to care for the children every night, instead of going out.  Most 
importantly, she had loved them.  Although she had worked as a 
domestic servant, her income had been "sufficient to clothe, feed and 
educate the children."  The Levy children had not been a burden to the 
State.  The argument concluded, "She did everything which a mother of 
legitimate children would do for her own children, and, indeed, decedent 
even did more for her children than many legitimate mothers would do 
for their's[sic]."6  The second point that the attorney added claimed that 
barring the illegitimate children from receiving death benefits would be 
unconstitutional as it, "deprives them of life, liberty or property without 
the due process of law, and it denies them the equal protection of the 
laws."7 
The trial continued through the winter and at the end of January 
1966, the Parish Court dismissed all charges against Charity Hospital, 
Dr. Wing, his insurance company, and the State of Louisiana.  It was the 
judge's opinion that Thelma, acting on behalf of Louise's five children, 
could not sue for a wrongful death because the children were 
                                                 
6 Appendix, Levy, 38-40.  
7 Ibid., 26.  
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illegitimate.8  Unsatisfied with that decision, Adolph Levy appealed.  His 
appeal was denied and the Parish District Court reiterated that the 
denial of the right to recover wrongful death benefits or sue for damages 
was "based on morals and general welfare because it discourages 
bringing children into the world out of wedlock."  It was the district 
court's opinion that "child," as it appeared in Louisiana Civil Code Article 
2315, which regulated wrongful death benefits, meant only legitimate 
children and the court concluded, "That an illegitimate child was 
dependent upon the deceased parent for support makes no difference."  
The district court also included an opinion on the question of the 
unconstitutionality of discrimination against nonmarital children "Since 
there is no discrimination in the denial of the right of illegitimate children 
to recover based on race, color, or creed; we can find no basis for the 
contention of unconstitutionality." 9  Adolph Levy then appealed to the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, which refused to hear the case and offered no 
opinion on it.  The Levy children's cause languished until the fall of 1967 
when Adolph Levy approached Norman Dorsen about the case and the 
possibility of arguing it before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Dorsen, who had built an impressive legal career through the 
1950s and into the 1960s, including time spent as a law clerk for Justice 
John Harlan II of the U.S. Supreme Court, was a member of the 
                                                 
8 Appendix, Levy, 44.  
9 Ibid., 62-63.  
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American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) Board of Directors.  As part of 
the ACLU, he worked on several constitutional law cases, including 
Gideon v. Wainwright, which held "the right of an indigent defendant in a 
criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right 
essential to a fair trial."  He also successfully litigated In re Gault, which 
determined that minors had basic due process rights in juvenile court.10  
His work on these cases and others like them shows his concern for the 
expansion of civil rights to all people.11  It was this concern that led him 
to construct a broad argument against the legal discrimination shown 
toward nonmarital children, ignoring the fact that the Levy's were 
African-American.  His goal from the beginning was to ask the Supreme 
Court for a ruling related to all nonmarital children.  By ignoring race, 
his work would apply to all children equally, not just minority children, 
and it would take issue with centuries of legal discrimination.12 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision to hear Levy in the spring of 
1968 was not a foregone conclusion.  The doctrine of abstention allowed 
federal courts to not hear cases involving a number of issues, including 
family law and state statutes.  In 1968, the three types of abstention in 
                                                 
10 Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  
Opinions found at Justia.com Supreme Court Center, hereafter Justia.com, 
http://supreme.justia.com/. 
11 Norman Dorsen biographical information from Library of Congress "Bicentennial" 
http://www.loc.gov/bicentennial/bios/democracy/bios_dorsen.html. [Accessed on 
3/28/2010]; Brennan, "Tribute to Norm Dorsen," 309. 
12 Levy Notes; Nov 6, 1967; Norman Dorsen Papers; TAM 251; 32; 11; Tamiment 
Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, 70 Washington 
Square South, New York, NY 10012, New York University Libraries. 
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use were the Pullman Abstention, which allowed a federal court to 
abstain when a State's court could clarify a statute, thereby avoiding a 
federal ruling on constitutionality, the Burford Abstention, which allowed 
the federal courts to not become involved in complex state procedures, 
and the Thibodaux Abstention, which deferred to states when a case fell 
under both federal and state jurisdiction.13  By abstaining from some 
cases, federal courts could avoid friction between the different levels of 
the judiciary system and avoid misinterpreting state law.  Also, by 
abstaining, federal courts could avoid unnecessary trials and rulings.14  
Because of the complexity of family law at the state level, it was possible 
for the U.S. Supreme Court to abstain from hearing Levy. 
However, as Erwin Chemerinsky writes in Federal Jurisdiction, 
"Abstention is not necessary if a state law is patently unconstitutional."15  
The jurisdictional statement that Dorsen submitted on behalf of the Levy 
children centered on the unfair treatment of children born to unwed 
parents.  Dorsen wrote that the question of equal rights for nonmarital 
children was substantial enough to deserve the U.S. Supreme Court's 
attention.16  At issue, as he saw the case, was the discrimination faced 
by children who had no choice over their birth status, comparing this 
                                                 
13 Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, 5th ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 
2007), 783-84.  Pullman Abstention is named after Railroad Commission of Texas v. 
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), Burford Abstention after Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 
U.S. 315 (1943), and Thibodaux Abstention after Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of 
Thobodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
14 Ibid., 786-788. 
15 Ibid., 791. 
16 Jurisdictional Statement, Levy, 6. 
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form of discrimination to that faced by people of minority races.  As 
Dorsen presented the argument, it was a question of due process and 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In early November, 
1967, the High Court agreed to add Levy to their calendar. 
Oral arguments were presented before the U.S. Supreme Court on 
March 27, 1968.  On May 20, the court ruled in favor of the Levy 
children and Justice William O. Douglas issued the court's opinion.  
Justice Douglas began the opinion by stating that "illegitimate children 
are not 'nonpersons.'  They are humans, live, and have their being.  They 
are clearly 'persons' within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment." 17  As Dorsen had argued and the state had 
maintained, the fact that the Levy children were African-American was 
less relevant to the case than was their status as illegitimate children.  
The Supreme Court also found the classification of illegitimacy unrelated 
to the ability to sue for wrongful death and survivor benefits.  At the end 
of his opinion, Justice Douglas wrote, "We conclude that it is invidious to 
discriminate against them when no action, conduct, or demeanor of 
theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother."18 
The Supreme Court's final opinion divorced nonmarital children 
from the actions of their parents and struck against centuries of long-
held traditions that discouraged nonmarital births by imposing 
                                                 
17 Levy v Louisiana, found at Justia.com, 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/391/68/case.html, [Accessed on 3/31/2010]. 
18 Levy at 72. 
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disadvantages upon children born to unwed parents.  Levy also laid the 
groundwork for a series of cases that continued to expand legal 
protection for nonmarital children, including access to welfare benefits, 
and paternal visitation rights and financial support.  One of these later 
cases was Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 
(1972).  Weber explored the argument that classifications based on 
legitimacy and illegitimacy served no real purpose for the state.19  
Despite the fact that Weber found precedent in Levy, as the years 
passed, illegitimacy cases tended to look only as far back as Weber.  
Because of this, scholars have often overlooked the early influence of 
Levy. 
The historiography surrounding Levy v. Louisiana is thin.  Shortly 
after the case was heard, a small number of law review journal articles 
appeared, including one written by two of Dorsen's researchers, John C. 
Gray Jr. and David Rudovsky.  However, because most of these articles 
were written so soon after the case was heard, they are more accurately 
described as primary sources, providing insight into the case but not 
historical analysis. 
Gray and Rudovsky's article, "The Court Acknowledges the 
Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & 
                                                 
19 Martha T. Zingo and Kevin E. Early, Nameless Persons: Legal Discrimination 
Against Non-Marital Children in the United States, (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 60; Weber 
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, found at Justia.com,  
http://supreme.justia.com/us/406/164/index.html, [Accessed on 4/25/10]. 
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Liability Insurance Co.," from the November 1969 issue of the University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review was one of the first to appear after the court 
decision.  It provides the most thorough legal analysis of the case, 
though little time is spent on the history of the case.  The authors found 
the decision of the court in Levy and Glona to be inadequate.  According 
to Gray and Rudovsky, Justice Douglas' opinion "condemn[ed] generally 
classifications based on illegitimacy."  However, he never clarified the 
legal grounds for the decision.  Despite these shortcomings, the authors 
felt this decision was the best basis for challenging other aspects of 
discrimination against illegitimate children.20 
The problems they noted in Justice Douglas' decision formed the 
basis for legal analysis of the case over the decades.  Douglas' opinion 
placed the right to wrongful death recovery in the category of basic 
rights, thus protected by the Constitution.  This has wide-ranging 
consequences, since wrongful death recovery is an economic question, 
and the court has traditionally been reluctant to interfere in economic 
issues.  If wrongful death benefits are a basic right, equivalent to those 
rights expressed in the Constitution, then other economic situations 
must also be considered basic rights.  This aspect of the decision allowed 
the Levy case to play a role in later welfare and other state benefit cases 
in the early 1970s.  The second aspect of Douglas' opinion equated birth 
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status with race or ancestry, making Oyama v. California 332 U.S. 633 
(1948) important precedent.  In that case, the court ruled that 
discrimination against aliens was constitutional.  However, according to 
the opinion written by Chief Justice Vinson, naturalization status could 
not be used as a basis for discriminating against a child of an alien, who 
was a citizen and therefore entitled to equal protection and due 
process.21 
There were three possible reasons for Douglas' rejection of the 
state's argument that legal disadvantages dissuaded people from having 
children outside of marriage.  The first reason was that it was illogical.  
People would not be dissuaded from creating children before being 
married because that child would not be able to claim wrongful death 
benefits.  The second reason hinged on the fact that by disallowing 
nonmarital claims, the law was undermined, since it was created to 
provide support for children who had lost their parent.  If the children of 
nonmarital parents could not claim benefits, the most financially 
desperate children would not be served by the law.  The third reason 
related to due process, a law must serve a rational purpose, and status 
beyond a person's control was suspect.22 
                                                 
21 Gray and Rudovsky, "The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate," 4-6; Vinson's 
opinion for the Court in Oyama v. California can be found at Justia.com, 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/332/633/case.html [Accessed 9/07/10].  
22 Gray and Rudovsky, "The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate," 8-9. 
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Finally, according to Gray and Rudovsky, Douglas' decision in Levy 
did not adequately address the particularities of the survivorship claim.  
The survivorship claim was based on the pain and suffering of the parent 
at his or her death.  It is a finite benefit and therefore the presence of 
nonmarital children affects the share that legitimate children receive.  
This differs from wrongful death, where each child has an individual 
claim.  For the Levy case, the "survivorship provisions [were] arguably 
justified."  Because the law traditionally considered nonmarital children 
unrelated to a parental family, their interests within that family were less 
important than those of a legitimate child.  The basis of this 
understanding was doubtful, according to the authors, because families 
often included illegitimate children.  Likewise, it was possible that 
legitimate children might not be intimately involved with their families.  
Survivorship benefits are usually distributed as if the parent had been 
able to do the distribution.  The law assumed that illegitimate children 
would be excluded but there was no evidence to support that 
assumption.  In the end, Gray and Rudovsky determined that the court 
ignored the survivorship aspect of the case and that question remained 
open.23 
In addition to the article by Gray and Rudovsky, a second early 
article, written by Harry Krause, appeared in the winter 1969 issue of the 
University of Chicago Law Review.  Krause began his piece with 
                                                 
23 Gray and Rudovsky, "The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate," 13-14. 
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Shakespeare's "Why Bastard, Wherefore Base," describing Levy and 
Glona as "sleeper" decisions that would end all legal discrimination 
between legitimate and illegitimate children with regard to their 
relationship with their mother.  Louisiana law was unique in that it 
required both the mother and father to acknowledge their illegitimate 
child.24  Because of this understanding, Krause's work on the Levy case 
focused on how the decision could expand the legal rights of unmarried, 
noncustodial fathers.  He wrote,  
But there is more than meets the eye.  Since the common 
law curse of filius nullius still affects the relationship 
between the illegitimate and his father, the interesting 
question about the Levy case is whether it will be extended 
to the father-child relationship.25 
   
His words were almost prophetic; many of the cases that followed Levy 
and worked to improve nonmarital children's rights and privileges 
addressed child-father relationships.  His article discussed the possible 
unconstitutionality of several state statutes and federal laws related to 
the father-child relationship in light of Levy. 
Krause described Douglas' opinion for the court as careless.  And 
although his article offers analysis of the decision, the history of the case 
is not mentioned.26  In addition to exploring Douglas' opinion, Krause 
looked at the dissent, written by Justice Harlan, who was joined by 
                                                 
24 Harry D. Krause, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana: First 
Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity," The University of Chicago Law Review 36, 
No. 2 (Winter, 1969): 338. 
25 Ibid., 339. 
26 Krause, "Legitimate and Illegitimate, 341-42.  
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Justices Black and Stewart.  Krause explained that Harlan's dissent 
centered on the argument between legal and biological definitions of 
relationships.  Legal relationships between people were not necessarily 
equivalent to biological ones and although people might be able to adjust 
their legal relationships to one another, they could not change their 
biological ones.  Krause argued that Justice Harlan had missed the point 
of Douglas' decision.  "The key to Levy is that the illegitimate child is 
disadvantaged purely by reason of his birth status over which he has no 
control (original emphasis)."  For Krause, illegitimacy was a biological 
relationship that could not be changed, whereas Harlan's dissent saw 
illegitimacy as a legal status that held the potential for change.  After 
exploring the decision handed down in Levy, Krause turned to the 
quagmire of paternity laws that varied from state to state and offered his 
opinion regarding how the Levy decision might affect those laws.27 
The topic of nonmarital children was an important area of study 
for Krause and his article, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy 
v. Louisiana: First Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity," was one 
of several on the topic Krause wrote before and after the Levy case.  
Another article, "Why Bastard, Wherefore Base?," which appeared a few 
months prior, also focused on the father-child relationship.  In this 
article, Krause created a before and after comparison of illegitimacy laws 
to show the changes that he believed Levy would usher in.  As in his 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 343, 349.  
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other works, Krause linked poverty, in part, to illegitimate children.  The 
statistics he quoted showed that some urban areas had reached an 
illegitimacy rate of fifty percent.  Krause saw these children, whom he 
referred to as "fatherless welfare children," as a "symptom of the social 
malaise," and he felt that progress in the private sector was necessary to 
improve these children's lives.  For Krause, private sector emphasized the 
family and he saw the father as key to solving the problem of illegitimate 
children growing up in poverty.28 
In addition to his work relating illegitimacy to poverty, Krause 
distinguished between two types of laws related to illegitimate children: 
definitional laws, and laws that lessened the burden of illegitimacy.  
Discrimination between types of illegitimate children had been common 
for ages.  For example, some jurisdictions considered children born to 
parents of different races illegitimate.  This "would seem to be prohibited 
under recent United States Supreme Court decisions," Krause wrote.29  
Although he does not mention these cases by name, it is likely that he is 
referring to miscegenation cases, such as Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 
(1967).  Laws had also changed to distinguish between children born into 
voided marriages and those born into voidable marriages, allowing them 
to be recognized as legitimate.  In other cases, as long as the child was 
                                                 
28 Harry D. Krause, "Why Bastard, Wherefore Base?" Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 383, Progress in Family Law (May, 1969): 
59.  His statistics were quoted from U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 2, 1967, 84 and 
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29 Ibid., 60.  
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born into any relationship that resembled a formal marriage, they would 
be considered legitimate. 30  These early primary source articles appeared 
in law journals through the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Their ultimate 
goal was to analyze and disseminate information about the Supreme 
Court's decision and how that decision affected current and future cases 
related to similar questions about birth status.  These articles later gave 
way to those that provided some historical analysis. 
Later articles, such as "Judicial Disapproval of Discrimination 
against Illegitimate Children: A comparative study of developments in 
Europe and the United States" by Johan Meeusen and "Corruption of 
Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of the Parents Should Not 
Matter" by Max Stier, offer some historical analysis.31  However, these 
works focus on nonmarital children in general and not on the importance 
of the Levy case. 
Meeusen begins his article with Justice Douglas' Levy opinion, 
using it as the opening volley in the "decade-long attack against the 
traditional legal discriminations suffered by illegitimate children."  His 
article explores changes in laws regarding nonmarital children in the 
U.S. and Europe.  "For centuries, both the common law and, especially, 
the civil law tradition subjected children born out of wedlock to 
                                                 
30 Harry D. Krause, "Why Bastard, Wherefore Base?", 60. 
31 Johan Meeusen, "Judicial Disapproval of Discrimination against Illegitimate 
Children: A comparative study of developments in Europe and the United States," The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 43, No. 1 (Winter, 1995): 119-145; Max Stier, 
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numerous disabilities."32  With this opening, Meeusen focuses on the 
shifting patrimonial laws of the U.S. and Europe and analyzes the 
various decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.  His summation of Justice 
Douglas' opinion succinctly explains the many problems that legal 
analysts had with it in the earlier articles.  He wrote,  
Applying a vague test (which referred to rationality, scrutiny 
concerning basic civil rights, invidious classifications and 
Shakespeare's King Lear), Justice Douglas' opinion for the 
majority was clear only in its rejection of the Louisiana 
statutes which discriminated on a basis which was 
completely irrelevant to its purpose and subject matter.33 
 
In 1992, Stanford law student, Max Stier, also explored illegitimacy 
and other "corruption of blood" sins within the Constitution's legal 
framework.  His article offers the closest example of bringing the child 
and family's voice into the debate.  He accomplished this by referring 
directly to the children in his introduction.  However, Stier felt obligated 
to change the names of the Levy children to protect their privacy.  
Although the Supreme Court had struck down a number of decisions 
that disadvantaged children because of their parents' decisions over the 
decades, Stier felt that the Court had not offered an adequate 
explanation for these decisions.  This is a common theme when 
discussing Levy.34 
                                                 
32 Meeusen, "Judicial Disapproval of Discrimination," 119. 
33 Ibid., 122. 
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Stier's argument is simple, "children should not be made to pay for 
the sins of their parents."35  Further, he argues that the Constitution 
contains provisions against this "corruption of blood" (holding children 
guilty of parental sin) principle.  According to Stier, four reasons that 
illegitimacy cases deserved to be heard under the heightened scrutiny 
principle.  First, the constitutional principle of corruption of blood 
"prohibits discrimination against children on the basis of parental 
conduct."  Additionally, in cases related to illegitimacy, the law has 
discriminated against children.  Third, those children who have been 
discriminated against in this manner have no political voice and cannot 
protest their treatment.  Finally, in these cases, children were being held 
responsible for their status, not their actions.  He writes that if the court 
recognized the importance of the "Corruption of Blood" aspect of the 
Constitution more explicitly, it would allow judicial decisions based on 
corruption of blood to rest on a more solid foundation.  This would also 
allow for the questioning of many state-level classifications.36 
For Stier, Levy "initiated judicial recognition of the constitutional 
rights of illegitimate children," but it did not explain how states could use 
the classification of "illegitimate."  The questionable grounds of the Levy 
decision provided leeway in future decisions.  For example, in Labine v. 
Vincent 401 U.S. 532 (1971) the court decided that an illegitimate child 
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did not deserve an inheritance.  While the father had the option of 
legitimizing the child by marrying the mother, the dissenting justices in 
this case stated that illegitimacy in Levy and Weber was equally 
insurmountable on the part of the child.  Throughout the article, Stier 
illustrates the U.S. Supreme Court's indecision regarding illegitimacy.  Is 
it, or is it not, acceptable to discriminate against illegitimate children?  
Not until the 1980s did the court finally decide that they would use 
heightened scrutiny for all illegitimacy cases, regardless of 
circumstances.  This marked the end of the legal battle in the United 
States for equal treatment of nonmarital children.37 
One final article lends an international setting to the Levy case, 
showing that the changes it ushered in were part of global trends.  This 
article, "Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children: New Science Plus 
Old Intermediate Scrutiny add up to the Need for Change" by Karen A. 
Hauser, provides a brief but thorough history of illegitimacy laws that 
formed the English Common Law.  Hauser's early point, that the laws did 
not always discriminate against children born outside of a traditional 
marriage, counters the accepted framework of constant discrimination 
other historians have used.  However, other than the enlarged theater 
and more objective exploration of the legal history surrounding 
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illegitimacy laws, the work does not improve upon the historical analysis 
of the Levy case.38 
Beyond journal articles, a small number of unpublished 
dissertations and theses also mention Levy v. Louisiana.  Unfortunately, 
they rely heavily on the court's official opinion and the previously 
mentioned journal articles.  The most useful of these, for this study, is 
Elizabeth Anne Yukins' The Agency of Illegitimacy in Twentieth-Century 
American Literature, which begins with a brief examination of legal 
discourse related to illegitimacy before exploring its appearance in 
several works of American literature. 
Yukins based her research on Justice Douglas' opinion, the early 
journal articles, and quotations taken from the appellant brief, as they 
appeared in those early articles.  Yet, from her reading, she concludes 
that, "It is possible to say that Levy v. Louisiana represents the most 
significant legal breakthrough for the rights of children born to 
unmarried parents in the twentieth century."39 
She begins with the interpretation that Justice Douglas was 
fighting against the fiction of illegitimate children being nonpersons.  It is 
Yukins' belief that the Levy case "arose out of a series of discriminations 
levied against the mother of the children."  Louise Levy was "a poor, 
                                                 
38 Karen A. Hauser, "Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children: New Science Plus 
Old Intermediate Scrutiny add up to the Need for Change," University of Cincinnati Law 
Review 65, (1997): 891. 
39 Elizabeth Anne Yukins, Bastard Claims: The Agency of Illegitimacy in Twentieth-
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black woman" whose "suspect race and gender status" led to W.J. Wing's 
misdiagnosis and dismissal of worsening symptoms.  Yukins' attack 
against Wing's actions is predicated by his presumed whiteness.  It 
should be noted that currently, there is no evidence regarding Wing's 
race.  Regardless, her point is valid.  Louise's race influenced all aspects 
of her life and the lives of her children. 40  Because of the importance race 
played in this case, it is logical to look for information regarding the Levy 
case in books related to race relations in the United States or the Civil 
Rights Era.  Unfortunately, the majority of them are silent regarding this 
case. 
That silence does not detract from their usefulness to this study.  
These works provide significant information related to racial injustice 
and the world that the Levy children and their mother inhabited.  Some, 
such as David Chalmers' And the Crooked Places Made Straight: The 
Struggle for Social Change in the 1960s, do not talk about children or the 
Levy case, despite the fact that they are looking at social change and the 
fight for civil rights.41  Other works, which focus on African-American 
families, such as Harriette Pipes McAdoo's collections of essays, entitled 
Black Families, and Black Children: Social, Educational, and Parental 
Environments, have proven more useful.  Jualynne Elizabeth Dodson's 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 2, 15. 
41 David Chalmers, And the Crooked Places Made Straight: The Struggle for Social 
Change in the 1960s 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991, 
1996). 
 24 
     
"Conceptualizations and Research of African American Family Life in the 
United States: Some Thoughts," delves into the various theoretical 
approaches researchers used while studying African-American families in 
the twentieth century, including the cultural ethnocentric and the 
cultural relativist schools of thought.42 
The cultural ethnocentric school of thought regarding the historical 
study of African-American families started with E. Franklin Frazier's 
work, The Negro Family in the United States.  Frazier believed that 
patterns he discerned within the African-American family stemmed from 
enslavement.  Through the middle of the twentieth century, a number of 
investigators followed in Frazier's wake, their work culminating in the 
Moynihan report.43  Moynihan's work characterized the African-American 
community "with such traits as broken families, illegitimacy, matriarchy, 
economic dependency, failure to pass armed forces entrance tests, 
delinquency, and crime."44  In turn, this report became the basis for 
implementing social policy.  The assumptions that Moynihan made were 
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widely accepted by other scholars.  Moynihan's influence could be seen 
in many works written through the mid-1960s.  Jessie Bernard reported 
in 1966 on the instability of the African-American family and traced the 
increase of illegitimate children to hedonistic ethics.  That same year, 
Seymour Parker and Robert J. Kleiner wrote "Mental Illness in the Urban 
Negro Community."  In 1967, Elliot Liebow looked at "street corner" 
African American men who could not fulfill their familial roles because of 
societal pressure.  A year later, Lee Rainwater looked at matrifocal family 
structures, although he used the term matriarchy.45  These examples, 
and others, of ethnocentric studies assumed that the African-American 
family was dysfunctional and disorganized.  They concluded that it was 
typically fatherless, on welfare, thriftless, and overpopulated with 
illegitimate children.  More often than not, these studies recommended 
ways to "save" these families.  In 1968, Andrew Billingsley took issue 
with these studies, developing the cultural relativist school, which saw 
African heritage as central to the cultural behaviors of African-American 
families.46  Cultural relativist theories offered an improvement over the 
ethnocentricity of Frazier's and other early scholars' work and it 
complemented the growing Civil Rights rhetoric of the late 1960s.  By 
viewing variety within American culture as positive instead of negative, 
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Cultural Relativists validated many aspects of the emerging New Social 
History. 
Since Levy occurred during the complex decade of the 1960s, other 
related historical topics range from legal theory to childhood history.  
However, for the majority of books in these categories that mention Levy, 
authors usually limit their discussion of the case to roughly a paragraph 
in which generalized background information is given and the outcome 
that illegitimate children were "not 'nonpersons'" is presented.47  This 
cursory treatment has deprived scholars of an opportunity to explore 
fundamental concepts, such as how labels affect people legally, how we 
define family, and American culture's changing understanding of 
childhood and children. 
Although Making all the Difference, Inclusion, Exclusion, and 
American Law by Martha Minow offers an excellent legal analysis of 
family law and labeling, it does not address the Levy case.  Minow's work 
provides foundational information regarding the use of labels and 
morality, which is vital to understanding why Levy remains an important 
legal decision.  She opens with Harold A. Herzog's theory that the labels 
we use influence our understanding of ethical and unethical behavior.  
She writes, "Negative labels are especially a problem for members of 
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minority groups or groups with less influence in the society."48  Laws and 
labels define society and create boundaries and categories in an attempt 
to regulate the chaos of daily life.  As a fundamental aspect of Western 
society, these boundaries and legal rules distinguish between 
"competent" and "incompetent," "normal" and "abnormal."49  A detailed 
exploration of those living outside the preferred category can be found in 
Barabara Young Welke's Law and the Borders of Belonging in the Long 
Nineteenth Century United States.  For Welke, people who could not be 
classified as able, white, heterosexual, males, found themselves residing 
on the legal periphery of society.50  
Minow reminds her readers that children, who are traditionally 
seen as legally incompetent, usually fall victim to these arbitrary 
boundaries.51  In fact, by comparing other groups to children, the law 
and the state justified the unequal treatment of those labeled as 
"different."  However, Welke specifically avoids adding age to her 
categories as "children aged out," becoming adults and joining one of the 
other groups that she has included.52  Her focus is on women, members 
of other races, and those defined by law as "disabled in some way."  Yet, 
nonmarital children easily fall into the paradigm she presents.  
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Depending on the jurisdiction the child lived in, the label of illegitimacy 
remained a permanent part of the child's identity, following them into 
adulthood and depriving them of rights that legitimate children would 
gain after reaching the age of majority.  In this way, they remained along 
the "border of belonging," even if they were "able white males" in all other 
respects.  "Illegitimate" becomes a disability under Welke's thesis. 
Minow's work also complements Holly Brewer's By Birth or 
Consent: Children, Law, and the Anglo-American Revolution in Authority.  
Ideas regarding the age at which a person became an adult have always 
been in flux.  Brewer's work explored the shifting definition of "adult" and 
"child" in Britain's pre-Revolutionary American colonies.  The changes 
she discussed delineated those who had authority and could give consent 
from those who did not.53  Beginning with hierarchical status, which was 
assigned at birth during the Middle Ages, society shifted toward 
individual rights as contracts became more important.  "But no one 
claimed that these new ideas would apply to everyone," Minow writes.54 
For Americans in the 1700s, consent derived from competence and 
reason.  Americans drew most heavily on John Locke's treatises, which 
argued that children remained subjected to those in authority because 
they lacked the ability to reason.55  This in turn, coupled with the 
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penchant for equating other groups to children, justified the withholding 
of civil liberties to a variety of people.  Also stemming from this, society 
had traditionally placed those defined as legally "incompetent" under the 
care of "competent" individuals or under the care of the state.  
Reasoning, adult males had a right to equality, and freedom, and could 
legally give consent.  For Welke, law reinforced this privilege.   
Those who lacked the ability to reason, such as children, women, 
and the uneducated poor, did not receive individual rights.  Minow 
summarized the legal implications of equating "different" to "legally 
incompetent" as, 
The competent have responsibilities and rights; the 
incompetent have disabilities and, perhaps, protections.  The 
competent can advance claims based on principles of 
autonomy; the incompetent are subject to restraints that 
enforce relationships of dependence.56 
 
For the study of nonmarital children, this leads to an important 
point.  Namely, that in Western tradition, "responsibility follows only 
from voluntary, knowing, and intelligent choice."  This suggests that a 
child's parents must voluntarily take care of it.  Related to legitimate 
children, the marriage act signifies the voluntary and intelligent choice to 
create a family.  Nonmarital children, because they are born outside the 
marriage, have a tenuous tie to the family and responsibility for them is 
questionable.57 
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As the law creates boundaries around people and groups of people, 
it often reinforces social prejudice.  Minow asks, "Does equality mean 
treating everyone the same, even if this similar treatment affects people 
differently?"  She replies to her rhetorical question, "Law has failed to 
resolve the meaning of equality for people defined as different by the 
society."  Her concern is that society used law to accentuate the 
marginalization of people labeled as different.  An example of the 
inequality created by boundaries can be seen in the way that these 
borders delineated obligation between people, as seen in the lack of 
obligation to care for an illegitimate child.  As Welke's work shows, 
Minow's conclusion is justified:  "Naming differences may deny the 
humanity of those who seem different."  Thus, labeling certain children 
as "illegitimate" may have provided society with the necessary 
justification to deny them equal rights.58 
Decades of legal struggle have diminished the number of groups 
that lack full civil rights.  However, children, married women and those 
deemed mentally deficient remained legally defined as incompetent into 
the twentieth century.59  Levy presents an example of the process Minow 
describes by which Western legal traditions moved from "fixed and 
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assigned status to notions of individual freedom and rights."60  It struck 
a blow against the tradition of labeling children born to unmarried 
parents as different from children born to married parents. 
Yet, as more groups gained legal equality, children remained 
dependent and "incompetent".  Unfortunately, Minow's argument focuses 
on legitimate children who live within a familial structure.  She writes, 
"Children for the most part still stand in official relationships to their 
parents under law, rather than assuming the position of autonomous 
individuals."  But how does a nonmarital child fair under this concept?  
If children born outside of marriage do not belong to a parent, and they 
are not automatically autonomous, how do they relate to the law?  The 
uncertainty about their status may have justified their disadvantageous 
label and unequal treatment.61 
For Minow, the Civil Rights movement represents an attempt to 
remove societal and legal labels that disadvantaged groups of people. 62  
The Levy case occurs within the context of the Civil Rights Era.  
According to Minow, "The right to due process is special, among other 
rights, in its specific call for communication and attention to the 
individual's dignity."63  When people step forward to claim rights for 
children, it opens a dialogue within the community.  Through this 
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dialogue, attention is given to an individual and a legacy is created.  This 
legal analysis provides a deeper look at the role that labels and difference 
played in Levy's history.  However, it is important not to lose sight of the 
children and the family at the heart of this thesis. 
Beyond legal analyses, works on the history of childhood appear to 
be the most likely place to find further information on the Levy case.  
However, these often use only Douglas' official opinion as a source.  
Typical of this treatment is John Witte, Jr.'s The Sins of the Fathers: The 
Law and Theology of Illegitimacy Reconsidered.  This book offers a 
definitive history of religious law and illegitimacy, which is equally 
important to understanding the importance of the Levy case.  Witte 
begins with ancient traditions and moves forward through history until 
he reaches the late-twentieth century.  Much of this study's presentation 
of ancient traditions relies upon Witte's work.  However, while Witte 
provides a good general discussion of the Levy case's basics, he does not 
go any deeper than Douglas' opinion.  Although a more complete 
background to the case can be found in Steven Mintz' Huck's Raft, A 
History of American Childhood, his overall treatment of Levy is less than 
a paragraph in length.64  Mintz mentions the Levy case in conjunction 
with a discussion regarding “erasing the stain of illegitimacy.”  His 
                                                 
64 Witte, The Sins of the Fathers, 158-159; Steven Mintz, Huck's Raft, A History of 
American Childhood, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 333.  The fact that 
these books provide little detail on Levy v. Louisiana should not be misconstrued.  Both 
are excellent scholarly works that contribute greatly to our understanding of childhood 
and childhood legal history. 
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information regarding the Levy case comes from the court records of 
Weber v. Aetna 406 U.S. 164 (1972) and New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. 
v. Cahill 411 U.S. 619 (1973), two important cases that built upon 
Levy.65 
Levy, which was heard in 1968, was one of the cases heard by the 
Supreme Court while Earl Warren served as Chief Justice.  Attempting to 
find information regarding the Levy case in works devoted to the Warren 
Court proves equally fruitless.  Books that do mention the case, like the 
journal articles, focus on legal analysis and criticism rather than history.  
As with the scholarly works on childhood history, the treatment is brief 
when it does appear.  Lucas A. Powe Jr.'s  The Warren Court and 
American Politics, is representative of the literature. 
Powe's goal is to “[revive] a valuable tradition of discussing the 
court in the context of American politics,” and “replace stereotypes 
regarding the Warren Court.”66  Despite these goals, for the purpose of 
this study, Powe's work falls short in that it does not address Levy v. 
Louisiana.  However, Powe does include some aspects of children and 
childhood as they pertained to the Warren court.  This can help 
illuminate some of the cultural underpinnings that helped shape the 
court's Levy decision. 
                                                 
65 Mintz, Huck's Raft, 333. 
66 Lucas A. Powe Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics, (The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass, 2000), xi. 
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Powe opens by quoting Morton J. Horwitz's The Warren Court and 
the Pursuit of Justice, stating that the Warren Court was “increasingly 
recognized as a unique and revolutionary chapter in American 
Constitutional history,” and that the court “regularly handed down 
opinions that have transformed American society.”67  After exploring the 
Warren Court from 1953 to 1968, Powe concludes that the court was 
indeed revolutionary in that it broke with tradition and "was engaged in a 
fundamental discarding of older law."  When Earl Warren replaced Fred 
M. Vinson as chief justice, the U.S Supreme Court had overruled eighty-
eight cases.  When Warren stepped down, another forty-five cases had 
been overturned.  "And the changes were in virtually all constitutional 
areas," Powe reminds his readers, supporting Horwitz' theory.68 
Perhaps the best treatment of the Levy case and the Warren Court 
is found in The Warren Court in Historical and Political Perspective, edited 
by Mark Tushnet.  This series of essays explores each justice of the 
Warren Court and his important decisions.  It is in this context that 
Melvin I. Urofsky mentions Levy in his essay “William O. Douglas as 
Common Law Judge.”  Although Urofsky's analysis of the Levy case is 
brief, he uses it and its results to analyze Douglas' rationale for finding in 
favor of the Levy children.  Urofsky finds both a simple rationality test 
and heightened scrutiny in Douglas' opinion, neither of which is stated 
                                                 
67 From Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1998), 3. 
68 Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, 485-86. 
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outwardly.  This lack of a bold statement, Urofsky suggests, is the reason 
why Douglas' opinion has been seen as vague.  Urofsky quotes Douglas' 
opinion at length before comparing the Levy decision to Labine v. Vincent 
401 U.S. 532 (1971), which found against acknowledged illegitimates in 
favor of legitimate children regarding intestate property.69  However, for 
Urofsky, Douglas was the right kind of justice because he asked the right 
questions:  “Is it right?  Is it just?  Is the rule fair?” 
The one thing all of these authors, regardless of subject, agree 
upon is that Levy was a landmark decision with far-reaching 
consequences.  Yet, a thorough, historical examination of its place in 
childhood legal history, along with an explanation of why it was a 
landmark case, does not exist.  More importantly, by limiting source 
material to the official court opinion and a few law review articles, 
scholars have neglected an intricate history that provides an opportunity 
to explore American culture at an important moment in time.  Thanks to 
the rhetoric used in arguing the case, Levy helps illuminate society's 
struggle over the definition of "family" and fears related to its perceived 
disintegration and the apparent decline of American values.  Wrapped up 
in the cultural upheaval of the late 1960s, it also creates another way to 
access racial stereotypes that fueled the policy debates of the decade.  
From a legal standpoint, Levy marks an important point in the 
                                                 
69 Melvin I. Urofsky, “William O. Douglas as Common Law Judge,” in The Warren 
Court in Historical and Political Perspective, Mark Tushnet ed. (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1993), 77. 
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and it sits at the beginning 
of a fundamental change in how the court viewed children's rights, 
pointing the way toward an enhanced belief in the individual equality of 
children. 
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CHAPTER 2 
'ILLEGITIMATE' CHILDREN THROUGH THE AGES   
Living in twenty-first century America, Douglas' opinion and the 
decision in Levy v. Louisiana may seem uneventful.  In our current 
society, illegitimacy is rarely defined as a societal problem.  Despite this, 
children who are born to unmarried parents are still perceived as deviant 
in some areas of society.  As this chapter will show that opinion was 
long-standing and can be traced through Western Culture, beginning 
with early religious traditions.  Although the laws and traditions related 
to the legitimacy of children often left nonmarital children at a 
disadvantage, through the years, various people, ranging from church 
leaders to legislatures, attempted to lessen the detrimental impact the 
stigma of illegitimacy had upon the children bearing that label.  A survey 
of these laws and traditions shows that Levy was not the first time people 
attempted to limit the impact these laws had on nonmarital children.  
Yet, Levy does mark the first time that the U.S. Supreme Court explored 
the nature of the label that had been placed upon nonmarital children 
and it illustrates how the court grappled with the unspoken realization 
that labels dehumanized people.  More importantly, various past 
attempts at redefining "illegitimate" children were short lived.  For Levy, 
the reinterpretation of nonmarital children's status paved the way for 
future cases that would continue to expand the rights of children. 
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Before Levy and the string of court cases that came after it, 
nonmarital children were often punished for the circumstances 
surrounding their birth.  In essence, the law treated them as if they were 
as guilty as their parents were.1  The laws that were challenged by the 
Levy case, which relegated illegitimate children to second-class 
citizenship, have a long history in Western culture.  The laws described 
here are generalizations by necessity.  Every jurisdiction held its own 
laws and traditions.  Additionally, laws may not be a precise indication of 
cultural practice and the population in any jurisdiction may have ignored 
official statements regarding the treatment of illegitimate children.2 
According to John Witte, in the Western tradition, "bastard" 
children were both filius nullius and filius populi.  They belonged to 
everyone and no one, living in a "legal limbo." 3  This opinion is supported 
by Jenny Teichman, who wrote in her philosophical exploration of 
illegitimacy, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, that, "Generally 
speaking, until the twentieth century illegitimate children did not count 
as kin."  Children who were born out of wedlock often could not inherit 
from fathers who died intestate.  In fact, some jurisdictions blocked 
parents from willing any property to their illegitimate children.4  
However, illegitimate children could claim some charity and support, 
                                                 
1 Witte, Sins of the Father, 158.   
2 For an enlightening exploration of written law vs. traditions see Hendrick Hartog 
"Pigs and Positivism," Wisconsin Law Review vol. 1985, (1985):899-935. 
3 Witte, The Sins of the Fathers, 3. 
4 Jenny Teichman, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1982), 104. 
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though they could not hold high office, sue, or testify in court.  Because 
of these disadvantages, many in the lower classes suffered from chronic 
poverty, neglect, and abuse, a fate many in the upper classes managed to 
avoid.  Because of these problems, some parents smothered their 
illegitimate children or allowed them to die of exposure at birth.5  The 
justification for this treatment of children born outside a traditional 
marriage could be found in Western religious traditions. 
Teichman explained that under Roman law, Canon law and 
English common law, for a child to be legitimate, it had to be conceived 
in wedlock, born in wedlock, or conceived and born in wedlock.6  All 
others were illegitimate.  Traditionally, there were four ways a child who 
was born illegitimate could become legitimate.  The first way was by act 
of King or Parliament.  If the child was not nobility, in general, they could 
not rely upon this method.  The subsequent marriage of the parents 
could also legitimate a child, as could adoption in some jurisdictions; it 
is important to remember that under English common law, adoption was 
not permitted.  Finally, in some jurisdictions, it was possible for the child 
to sue for legitimation.7 
 However, ancient Jewish teachings regarding illegitimate children 
were so harsh that rabbis did all they could to keep children from being 
classified as bastards.  Only children who were born of adultery or incest 
                                                 
5 Witte, The Sins of the Fathers, 3. 
6 Teichman, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, 28. 
7 Ibid., 34. 
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fell under this classification.  And adultery, in this instance, referred only 
to "proven sexual intercourse between a Jewish man and a Jewish 
woman who was validly betrothed or married to another Jewish man at 
the time of the sexual union." 8  Therefore, the laws excluded all non-
Jews and women who were not validly married or promised to another.  
Additionally, the child would only be considered a bastard if its parents 
could never legally marry.  This further limitation meant that only 
children born of incest were illegitimate because so long as marriage was 
possible, even if divorce or death had to occur first, then the child would 
be legitimate.  Children who were illegitimate faced only one legal 
restriction; they could not marry legitimately born Jews and were limited 
to marrying other bastards, Gentiles, or converted Jews.  In this way, the 
Jewish faith hoped to keep their rabbis free of sin.  The Jewish faith 
contained few of the stigmas that later Christian and Roman law would 
impose upon illegitimate children.  For example, all children, regardless 
of status, inherited from their fathers.9 
Early Christian teachings were similar to Jewish ones.  In addition, 
they used the New Testament to counter some of the harsher laws 
spelled out in Deuteronomy.  While the church expanded the laws that 
regulated sex, marriage, and family, early Christians did not expand 
                                                 
8 Witte, Sins of the Fathers, 17-19, 21. 
9 Ibid., 17- 22. 
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upon illegitimacy until the medieval period.10  From the beginning of 
Christian teaching, only sex that was part of a heterosexual 
monogamous marriage was considered licit.  All other forms were sinful.  
Procreation was the main goal of the marriage and by the end of the 
fourth century it was the only reason to have sex.  This limited view of 
sex and marriage led church officials to condemn sex outside of marriage 
and those who performed it.  However, they did not condemn the 
children of these illicit unions.11 
In addition to these early religious teachings, ancient civilizations 
also took an interest in regulating the legitimacy of children.  For 
example, in ancient Rome, where many laws related to legitimacy arose, 
the question of illegitimacy could be used as a means to control 
citizenship and property.  Legitimate children inherited from their fathers 
while illegitimate children inherited from their mothers.  This later 
changed in the fourth through sixth centuries, under the Christian 
emperors.  By that time, Christianity had added a moral patina to the 
status of "illegitimate."  Because of this change, nonmarital children were 
cut off from any maternal inheritance and the position of illegitimates in 
society worsened.  Even before the rule of the Christian Emperors, 
nonmarital children lived outside the authority and care of a 
paterfamilias, the family unit that grew up around the father's authority.  
                                                 
10 Witte,Sins of the Fathers, 27. 
11 Ibid., 28, 36-37. 
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Because they existed outside this family unit, they had no legal recourse 
if they were abused, did not inherit any of their father's property, and 
could not be counted for taxation benefits or other rewards.12 
The moral aspect of the early Christian laws began as an attempt 
by Christian leaders to expand the laws that regulated sex, marriage, 
and family.  Teichman posits that questions surrounding illegitimacy 
used birth status to control sexual relationships.  By labeling children, 
"illegitimate," it allowed law to control who had sex.  Following her logic, 
because laws existed to say who should or should not mate, it followed 
that some children should not exist. 13  However, in most cultures, the 
child's illegitimate status could be changed, "by the subsequent marriage 
of his parents provided that the parents had been free to marry each 
other at the time of his conception."  This rule existed under canon law 
as well and every European country, except England, allowed children to 
become legitimate through their parents' subsequent marriage.14 
In addition to these options for securing legitimacy, the tradition of 
abandoning children to the elements and adopting children who had 
been exposed in this way provided an opportunity for removing the 
stigma of illegitimacy from a child.  In his classic work The Kindness of 
Strangers: The Abandonment of Children in Western Europe from Late 
                                                 
12 Witte, The Sins of the Fathers, 49-52; John Boswell, The Kindness of Strangers: 
The Abandonment of Children in Western Europe from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance, 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 72, note 60. 
13 Teichman, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, 5, 7-8. 
14 Ibid., 35. 
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Antiquity to the Renaissance, John Boswell explores this aspect of 
illegitimacy.  If the parent claimed that they had found the child exposed 
and adopted it, then the child would be considered legitimate in many 
circumstances.15  A great deal has been written regarding abandoned or 
foundling children, but there are no reliable statistics regarding whether 
or not these children were originally legitimate or illegitimate.  Some 
estimates place the rate of illegitimate children as high as 60% of those 
abandoned.  Generally, abandoned children were placed in hospices, 
foundling homes, or simply exposed to the elements and left to die.16  It 
is important to remember that nonmarital children were not the only 
ones abandoned.  Children were abandoned for a number of reasons 
including famine, poverty, and because the mother could not care for 
another child at that time. 
Whether parents abandoned or kept their nonmarital children, the 
medieval Christian Church was deeply troubled by the number of 
illegitimate children in Europe.  The great lengths that medieval 
canonists went to in order to classify these children according to the sin 
that had produced them suggests this level of concern.17   The canonical 
decrees of 906, compiled by Regino of Prüm, were the first of many 
                                                 
15 Boswell, Kindness of Strangers, 108. 
16 Ibid., 16-17, note 30 and note 34. 
17 Some examples of the laws related to the classification of children, the procedure 
that a person would take to legitimate a child, and the punishment for having an 
illegitimate child, can be found in Pope Gregory IX's 1234 decree entitled "Which 
Children Are Legitimate."  This decree included several categories of illegitimacy ranging 
from "A natural child born to two unmarried individuals" to the offspring of 
"unbelievers."  Quoted in Witte, Sins of the Fathers, 84-85. 
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collections to influence the Christian Church.  In addition to imposing 
penalties on parents for infanticide and negligence, it asked that mothers 
leave their illegitimate children at the church instead of exposing them.  
Children left with the church were eligible for adoption.  Others resided 
in institutions for the poor or ill, or managed to survive on their own.  
Boswell suggests that the majority may have been raised as servants.18 
In the thirteenth century, laws regarding marriage and clerical 
celibacy led to the creation of new categories of illegitimate children.  A 
priest's children were considered illegitimate since priests were not 
allowed to marry.  Boswell writes, 
It proved difficult to dissuade the clergy from producing 
offspring, so the church adopted the expedient of making life 
difficult for the children themselves, either in the hopes that 
this would in the end discourage their fathers, or simply as 
punishment of the parents through the children.19 
 
Legally, the children of priests were considered slaves, though it is not 
likely that they actually lived as such.  They could not enter religious 
orders, marry, or inherit.20  In reality, these efforts by the church to 
regulate marriage and produce legitimate children had the opposite 
effect; more children became illegitimate, though often only through legal 
technicalities such as changing rules of consanguinity.  During the High 
Middle Ages, "children of awkward parentage" were often given to the 
church through oblation.  "By the fourteenth century the influx of 
                                                 
18 Boswell, Kindness of Strangers, 222-24. 
19 Ibid., 342-43. 
20 Ibid., 341.  
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illegitimates, primarily the children of priests, was staggering," Boswell's 
research showed.  In 1346, for example, the Master-General of the 
Dominicans asked for dispensation from illegitimacy for 200 
Dominicans.21 
Laws in the Middle Ages that addressed illegitimacy remained 
focused on punishing the sin of the parents.  It was hoped that by 
making the punishments harsh enough, church leaders could curb the 
sexual interactions of their church members.  Secular changes in the law 
also joined these canonical revisions.  As urban populations grew and 
women could more easily care for themselves and their illegitimate 
children, the stigma against illegitimacy faded somewhat, though their 
position in society remained unequal to that of legitimate children.22 
Legal commentators in medieval Europe reworked Roman law in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as well.  These laws divided 
illegitimate children into two main groups, natural and spurious 
illegitimates.  Natural illegitimates were born of concubines or from 
premarital sex or simple fornication.  Spurious illegitimates arose from 
adulterous or incestuous relationships or from rape and other forms of 
illicit sex, such as prostitution.  The circumstances of their births stained 
these illegitimate children with the crimes that had been committed by 
                                                 
21 Boswell, Kindness of Strangers, 302, note 22, 342-43. 
22 Witte, The Sins of the Fathers, 89; Boswell writes that the fading stigma 
surrounding nonmarital children stems from a more lenient opinion of adulterous love, 
which he sees evinced in erotic poetry and treatises on "Courtly Love." Boswell, 
Kindness of Strangers, 274-75. 
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their parents.  Because of the sins related to their birth, the law placed 
limits on the amount of property spurious illegitimates could own.  It 
also restricted their rights to inheritance, contracts, and the use of the 
courts.23 
Although the changes in illegitimacy law were given special 
support by Christian theology, Witte's more recent reading of the verses 
demonstrates that there was no Biblical reason to disadvantage 
illegitimate children.  Because sex out of wedlock was sinful according to 
the church, the verse, "The sins of the fathers shall be visited upon their 
children (Ex. 20:5, 34:7; Num. 14:18; Deut. 5:9)," appears to support 
prejudicial treatment of bastard children.  However, Witte shows that 
there are far more verses within the Bible that support shielding 
illegitimate children and he further argues that the "sins of the fathers" 
verses do not relate to illegitimacy or adultery at all.  Exodus's two verses 
relate to the sin of idolatry and do not distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate children.  All four verses stipulate that God's vengeance will 
be enacted upon generations who do not worship Him, regardless of their 
birth status.24  Punishing children for the sins of their parents was also 
limited in Biblical teachings.  In fact, ancient Biblical laws specifically do 
not punish children for the actions of their parents.  "The fathers shall 
not be put to death for the children, nor shall the children be put to 
                                                 
23 Witte, The Sins of the Fathers, 67-68. 
24 Ibid., 4-6. 
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death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin" 
(Deut. 24:16).25 
The Protestant Reformation also influenced the lives of nonmarital 
children.  Countries under early modern Protestant rule often remained 
true to Roman law, dropping much of the medieval reworking that the 
Catholic Church had done related to marriage, legitimacy, and 
illegitimacy simply because it was Catholic.  Simultaneously, however, 
Protestants did little to improve the lives of nonmarital children.  As 
Catholic institutions, such as monasteries and orphanages, were 
dismantled, they were not replaced by Protestant equivalents.  The loss 
of the Catholic institutions in these lands meant that children born out-
of-wedlock had fewer possibilities for support.26 
Finally, English law differed from the Roman law found on the 
continent in that it began as two separate bodies of law, one canonical 
and one secular, which eventually merged to form the English common 
law that later took root in the American colonies.  The canonical aspect 
of this law dealt with the sins that the parents had committed to create 
an illegitimate child, along with the child's life, while the secular aspect 
confined itself to laws regarding how an illegitimate child could inherit 
property.  After the Reformation, these two bodies became one law that 
grappled with not only the parents' sins but also the legal rights of the 
                                                 
25 Witte, Sins of the Fathers, 4-6. 
26 Ibid., 102-103. 
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illegitimate child.  In this way, the child became responsible for the sins 
that the parents had committed.27  One of the tenets of English common 
law was the principle of filius nullius, child of no one, which became the 
root of American law. 
Despite the fact that they were filius nullius, there is evidence that 
in 1576, parents were required to support their nonmarital child in some 
way in order to limit the financial burden imposed upon local state 
entities.  Later, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William 
Blackstone wrote,  
And really any other distinction [between a bastard and 
another man], but that of not inheriting, which civil policy 
renders necessary, would, with regard to the innocent 
offspring of this parent's crimes, be odious, unjust, and cruel 
to the last degree. 28    
 
Therefore, according to Blackstone, the only distinction that should have 
differentiated legitimate and illegitimate children was a question of 
inheritance.   
Instead, laws that limited a child's access to financial support or 
inheritance, continued to disadvantage children born outside of church-
sanctioned marriages.  However, the presence of filius nullius was 
tempered within English common law by the presumed legitimacy 
                                                 
27 Witte, Sins of the Fathers, 106-07. 
28 Quoted from Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 485-486 vol. 1 
(1757), found in Krause, "Why Bastard, Wherefore Base?" 60.  However, it is important 
to remember that Blackstone may have had his own agenda when he wrote his 
Commentaries, and they may not reflect actual law but rather the direction he wished to 
take law.  Regardless, his treatises greatly influenced the American Colonists.  See 
Brewer, By Birth or Consent, 10-11 and Welke, Borders of Belonging, 27.  
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doctrine.  Only with undeniable proof that the husband could not be the 
father, would a child be considered illegitimate if the mother was 
married.29  Additionally, there were two legal ways to limit this 
discrimination against nonmarital children.  The first was definitional.  
By redefining who was legitimate, the law could mitigate the 
consequences of out-of-wedlock births.  The second way was by 
alleviating specific hardships.  Yet, England's law was slow to change.  It 
was not until 1926 that children could be legitimized by the subsequent 
marriage of their parents.30 
Although informed by Roman traditions, American law draws most 
heavily on England's common law traditions, such as the concept of filius 
nullius.  In America, the only obligation the parent had toward the child 
was financial support.31  However, in his work "Illegitimacy and Bridal 
Pregnancy in Colonial America," Robert Wells explored colonial laws 
related to illegitimate children and marriage.  He admits that sources are 
scarce but what is available suggests that illegitimacy rates, though 
possibly negligible, increased in the colonies through the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.32  While colonial churches remained concerned 
                                                 
29 Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-
Century America, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 201. 
30 Quoted from Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 485-486 vol. 1 
(1857), found in Krause, "Why Bastard, Wherefore Base?" 60; Teichman, Illegitimacy, An 
Examination of Bastardy, 35. 
31 Mintz, Huck's Raft, 163. 
32 Robert V. Wells, "Illegitimacy and bridal pregnancy in colonial America," in 
Bastardy and its Comparative History.  Peter Laslett, Karla Oosterveen and Richard M. 
Smith eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 354. 
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with the punishment of sin, civil leaders grew more concerned with the 
economic aspects of caring for illegitimate children.33  Over time, 
according to Wells, governments in the colonies "lost interest in 
prosecuting sexual sinners so long as the children of sin were financially 
cared for."34 
After the American Revolution, states often reworked their laws 
based on the ideological shift towards the importance of individual rights 
that had occurred in the new country.  As Brewer has argued, this shift 
related to John Locke's theories of the consent of the governed.  Only 
reasoning adults could give consent to be governed and earn the right to 
participate in government.  As the list of those who were able to give 
consent increased, the sphere of civil rights expanded to include them.  
This expansion caused many long-held English laws to change through 
the 1800s and into the early 1900s.  Hints of this shift toward 
individualism can be seen in the U.S. Constitution, particularly Article 
Three and its prohibition of bills of attainder and corruption of blood.  
For Blackstone, corruption of blood began as a Norman penalty 
and involved forfeiture of property to the feudal lord.  Under Saxon 
custom, the forfeiture went to the king for a year and a day and then was 
returned to the heir except in cases of treason when the property was 
lost for good.  Under the common law, corruption of blood began as the 
                                                 
33 Grossberg, Governing the Hearth, 198-99. 
34 Wells, "Illegitimacy and bridal pregnancy," 356. 
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penalty of attainder.  Attainder allowed for the confiscation of all a 
person's property and the loss of his ability to inherit or leave anything to 
any heir.  According to Blackstone's definition, attainder exhausted and 
"dammed up" hereditary blood, stopping rights from flowing from 
ancestors to descendants, corrupting it.  This included property rights.  
In his article on corruption of the blood, Stier concludes that, "The result 
of this punishment was to preclude children of an attainted person from 
inheriting," from their parents.35 
Corruption of blood is found in Article Three of the United States 
Constitution, which stated that although Congress could declare the 
punishment for treason, no attainder would "work corruption of blood, or 
forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted."  In his article, 
Stier explains that there is no debate surrounding the rationale for 
including this clause and his research shows that the Framers of the 
Constitution included this provision because they intended to, "prevent 
children from suffering the wrongs of their parents."  Children who faced 
corruption of blood rulings faced "denial of rights to inheritance, welfare 
benefits, education, and other critical resources."  After the 
Constitution's ratification, several state constitutions also contained 
corruption of blood clauses.  Ultimately, this constitutional principle, 
"prohibit[ed] discrimination against children on the basis of parental 
                                                 
35 Stier, "Corruption of Blood," 729, note 11. 
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conduct."36  Yet, laws that targeted nonmarital children continued.  
Despite Article Three, American society remained true to the traditions 
that had been transplanted from Europe.  Children born outside of a 
traditional marriage could not inherit property and the alleviation of 
corruption of blood only affected legitimate heirs.  Centuries later, this 
Constitutional principle was touched upon within the Levy brief, 
although the possible unconstitutionality of laws related to the treatment 
of nonmarital children appears less influential than the precedent set 
forth by earlier court cases. 
Beyond the Constitution, reform in the United States continued 
through the 1800s.  The changes in law in the United States during the 
nineteenth century illustrate a shift in culture from an emphasis on 
community and family to one of individualism.  In his work Governing the 
Hearth, Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America, Michael 
Grossberg explores this shifting debate, focusing on the transformative 
power of a concern for child welfare, that permeated Western culture.37  
As time passed, the laws related to illegitimate children lost their focus 
on punishing illicit sex to limiting the financial obligations these children 
placed upon the state.  Because of this focus, the establishment of 
                                                 
36 Stier, "Corruption of Blood," 730, 736.  Stier cites James Madison from The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Max Farrand ed. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1911, 1937) and Federalist 43.  Federalist 43 can be found at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_43.html [accessed on 9/30/10]. 
37 Grossberg, Governing the Hearth, 196. 
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paternity became all-important and paternity suits "skewed toward 
conviction."38 
Laws that separated illegitimate children from their families gave 
way to concerns that the state should not provide financial support to 
these children and their parents.  These barriers were lessened in many 
ways through the nineteenth century, first by recognizing common-law 
marriages as valid.  Additionally, legislatures brought in the civil law 
tenet declaring that children of annulled marriages would remain 
legitimate.  The states also slowly adopted the civil law provision that 
legitimated children after their parents married.  The Spanish Law that 
granted fathers the right to legitimize their children by notary also 
appeared in some jurisdictions.39 
In the United States, mothers became solely responsible for their 
children seven years and younger, rather than allowing fathers to take 
control of their upbringing.  Grossberg highlights three reasons for this 
change.  The first stemmed from the fact that nonmarital children were 
attached to their mothers more readily than they were attached to their 
fathers.  Second, "womanhood" became conflated with "motherhood" and 
led to preferred maternal custody, so long as the mother conformed to 
the stereotypical "good mother" supported by society.  Finally, child 
welfare doctrine preferred children stay with their mothers.  By the 
                                                 
38 Grossberg, Governing the Hearth, 198-99. 
39 Ibid., 200-204. 
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1830s, these social underpinnings "established direct lines of inheritance 
between the mother and her illegitimate child," though they varied by 
jurisdiction.  Grossberg explains this occurrence, 
The illegitimate child began to have its own set of guaranteed 
rights and responsibilities.  Legislators and judges carved 
out that place by using the welfare of the child and the rights 
of the mother to sever the link between punishment for 
sexual immorality and rights to family membership.  
Illegitimacy never ceased to blight children's lives.  But 
bastards with the "good fortune" to be born to women able 
and willing to care for them were afforded unprecedented 
opportunities to escape some of the degradation of birth 
outside wedlock.40 
 
As the decades passed and society changed, illegitimacy became 
less threatening to order, morality, and the family.  Most changes in 
legitimation laws applied to nonmarital children who acquired enough 
parental financial support to avoid various poor laws.  In contrast, 
impoverished families often lost custodial rights to their nonmarital 
children.  Post-1850, the renewed interest in strengthening the family led 
to more changes in illegitimacy laws.  By century's end, according to 
Grossberg, law in the United States focused on whether the individual or 
the family was more important to society.  Most changes in law at this 
time relied on state intervention to improve the lives of poor illegitimate 
children.41 
New ideas about improving the lives of children prompted many 
states to reconsider their laws related to nonmarital children.  However, 
                                                 
40 Grossberg, Governing the Hearth, 209, 212, 214-15. 
41 Ibid., 218, 226, 228. 
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the rights extended to this group of children were limited.  As previous 
societies had done, states often improved the lives of nonmarital children 
by redefining who was legitimate.  Prior to the Civil War, many states 
helped children by recognizing common law marriages and by 
legitimating children born from annulled marriages or to parents who 
married after the child was born.42 
After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
also had an impact on the treatment of nonmarital children as its 
provisions for equal protection combined with the earlier principles 
forbidding corruption of blood.43  Eric Foner succinctly addresses the 
importance of this amendment in his work, Reconstruction: America's 
Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877.  The Fourteenth Amendment became 
arguably the most important addition to the U.S. Constitution as the 
courts grappled with its meaning.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
fundamentally changed the nation, making "all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States," citizens of the United States.  Because 
of this, the states could not abridge their rights without due process nor 
could they deprive people of equal protection.  Although ambiguous, at 
the heart of the amendment lies the principle that all people deserve 
equal treatment from the law.44 
                                                 
42 Mintz, Huck's Raft, 163. 
43 Stier, "Corruption of Blood," 734. 
44 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1988), 257-258. 
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 As has been noted, changes in illegitimacy law in the United States 
began in colonial times.  By the end of the nineteenth century, a great 
concern for children, both legitimate and illegitimate, had appeared, 
joined seamlessly with other movements of the Progressive Era.  A part of 
this movement was the creation of children's aid societies and ultimately 
a child-saving movement.  However, because these societies met with 
resistance from parents when they attempted to change how parents 
raised their children, they made little real progress.  One such agency 
was the United States Children's Bureau, formed in 1912.45  It was 
charged with the task of investigating and reporting on various aspects of 
childhood, including desertion, juvenile courts, diseases, child 
employment, and laws that affected them.  In this capacity, the 
Children's Bureau grew to occupy a central position, providing 
authoritative information on all aspects of childhood.  One of the 
Children's Bureau's main investigative figures was Florence Kelley.46 
Near the end of the nineteenth century, Kelley had documented 
many of the changes that had occurred in illegitimacy laws through the 
1800s.  The improvements she saw included equal treatment with 
legitimate paupers, access to training in public schools, changes in child 
labor laws, and "prohibitions on buying liquor and obscene literature."  
                                                 
45 Michael Grossberg, "Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United States, 
1820-1935," in A Century of Juvenile Justice, Margaret K. Rosenheim, et. al, eds. 
(Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 27. 
46 Ibid., 28-29. 
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Because of these improvements, Kelley noted, the only disadvantage 
faced by nonmarital children related to inheritance.47 
As the belief that government had an obligation to care for children 
grew through the early twentieth century, many states enacted special 
children's codes.  By working to improve the individual nonmarital 
child's life, reformers like Kelley shifted responsibility away from the 
family and onto the state.48  In a 1915 survey, the United States 
Children's Bureau estimated that 32,400 illegitimate children were born 
every year, approximately 1.8 percent of all live births.  These illegitimate 
children "face[d] the world with few resources beyond the meager aid 
provided under poor laws or by charities," the Bureau reported.  The 
previous year, the Children's Bureau reported that only thirteen percent 
of illegitimacy cases included paternity proceedings and only seven 
percent of illegitimate children received financial support from putative 
fathers.49 
To improve the lives of illegitimate children, reformers relied on 
foster homes and adoption.  Additionally, they attempted to strengthen 
marriage and the family in order to avoid the creation of illegitimate 
children.  Bradley Hull stated that,  
                                                 
47 Grossberg, Governing the Hearth, 228-29; Kelley quoted from Florence Kelley, "On 
Some Changes in the Legal Status of the Child Since Blackstone," International Review 
13 (1882), 96. 
48 Grossberg, Governing the Hearth, 229. 
49 Ibid. 
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If you are going to make, as far as the economic basis is 
concerned, the status of the unmarried mother and her child 
equal to that of the married woman and her child, you are 
going to do something to unsettle society.50 
 
Grossberg writes that this struggle between supporting the family or 
supporting the individual combined with the fear of "undermining 
paternal property rights [and] encouraging blackmail and sexual 
immorality," in order to tilt law toward support of the family.  The 
constant theme of these debates was, according to Grossberg, "the 
persistent willingness to sacrifice the interests of the nonmarital child to 
a majoritarian vision of society's larger needs."  In 1926, Emma O. 
Lundberg illustrated this belief, writing,  
[I]n practically all states, up to the present time, it has been 
held incompatible with the interest of the legal family to 
place the child of illegitimate birth upon an equality with the 
children born in wedlock with respect to his claims upon the 
father.51  
 
The laws enacted in the early twentieth century greatly expanded 
the right to support and inheritance that illegitimate children could 
claim.  After the 1930s, many states reformed both their criminal and 
civil laws to give children, both legitimate and illegitimate, greater 
protection from exploitation and abuse.  For nonmarital children, one of 
the greatest changes in their favor was the return of the Roman practice 
that allowed them to inherit from their mothers.  Despite these changes, 
the stigma of illegitimacy remained.  For example, into the 1950s and 
                                                 
50 Grossberg, Governing the Heart, 232-33.  
51 Ibid., 233. 
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1960s, the status of illegitimacy was apparent on the child's birth 
certificate, which were often stamped or marked "illegitimate" while some 
recording agencies used a different color paper for printing the birth 
certificates of nonmarital children.52  Because many changes were at the 
state level, improvements in the lives of nonmarital children were not 
uniform. 
Throughout the centuries, Western tradition has held children 
born outside a marriage separate from those born to parents within one.  
For many religions, the presence of an illegitimate child signified illicit 
sexual relationships, both those deemed taboo by the culture, such as 
incest, and those deemed sinful by the various church doctrines.  When 
it proved difficult or impossible to regulate the promiscuity of adult 
church members, leaders moved to enforce behavioral codes by imposing 
disadvantages upon illicit children.  It is impossible to say what the 
success rate may have been for this strategy.  However, because these 
traditions are so timeworn and nonmarital children continued to play a 
role in society, it is safe to conclude that they did not work as effectively 
as the religious leaders may have hoped. 
As with many other aspects of religion, the Enlightenment also 
affected the treatment of nonmarital children.  This is seen in the 
changes that occurred in the United States.  Moreover, because of 
federalism, these changes could differ from state to state, especially in 
                                                 
52 Mintz, Huck's Raft, 173, 286; Witte, Sins of the Fathers, 152. 
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Louisiana.  Unlike most states whose laws were grounded in the English 
common law tradition, Louisiana’s law developed differently.  Its roots lay 
in the Roman civil law tradition, as developed in France. To complete the 
historical overview of illegitimacy, it is necessary to examine the roots of 
Lousiana’s law in French history. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FRENCH CONNECTION 
While common law principles and the rhetoric of individual rights 
took root in the American colonies, Louisiana's law traveled a different 
path.  These differences, at least in part, formed the basis for Louisiana's 
struggle against the United States Supreme Court.  Levy v. Louisiana, for 
the state of Louisiana, was just another example of federal "meddling."  
To understand this antagonism, it is necessary to explore some aspects 
of Louisiana's chaotic legal history.  Of greatest importance is the fact 
that Louisiana's law was not based on English common law but on 
French and Spanish law, which was originally derived from Roman civil 
law.  The specific law that Levy targeted was Article 2315 of the Civil 
Code.  As part of his article, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy 
v. Louisiana: First Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity," Harry 
D. Krause argued that the standard interpretation of Article 2315, which 
the lower courts had applied, came about because of an "accident" 
related to Louisiana's murky legal history.1  Krause described the law's 
history as a "tragicomic historical accident."  According to Krause, the 
confusion surrounding the interpretation of Article 2315 was complete 
because French law allowed illegitimate children to recover for the 
                                                 
1 Krause, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring," 342. 
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wrongful death of their mother and even their father.2  In other words, if 
Louisiana had remained true to French law, the Levy children may not 
have been denied wrongful death benefits.  Yet, the state did not.  
Instead, Louisiana's laws grew from French beginnings into a jungle of 
confusion. 
Because French law provided the foundation for Louisiana's law, 
this chapter begins with a discussion of Pre-Revolutionary France and 
the problems related to illegitimacy found in that society.  Through this 
discussion, it is possible to gain an understanding of how law formed in 
the former French colony of Louisiana.  From this beginning, the chapter 
summarizes Louisiana's unique history, showing that the antagonistic 
relationship the state had with the federal government did not begin with 
the Civil Rights Era, or even with the Civil War, but with the Louisiana 
Purchase. 
The French connection with nonmarital children begins quite early 
in France's history.  Jenny Teichman offers a philosophical discussion of 
legitimacy and illegitimacy, based in anthropological understandings of 
cultural constructs.  In this way, her work becomes a gateway into 
                                                 
2 Krause, "Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring," 345, note 31.  Krause directs 
readers to these French cases: Erhard v. Uttwiller, [1809-11] S. Jur. II 223 (Cour 
d'appel, Colmar, March 3, 1810); Rolland v. Gosse, [1815-18] S. Jur. I 540 (Cass. civ. 
Nov. 5, 1818) regarding tort actions and to these sources regarding illegitimate children 
and death benefits: Min. publ. et cons. Scherriff v. Sansen, [1954] D. Jur. 176 (Cour 
d'appel, Douai, Dec. 10, 1953); Beinheir Ben M'Bark et Cie v. Dame Bousquet, [1954] D. 
Jur. 777 (Cour d'appel, Rabat, Nov. 12, 1954). See 1 Mazeaud and Tunc, Traite 
Theorique et Pratique de la Responsabilite Civile Delictuelle et Contractuelle 372 et seq. 
(5th ed. 1957). 
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understanding why French legal principles play an important role in the 
Levy story.  Because it is anthropological and relies on language's  role in 
the construction of culture, her approach draws attention to the possible 
etymology of the word "bastard," which comes from the French bast, 
meaning luggage or baggage, and the suffix ard.  Therefore, the bastard 
child was literally baggage.3  The etymology suggests that nonmarital 
children held an extraneous and unwanted position in society. 
Under France's old regime, 1648 to 1788, the status of illegitimate 
children varied by region.  However, for the most part, the king's courts 
provided for them.  Statistics related to nonmarital births in France 
during the old regime are lacking.  In his work on French illegitimacy 
law, French Revolutionary Legislation on Illegitimacy, 1789-1804, Crane 
Brinton suggests that by extrapolating from the number of Paris 
foundlings before the French Revolution, it is possible to gain a general 
impression regarding how many nonmarital children lived in Paris.  In 
1775, in Paris, there were 6,505 foundlings and 19,550 registered births.  
However, according to Brinton, these numbers are too high, and he noted 
that foundlings were brought to Paris from the surrounding countryside.  
                                                 
3 Teichman, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, 1-2.  Teichman's definitions 
are taken from the Oxford English Dictionary.  She also includes the possibility that the 
term refers to a saddle or saddle-pack, implying a temporary bed instead of a marriage 
bed as the place where these children were conceived.  For more on linguistic 
anthropology and the creation of culture through the use of language see Linguistic 
Anthropology: A Reader, Alessandro Duranti ed. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001). 
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Additionally, "foundling" does not necessarily mean "illegitimate."4  
During the old regime, Brinton concluded, 
In the absence of statistics, it is safer to rest on general 
opinion, and there seems to have been no great notice taken 
of any change in the proportion of illegitimate births, no 
crusade to end a growing nuisance, no conspicuous reform 
movement directed at this particular issue of illegitimacy.5 
 
By 1789, French nonmarital children had moved up society's 
hierarchical ladder, losing the status of serfs or outlaws, which society 
had attributed to them during the medieval period.  Although they still 
occupied a lower hierarchical position than legitimate children did, they 
could own property, marry, and transmit property to their legitimate 
children, even create wills in many regions of France.  They could also 
demand support from both parents.  In theory, tradition excluded them 
from office but, with the prince's consent, they could attain most 
positions including mayor or judge.  Additionally, with the bishop's 
permission, they could hold minor holy orders and the Pope could open 
major orders to them.  Originally, nonmarital children in France did not 
belong to either parent's family and could not inherit from their mother 
or father.  However, by the early 1600s, according to Brinton, "bastards 
could inherit a share of their mother's estate."  Additionally, during the 
old regime, "Filiation could be claimed in legal proceedings against either 
                                                 
4 Crane Brinton, French Revolutionary Legislation on Illegitimacy, 1789-1804, 
Harvard Historical Monographs, vol. IX (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), 
11. 
5 Ibid. 
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mother or father," though the most common course of action involved 
single mothers suing putative fathers on behalf of the child.6 
French communities addressed illegitimate children and their 
status in various ways.  The documents from the Old Regime that 
Brinton used for his study showed the range of treatment that 
illegitimate children faced.  French villagers wrote, "We ask that bastards 
be given a civil and political status, like that which they enjoy in several 
neighboring kingdoms."  The Third Estate of St. Alban in Brittany 
lamented the "unfortunate state of bastards, who are not the cause of 
their birth," and asked that they be allowed to inherit from their mothers.  
However, other French citizens "wished only to see illegitimate children 
adequately nourished."  Most regional laws regarding nonmarital 
children in pre-revolutionary France concerned themselves with 
providing support for nonmarital children, ignoring the possibility of 
changing their legal status.7 
Prior to the nineteenth century, if more than one man could 
potentially be the father of an illegitimate child, each of them could be 
held responsible for supporting that child.  The illegitimate child's 
mother could sue for paternity and so long as the putative father was 
unmarried and paternity could be proven, he was forced to maintain the 
                                                 
6 Brinton, French Revolutionary Legislation, 6- 7. 
7 Ibid., 17-18. 
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child.8  However, there were exceptions and qualifications to establishing 
paternity.  For example, before the court decided paternity, any possible 
father could be held liable for lying-in expenses.  While an illegitimate 
child could inherit from his mother, he could only inherit from his father 
if there were no legitimate children.  Finally, if legitimate heirs existed, 
the illegitimate child could inherit only one-sixth of his father's estate.9 
The French courts often decided paternity based on the public and 
private writings of the putative father(s).  To be held responsible for a 
child, there had to be some form of written acknowledgement that the 
child belonged to him.  However, putative fathers also had an 
opportunity to prove misconduct on the woman's part, calling their 
responsibility for the child into question.  If the sexual relationship was 
adulterous or incestuous in any way, the court found no actionable claim 
and the children could never be legitimized and had no claim to either 
parent's estate.  Even after paternity was proven, the man was only 
responsible for support until the child's majority, "including the teaching 
of a trade not 'abject'," and for damages to the mother.  Children who 
remained illegitimate had no right to a father's name or inheritance.10 
During the Old Regime, legitimation was possible in two ways.  
Either the king could declare the child legitimate -- usually only done for 
                                                 
8 Brinton, French Revolutionary Legislation, 8; Teichman, Illegitimacy, An 
Examination of Bastardy, 154-56. 
9 Teichman, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, 154-56. 
10 Teichman, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, 154-56; Brinton, French 
Revolutionary Legislation, 8-9. 
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nobility and in cases where marriage was impossible -- and by the 
subsequent marriage of the parents.  This second form of legitimation 
stemmed from canon law.  In Brinton's opinion, this "was an obvious 
effort of the mediaeval [sic] church to encourage the institution of 
marriage."11  Legal discrimination against nonmarital children was seen 
by Brinton to buttress monogamous marriage, which had a long tradition 
in France, beginning with the Roman Paterfamilias and the Christian 
emphasis on monogamy.  Despite the legal discrimination, there is no 
reason to think that the nonmarital children of France lived a harsh life, 
Brinton concluded.  Although they did suffer from the lack of 
inheritance, it is possible that the parents gave their illegitimate children 
gifts and voluntary legacies.  However, as the middle class encroached on 
the aristocracy, tension over illegitimate birth may have increased and 
prejudice against illegitimate children may have spread.12 
After the Revolution, France busily adopted new laws that 
addressed the Rights of Men and nonmarital children were part of that 
reform.  Poetically, Brinton wrote, "The syllogism lay ready:  All men are 
created equal; bastards are men; therefore bastards are the equals of 
other men."13  Along with sentimental literature, Enlightenment treatises 
may have spread humanitarian leanings through the population, 
improving how French society saw nonmarital children.  For example, 
                                                 
11 Brinton, French Revolutionary Legislation, 9-10.  
12 Ibid., 10, 12, 14. 
13 Ibid., 19. 
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote, "Children are born of love, not of 
marriage, and Nature knows no illegitimacy."14  The previous 
disadvantages placed upon illegitimate children disappeared as the 
National Assembly expanded individual rights to Rousseaus's "Natural 
Children."15  From 1790 to 1793, a debate over whether or not to do 
away with illegitimacy laws altogether occurred.  During the debate, 
proponents for illegitimate children argued that, "the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate people was founded on aristocratic, irrational, 
priestly notions."16  Assembly members suggested that children could be 
legitimate so long as they could prove that their parents had lived 
together.  Those in favor of this suggested that "the abolition of all 
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children 'is but the 
consequence of principles of equality established for all citizens'."  
However, the other side of the debate was anxious over changing 
inheritance law and proof of paternity.17  They worried that the 
illegitimate child's ability to inherit from a putative father would 
undermine the social foundations.  Even at this time, policy-makers 
feared that illegitimate children, who were proof of infidelity, would cause 
the downfall of the family and through a weakened familial structure, 
                                                 
14 Brinton, French Revolutionary Legislation, 16, 19. 
15 Ibid., 22. 
16 Teichman, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, 154-56. 
17 Ibid. 
  
69 
     
damage to society as a whole.  These same arguments would surface 
again centuries later in Levy.18 
In France, the Law of 12 Brumaire grew out of these debates, 
becoming law on November 2, 1793.  It declared that illegitimate children 
had the same rights as legitimate children regarding inheritance, so long 
as they could prove paternity.  Proof was also necessary to claim 
inheritance from a mother.  This proof consisted of written evidence that 
a parent had maintained the child as his or her own.  The law 
differentiated between illegitimate children of married fathers and those 
of unmarried fathers.  If the father was married, he paid one-third the 
maintenance paid by unmarried fathers.  The Law of 12 Brumaire 
represented the most favorable law toward illegitimate children of all 
French revolutionary legislation.  However, it had little effect.  According 
to Brinton, "The courts usually ignored that part of it which dealt with 
inheritance, […] the Commission of Civil Administration soon cancelled 
parts of the law by issuing directives."  One of those directives, passed in 
1795, forbade all paternity suits.19 
The ineffectiveness of the Law of 12 Brumaire lies within the 
debate that surrounded its creation.  Many French citizens felt that 
supporting laws against illegitimate children meant not supporting the 
                                                 
18 Brinton, French Revolutionary Legislation, 23-24. 
19 Teichman, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, 154-56. 
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revolution.20  Laws differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate 
children were identified with aristocrats and the clergy, two groups that 
most French citizens saw as anti-revolutionary.  This side of the debate 
also hoped that by legitimizing all children, people would be less likely to 
commit infanticide or abandon them.  Some members of the National 
Assembly felt that by removing legal barriers, people would be more likely 
to police their own behavior, becoming more moral.  Finally, they hoped 
that republican virtue would ensure that parents took responsibility for 
their children.21 
Despite enlightened sentiments, support for reform dwindled 
quickly.  The move to improve the lives of nonmarital children only lasted 
until law makers began to fear that nonmarital children were a threat to 
the French family structure and the rules regarding inheritance.  
Regardless of the laws and their complexities, the courts "were not at all 
inclined to permit illegitimate children to share inheritances on an equal 
basis with legitimate children."  Legitimizing "natural children" was seen 
as an attack against the family, inheritance, and property rights.  More 
legal changes occurred after Napoleon Bonaparte took control of the 
country.22 
In 1803, the Napoleonic Code took effect.  It included harsh new 
laws related to illegitimacy.  This body of law formed the basis of French 
                                                 
20 Brinton, French Revolutionary Legislation, 32-33. 
21 Ibid., 34. 
22 Ibid., 41, 48; Teichman, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, 154-56. 
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law, which, in turn, would influence law in French colonies, such as 
Louisiana.23  Under the Code, unmarried women were not provided with 
lying-in expenses and could not sue for paternity except in cases of 
abduction.  Inheritance could only pass to the illegitimate child if the 
father voluntarily confirmed paternity.  Filiation proceedings could be 
brought against a mother so long as the child was not a product of 
adultery or incest.  However, the legitimation or recognition of children 
born of adultery or incest was forbidden under all circumstances, even if 
their father acknowledged them; these children could not inherit 
anything.  Additionally, article 338 of the Code Napoléon stated, "the 
natural child, even though acknowledged by the father, cannot have the 
rights of a legitimate child."24  Because of this, "natural children" could 
not inherit unless there were no legitimate heirs, although an exception 
existed that allowed them proportional shares of what legitimate relatives 
received from an estate.  Only after the legitimate children were cared for 
could "natural children" hope for support and training in a trade.  
Because of these provisions, a single mother and her child had to rely on 
friends, her family, or the state for support, leading to a precarious 
existence under the Napoleonic Code.25 
                                                 
23 Meeusen, "Judicial Disapproval of Discrimination against Illegitimate Children," 
120. 
24 The Code Napoléon can be found at http://www.napoleon-
series.org/research/government/c_code.html. 
25 Brinton, French Revolutionary Legislation, 50-51; Teichman, Illegitimacy, An 
Examination of Bastardy, 154-56. 
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Rachel Fuchs explores the lives of these women and their children 
in her book Abandoned Children: Foundlings and Child Welfare in 
Nineteenth-Century France.  "Child abandonment was a serious problem 
in nineteenth century France," Fuchs wrote, "and the problem was most 
acute in Paris, the nation's largest and fastest growing city."  Nearly half 
of all illegitimate children were abandoned each year at Paris' only 
foundling home, Hospice des Enfants, according to Fuchs' research.26  As 
with Boswell's work, it is important to remember that not all abandoned 
children were nonmarital.  However, according to Fuchs, nearly 95% of 
the children abandoned at the hospice were illegitimate at the beginning 
of the century.  By 1900, this had dropped to approximately 85%.  Fuchs 
also notes that these high percentages may be due in part to presumed 
illegitimacy.  Women could abandon their babies anonymously during 
the early years of the century, though many of them did provide some 
identification.  If the mother did not list a father, the baby was presumed 
illegitimate.  Also, if the mother and father had different surnames or if 
the parentage was unknown, the child was listed as illegitimate.27 
Perhaps in response to the large numbers of abandoned children, 
social reformers and state officials publically deplored women who 
abandoned their children.  To the officials, abandonment was an 
expeditious solution to the problem of an unwanted child that would 
                                                 
26 Rachel Fuchs, Abandoned Children: Foundlings and Child Welfare in Nineteenth-
Century France.  (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 1984), xi. 
27 Fuchs, Abandoned Children, 66. 
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allow the woman to return to a promiscuous and immoral life.  Perhaps 
driven by this fear, in 1837, the government increased financial aid to 
unwed mothers, which may have led to a decrease in the abandonment 
of nonmarital children.  This policy continued through the 1800s, the 
amount increasing in the 1850s.  However, this support was not 
intended to aid the mother and child but to discourage abandonment, 
which would have cost the state more, financially.28 
These French laws and traditions migrated across the Atlantic 
Ocean as French settlers took up residence near the mouth of the 
Mississippi River on the Gulf of Mexico.  Several excellent works have 
been written on Louisiana's legal tradition.  George Dargo's Jefferson's 
Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Traditions, which explores the 
clash between Louisiana's civil law and the common law that 
predominated in much of the rest of the United States, is a foundational 
text on the subject.  Vernon Valentine Palmer, who described Louisiana 
as a "mixed jurisdiction" because of the intricate weaving of English 
common law and Roman civil codes, has also written extensively on law 
in Louisiana.  Further appreciation for the legal system that informed the 
lower courts in the Levy decision requires a brief exploration of the 
creation of Louisiana's mixed jurisdiction and the legal culture that 
created Article 2315, which was first enacted in the early 1800s, and was 
influenced, as all Louisiana law was, by the Napoleonic Code. 
                                                 
28 Fuchs, Abandoned Children, 64, 77, 79. 
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A tense mixture of races, ethnicities, and cultures marks 
Louisiana's social history.  For years the Louisiana territory had been 
ruled by first the French and then the Spanish.  After the United States 
acquired the territory, the old settlers retained their French and Spanish 
culture, an aspect of the territory that troubled officials of the United 
States.  In addition to taking territory, Americans brought their common 
law traditions with them, seeing them as the basis for "American liberty 
and political independence."29 
Although French settlers remained in the area, New Orleans 
attracted many Americans.  In 1803 and 1804, a population boom 
occurred in southern Louisiana and New Orleans.  Americans formed the 
largest group of immigrants; they were drawn to the area for a number of 
reasons that included agricultural opportunities and navigable 
waterways.  In addition to the immigrants, French-speaking refugees, 
slaves, and slave traders, converged on the area.  Natural increase also 
augmented the population; families in New Orleans and Louisiana were 
"notoriously large."30 
The influx of settlers allowed Louisiana to apply for statehood only 
a few years after the territory's cession.  It was a diverse population, 
equally divided along racial lines.  At the start of 1807, 26,000 
European-Americans, 4,000 free African-Americans, and 23,500 African-
                                                 
29 George Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Traditions, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 11. 
30 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 6. 
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American slaves called lower Louisiana home. 31  The city of New Orleans 
was more than half African-American at that time.  In his work, Crucible 
of Reconstruction: War, Radicalism, and Race in Louisiana, 1862-1877, 
Ted Tunnell stated that prior to the Civil War, African-Americans 
occupied several social classes in New Orleans and Louisiana, forming 
the largest community of freemen, free African-Americans, in the Deep 
South.32 
The freemen of New Orleans "held themselves aloof from slaves," 
especially those who worked on plantations.  Urban, Catholic, and 
comprising the majority of New Orleans' elite class, the French freemen 
were also less likely to follow the legal regulations of the French Code 
Noir.  Combined, these circumstances provided the French freemen with 
more freedom than their African-American counterparts had.  They 
owned property, both real and personal, including slaves, contracted 
legal marriages, were allowed to testify against European-Americans in 
court, learned trades and professions, and participated in music and the 
arts.  All their achievements "rested on a solid economic base," according 
                                                 
31 For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to make a distinction between 
"Americans," people living on the North American continent, and "the United States," 
that particular country.  In this way, "African-Americans," refers to people who were 
descended from Africans, living in North America, in territory controlled by France, 
Spain, and then the United States. 
32 Ted Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction: War, Radicalism, and Race in Louisiana, 
1862-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), 63.  Another 
important work that addresses the changing lives of African-Americans in Louisiana is 
Rebecca J. Scott's Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba After Slavery, (Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). 
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to Tunnell.33  According to Dargo, when Louisiana became a territory of 
the United States, 
They had full freedom to enter into business contracts and to 
own and transfer property, and they had full competence in 
civil litigation against whites and blacks alike.  Even in 
criminal prosecutions free blacks could give evidence against 
whites.34 
 
Additionally, African-Americans played an important role in the 
area's military history.  While the Spanish had been in control of the 
territory, they had formed African-American military units.  The practice 
continued under French rule and when the United States took control, 
the African-American units remained intact, despite the fear of a "black 
revolt."35  In 1815, when the British threatened New Orleans, the 
battalion that the city called up in order to strengthen the defense was 
mostly gens de couleur.  Yet, the freedoms enjoyed by this minority group 
and "their special status in Louisiana law and society," provided them 
with a reason to "preserv[e] some elements of the established [French] 
regime" after the territory fell under the United States' jurisdiction.36  In 
fact, a majority of the French-speaking community in Lower Louisiana, 
regardless of race, supported the effort to retain French culture and 
French institutions when the Americans attempted to change them.  
                                                 
33 Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction, 66-69, 75.  
34 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 7. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 7. 
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After 1803, as American encroachment continued, small groups of 
Spanish and Germans settlers also allied with the French communities.37 
Despite the fact that there was great ethnic and racial diversity, 
most tension was two-sided, between the old French settlers and the 
newly-arrived settlers from the United States.  However, ethnic 
background did not guarantee loyalty and, because there were no 
political parties, people often took sides based on interest rather than 
race or ethnicity.38  These differences were of great importance.  
Louisiana joined the United States at a time when "American identity" 
was fragile.  Citizens of the young nation saw differences in culture and 
custom as more important than anything they might have had in 
common.  Because of this, the U.S. government balked at the idea of 
leaving Louisiana and New Orleans as they had found them and 
attempted to "improve" their customs and their laws.  They did this by 
introducing common law, thereby creating Palmer's "mixed 
jurisdiction."39 
Palmer defines the term "mixed jurisdiction" as an area where the 
system of law is built upon both common law and civil law.  Mixed 
jurisdictions begin when a civil law nation transfers territory to a 
common law nation.  In the case of Louisiana, France and Spain 
transferred the land to the United States.  In his essay, "The French 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 8-9.  
38 Ibid., 9-11.  
39 Ibid., 12. 
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Connection and the Spanish Perception: An evaluation of French 
influence on Louisiana civil law," Palmer delineates four periods of 
French law in Louisiana.  The first of these lasted from 1699 to 1762 and 
was marked by the enforcement of the Coutume de Paris and the royal 
Ordonnances.  During this period, Louisiana law was relatively stable, 
based solely upon French principles.40 
Palmer's second period, the Spanish period, began in 1762 and 
ended in1803.  During this period, "France ceded the province to Spain 
and Madrid officially replaced French law with Castilian law."  According 
to Palmer, this created a "legal dualism" in Louisiana.  When the U.S 
took control, the official Spanish law remained in effect.  However, 
although the Spanish held power in the area for thirty years and legally 
replaced both French law and the French language, French culture 
prevailed.41 
The transfer of Louisiana and New Orleans from France to the 
United States, and the confusion surrounding the retrocession of 
territory from Spain to France as part of the secret Third Treaty of San 
                                                 
40 Vernon Valentine Palmer, "Two Worlds in One: The Genesis of Louisiana's Mixed 
Legal System, 1803-1812," in Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction, ed. Vernon 
Valentine Palmer, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1999), 23; Vernon Valentine 
Palmer, "The French Connection and the Spanish Perception: An evaluation of French 
influence on Louisiana civil law," in The Louisiana Civilian Experience: Critiques of 
Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction,(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2005), 51; 
Vernon Valentine Palmer, "Introduction," in Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed 
Jurisdiction, ed. Vernon Valentine Palmer, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1999), 4. 
41 Palmer, "The French Connection and the Spanish Perception," 51-53; Palmer, 
"Two Worlds in One," 29. 
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Ildefonso, left the government of the territory in tatters.42  On November 
30, 1803, the French prefect abolished all Spanish courts and did not 
replace them with French ones.  Approximately one month later, 
December 20, 1803, France transferred the territory to the United States.  
When William C. C. Claiborne, the provisional governor for the territory, 
arrived, he declared that all laws in force, "whatever they were," would 
remain in force while he rebuilt the legal system.43 
Claiborne had to do this from scratch.  He created a court of pleas, 
with seven judges, to hear civil cases, a Governor's Court, with himself as 
judge, to hear criminal cases, and he ordered the military commandants 
to act as judges for outlying districts.  The Act of March 26, 1804, 
marked Congress' attempt to fill the void left by the loss of French control 
of the area.  It allowed the President of the United States to appoint a 
governor, a council of thirteen "notables" to aid the Governor, and three 
justices for a Superior Court, which would have original jurisdiction for 
civil and criminal cases.  The act also allowed the governor to appoint 
inferior court judges and justices of the peace.  More importantly, the act 
provided staple common law guarantees, such as the writ of habeas 
                                                 
42  The Third Treaty of San Ildefonso, signed October 1, 1800, between France and 
Spain, was signed in secret and stated, in part, that six months after its provisions had 
been met that the colony of New Orleans and the territory of Louisiana would be 
retroceded to France.  (Spain had possessed the area since 1763).  However, the treaty 
never described the exact boundaries of the retroceded territory and there was debate 
over whether or not the conditions were fully met.  When the retrocession occurred, it 
created chaos in New Orleans.  Later, when France sold the Louisiana territory to the 
United States, Spain contested the boundaries.  The full text of the treaty can be found 
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ildefens.asp. 
43 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 105. 
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corpus, bail, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments.  However, the Act also stipulated that, "the laws in force 
were continued in force until altered or modified by the legislature."  This 
clause actually left the laws of the territory in confusion.44  Were the 
courts to follow customary law, in this case, French, not the English 
common law the judges knew, or were they to follow the Castilian law 
that the Spanish had put in place and that the citizens ignored? 
While French settlers and their allies out-numbered Americans 
when the United States first took control, their potential for growth and 
their attempt to overturn French custom worried the leaders of the 
French-speaking communities in Lower Louisiana.  Their approach 
differed from the Spanish, who had not tried to change the government 
or customs of the area when they briefly took possession of the city.  
Both culturally and legally, the French and Americans were 
contradictory.45 For example, cultural and political divisions could be 
seen in the press; newspapers were French, English, or English and 
French.  Legally, the jurisdiction was also divided with lawyers leaning 
toward civil or common law as well.46  Under French and Spanish civil 
law, property that was brought into a marriage belonged to the 
community.  Although the husband controlled any gains made through 
this communal property, the marriage was seen as a contract between 
                                                 
44 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 105-06. 
45 Ibid., 10. 
46 Palmer, "Two Worlds in One," 31. 
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equals and both husband and wife retained ownership of the property 
they brought into the marriage.  Upon its dissolution, the property was 
split evenly between the parties.  In contrast, under common law, when a 
man and woman married, the woman ceased to exist legally; she became 
feme covert and lost a great deal of her right to own property.  If she was 
widowed, she was only entitled to one-third of the inheritable property.47 
More importantly for the purpose of this study, under English 
common law, children born out-of-wedlock remained illegitimate 
regardless of subsequent marriage while civil law reversed this practice 
and a marriage at any time subsequent to birth would make the child 
legitimate.  Dargo noted, "The classic common law writers maintained 
that civilian rules governing legitimation were indecent because they 
struck at the sanctity of matrimony."  Those who supported the civil code 
argued, "The rules permitting legitimation were derived from canon law, 
and that natural morality dictated that children should not be penalized 
for the indiscretions of their parent."48  Under common law, an 
illegitimate child had no right of inheritance but under civil law, the child 
could inherit, so long as the mother and father married at some point in 
time.  In addition, illegitimate children under the civil law could inherit 
from their mother or father, or both, so long as the parents had no 
                                                 
47 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 12. 
48 See Blackstone's Commentaries as quoted in Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 13, 
note 48; also see Jean Brissaud's A History of French Private Law trans. Rapelje Howell, 
(Boston, Little Brown, 1912; reprint, 1968), p. 213-215, as quoted in Dargo, Jefferson's 
Louisiana, 13, note 49. 
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legitimate children with a claim to the property, and if the father had no 
other wife.  Finally, if illegitimate children did not inherit, they held a 
claim to alimony from the legitimate heirs.  Civil law included the 
principle of forced heirship; a parent was limited to one-fifth of their 
property being disposable how they saw fit.  The rest had to be given to 
their heirs.  In contrast, common law allowed a man to dispense with his 
property however he wished.  In this, Dargo stated, 
the common law's individualism and its tendency to locate 
decision-making power in the mature, reasoning adult stood 
out in sharp relief from the Civil Law which here, as 
elsewhere, upheld the family unit and the claims of family 
members when willful parental action might defeat them.49 
 
Compared to the common law that prevailed in much of the United 
States, Louisiana's civil law appeared quite lenient.  In fact, Louisiana's 
law influenced other states as the nineteenth century continued and 
many states adopted aspects of it, softening their legal treatment of 
illegitimate children.50 
Between 1803 and1828, jurists and legal commentators attempted 
to codify Louisiana's disparate laws, marking Palmer's third period of 
Louisiana legal history.  During these years, two procedural codes (1805 
and 1828), two civil codes (1808 and 1825), and a crimes act (1805) were 
enacted.  According to Palmer, "The Legislature and its appointed 
                                                 
49 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 13. 
50 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 13; Robert A. Pascal, "Louisiana Succession and 
Related Laws and the Illegitimate: Thoughts Prompted by Labine v. Vincent," Tulane Law 
Review 46 (1971): 167-183. 
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jurisconsults drafted and enacted [these] civil codes borrowing heavily 
from the Code Napoléon" and other French legal treatises.51 
When control over Louisiana transferred from France to the United 
States, the private law was left civil while the public law became 
common.  For French settlers in Louisiana, the imposition of common 
law, which remained tied to the legal concepts born during feudalism, felt 
like a step backward.  Philosophically, Dargo argued, the two bodies of 
law were also dissimilar.  Common law had its roots in the higher courts 
of justice and "case law maintained its position of primacy."  As cultural 
changes occurred, judges became "creative lawmakers" in order to keep 
up with rapid changes in business and commerce. 52  Civil law in 
Louisiana, however, "was rooted in a tradition that looked to agencies 
other than law courts for definitive statement of the law, new or old."  In 
common law, the jury rather than the judge determined the facts of a 
case while under civil law the evidence was evaluated by trained jurists.  
Many Louisianans, not just those in the legal profession, perceived these 
legal incongruities as a threat.53 
After taking control of the territory, authorities in Washington D.C. 
and Louisiana "strongly favored" a change in the legal system to the 
common law.  "But the weight of the French and Spanish culture upon 
the common citizen," the population discrepancies, and "the energetic 
                                                 
51 Palmer, "The French Connection and the Spanish Perception," 52. 
52 Palmer, "Two Worlds in One," 24; Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 14-16. 
53 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 15-16, 18-19. 
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remonstrance" of the French creoles made the task difficult, if not 
impossible.  Officials believed that by introducing the judicial structure of 
the common law first, people would more readily accept common law 
itself.  Yet, in his position as governor, Claiborne worried that changing 
the judicial structure too quickly would prompt resistance.54  John B. 
Prevost, appointee to the Superior Court, agreed with the governor.  He 
wanted to establish common law but realized that doing so too quickly 
would be even worse than the tangled legal system that was being used 
in the newly acquired territory.  Prevost desired a written reference that 
detailed the current legal system, feeling that it would simplify the task 
of changing those laws.  Claiborne opposed the committee that Prevost 
suggested for the task and the project languished. 
In 1804, several citizens voiced their disapproval of the territorial 
judicial system in the Louisiana Remonstrance, which was delivered to 
Washington D.C. that winter.  Among other things, the document 
showed that local citizens were uncomfortable with English being the 
official language of the court, did not approve of oral arguments, objected 
to parts of common law tradition, and were troubled by confused judges 
who could not navigate the tangle of Spanish, French, civil, and common 
law.  Unsatisfied with the results of the Remonstrance, the citizens of 
lower Louisiana also sought statehood in an attempt to preserve their 
culture, though their application was denied.  This denial hinged, in part, 
                                                 
54 Palmer, "Two Worlds in One," 27; Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 106, 110.  
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upon President Thomas Jefferson's distrust of Louisianans.  He felt that 
living under the influence of papists and monarchists had not prepared 
them for self-government and understanding republicanism.55 
In 1808, the American James Brown and French jurist Louis 
Moreau Lislet were finally able to write up a code that "solidified the civil 
law in the Orleans territory."  Their code "represented a crucially new 
kind of civil law, one purged by the French Revolution of the feudal 
elements found in previous French and Spanish law," according to 
Palmer.56 
Palmer's final period, the modern era, began in 1825 and 
continues to the present.  It is marked by various attempts to reform 
Louisiana's laws, which peaked in the mid-twentieth century.57  Levy v. 
Louisiana is only one of many cases that pitted the United States' federal 
government against the state of Louisiana.  A quick scan of any index to 
the Supreme Court will show an unusual amount of cases that include 
"v. Louisiana" as part of their name.  In part, this can be attributed to the 
North-South dichotomy of the African-American Civil Rights movement 
and the conservative versus liberal political agenda at the time.  
However, this survey of Lousiana's history shows that antagonism 
                                                 
55 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 116-118.  The full text of the Louisiana 
Remonstrance can be found at http://artsci.wustl.edu/~landc/html/2075.html; 
Palmer, "Two Worlds in One," 32. 
56 Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 113-114; Brown and Lislet's Digest, published in 
1808, can be found in full at 
http://www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?geaux=digestof1808.home; Palmer, "Two Worlds in 
One," 35. 
57 Palmer, "The French Connection and the Spanish Perception," 51-53. 
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between the two bodies of government has existed since the area fell 
under United States' control in the early 1800s. 
One of the defense's main points during Levy was that "child" as it 
appeared in Article 2315 meant only legitimate children.  According to 
Krause, that interpretation began with the case of Lynch v. Knoop 118 
La. 611, 43 So. 252 (1907), in which, the mother of an illegitimate child 
was denied wrongful death benefits for the death of her child.  Focusing 
on inheritance rights, the court ruled that since Article 2315 was a 
"derogation of the common law," it required strict interpretation.  
However, the basic provisions of the French law, as seen in the first 
sentence of Article 2315, allowed a "tort right of action to a dependent," 
according to Krause.  Krause wrote that Louisiana had rejected this 
French interpretation and adopted the common law view instead, 
"holding that without a specific statute no action could lie for wrongful 
death."  Although he described this as an accident, because of 
Louisiana's mixed jurisdiction status and the chaotic birth of its Civil 
Code, the cause behind the mixed interpretation is understandable and 
not accidental.  Krause's interpretation of Article 2315 and the tangle of 
illegitimacy laws relevant to the Levy case addressed other aspects of 
Louisiana and French law.  This included the provision that required 
mothers to acknowledge their illegitimate children, as Louise had done.  
"Elsewhere, the illegitimate child's relation to his mother usually is 
legally complete upon birth," Krause concluded. 
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As this summary shows, Levy was not the first attempt to improve 
the lives of nonmarital children from a legal standpoint.  The arguments 
on both sides of the case were neither novel nor innovative.  Norman 
Dorsen's rhetoric echoes the French Revolutionaries' attempts to improve 
the lives of "natural children."  The U.S. Constitution, in both Article 
Three and the Fourteenth Amendment, provided him with a foundation 
from which to build the attack against Article 2315.  Simultaneously, the 
defendants' position, that it was necessary to discourage promiscuity and 
illicit sex by differentiating between children born in a marriage and 
those born outside a marriage, came from ancient traditions.  Preserving 
the family and society through this distinction was so ingrained in 
Western culture that few questioned the mistreatment and 
discrimination of children labeled "illegitimate." 
The disadvantages that nonmarital children faced branded them 
second-class citizens, draping them with a criminality they did not earn 
by their own actions.  As Witte argues, the status offense of "illegitimate" 
did not meet the requirements to be labeled as a crime.  It was not done 
voluntarily on the part of the child, nor was it done intentionally (mens 
rea), knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.  Despite the ancient fears 
about illegitimacy being a threat to society, in actuality, being born 
outside a traditional marriage did not cause or threaten harm to a victim 
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or to society.58  Even today, the harm is done to the nonmarital child and 
their family, who may still suffer from subtle forms of discrimination and 
poverty; no harm threatens the traditional family built around a 
traditional marriage. 
If Levy and its arguments represent just one more attempt to 
change long-held beliefs, why do scholars label it a landmark case?  Why 
is it important in American legal history and childhood history?  When 
compared to past attempts at lessening the legal burden upon 
nonmarital children, Justice Douglas' opinion regarding their 
personhood questioned the very act of labeling them.  Perhaps it is that 
question that helped Levy create a precedent for the equality of all 
children.  Another aspect of Levy's importance lies in its social context.  
It came before the U.S. Supreme Court as the African-American civil 
rights movement crested, drawing on statistics that showed an 
overwhelming majority of nonmarital children in the United States were 
African-America.59
                                                 
58 Witte, The Sins of the Fathers, 6. 
59 The Bureau of Public Assistance, Illegitimacy and its Impact on the Aid to 
Dependent Children Program, (Washington D. C., April, 1960), 4, 9, 12-13. 
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CHAPTER 4 
'WELFARE QUEEN' HYSTERIA INFORMS 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL POLICY 
In addition to the legal confusion found in Louisiana and the long-
standing traditions within Western culture that influenced the creation of 
those laws, the world that the Levy children inhabited grew out of 
Louisiana's past, stereotypes regarding African-American culture, and 
the entrenched racism that marked the Civil Rights Era.  This chapter 
delves into the cultural milieu that surrounded the Levy family, 
highlighting the stereotypical African-American single mother and the 
near hysteria that informed the political debate regarding how to combat 
a perceived rising tide of African-American illegitimate children.  This 
concern, perhaps much of it inspired by the migration of African-
Americans out of the South and into other areas of the country, in turn 
informed public policies. 
Bitter struggles, both physical and political, accompanied the 
emancipation of African-Americans after the Civil War.1  While African-
Americans in New Orleans occupied a wide range of socio-economic 
positions prior to the Civil War, from members of the urban elite to 
plantation slaves, their lives changed dramatically in the late 1800s and 
                                                 
1 Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction, 5. 
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early 1900s.2  "The Reconstruction Acts, the Louisiana Constitution of 
1868, and the laws of the Radical legislature defined Louisiana as a 
biracial society," Ted Tunnell wrote, and many European-Americans in 
the Deep South did not adjust to the new situation.  They feared "Negro 
rule" and race wars, a concern that had permeated the South for 
decades.3  Sugar plantations act as the focus for exploring these changes 
in Rebecca J. Scott's Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after 
Slavery.  Slavery was replaced by sharecropping as land owners resisted 
leasing land to freedmen.4  Additionally, debates over labor relations 
became entangled with those over citizenship as people broached the 
topic of African-American suffrage.  For example, in 1867 African-
American males were allowed to vote, causing some European-Americans 
to boycott local elections for the Constitutional Convention.  Despite this 
protest, the convention represented a cross-section of Louisiana.5 Yet, by 
the 1880s, Scott writes, "men of color had been muscled out of most 
public offices," though African-Americans continued to organize and 
exert power locally through unions, such as the Knights of Labor, and 
Masonic lodges.  Labor strikes by field hands, which were supported by 
African-Americans who had moved away from the fields, brought 
                                                 
2 See Welke, Borders of Belonging for the legal justification of these changes.  James 
W. Loewen also wrote on the nadir of racial relations in the early twentieth century in 
his work, Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American Racism, (New York: The 
New Press, 2005). 
3 Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction, 5. 
4 Rebecca Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba After Slavery, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 37-39. 
5 Ibid., 40-41. 
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European-American Democrats and Republicans together.6  When the 
strikes did not bring significant change, African-Americans relied on 
voting, despite the violence they encountered at the polls.  When equality 
remained elusive, African-Americans living in New Orleans filed suit 
against the Jim Crow laws that had appeared, leading to Plessy v. 
Ferguson and the "separate but equal" ruling.7 
The struggle over reconstruction and Jim Crow reinforced the 
antagonism between Louisiana's state government, its people, and the 
federal government.  This enmity continued through the 1900s and can 
be seen in the aftermath of the Levy case as well.  Against this historical 
antagonism, debates over governmental and legal policy played out, 
many of them informed by racial stereotypes.  Of great concern to policy 
experts of the early to mid-twentieth century was the growing number of 
children, a large number of them African-American, who were born 
outside of a traditional marriage.  This concern sparked an increased 
interest in finding the cause. 
Early research, such as that conducted by Percy Kammerer, 
explored illegitimacy as a criminal act.  Kammerer's book, The Unmarried 
Mother, A Study of 500 Cases (1918), was one of the first to explore the 
lives of single mothers and their children.  For Kammerer, the illegitimate 
child faced a difficult life, brought on, in part, by the "flagrantly 
                                                 
6 Scott, Degrees of Freedom, 75-77, 85. 
7 Ibid., 86-91. 
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shortsighted" statutes passed by the State.8  His work placed the cause 
of illegitimacy on the women, their choices, and their environment.  
Because it was 1918, a time when eugenics was popular, Kammerer also 
blamed "physical abnormality" and "heredity" for women becoming 
pregnant outside of marriage.  However, he concluded, heredity and 
physical abnormality were only "minor factors."  After presenting his 
research, the statistics he shared showed that the majority of single 
mothers in the early 1900s were European-American rather than 
African-American.9 
Another early author, E. Franklin Frazier, who first wrote about 
the African-American family in the 1930s, had a greater influence on the 
study of illegitimacy.  John Valery White, in his 2004 article "The Turner 
Thesis, Black Migration, and the (Misapplied) Immigrant Explanation of 
Black Inequality," discusses the work of Frazier and other mid-twentieth 
century scholars of the African-American family.  According to White, 
that discussion was influenced by the Immigrant Tale, "a story of 
'natural' class ascension of immigrant groups in the 'land of 
opportunity.'"10  Because of this influence, many groups theorized that 
African-Americans had not full assimilated into the dominant American 
                                                 
8 Percy Kammerer, The Unmarried Mother, A Study of 500 Cases, (Boston, Little 
Brown and Company, 1918), 3.  Available from Google Books at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=EUxJAAAAIAAJ&ots=v8knoeX3tm&dq=Percy%20Ka
mmerer&pg=PR3#v=onepage&q&f=false. [Accessed 9/19/10]. 
9 Teichman, Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy, 13-14.  Kammerer, The 
Unmarried Mother, 325-26.  
10 John Valery White, "The Turner Thesis, Black Migration, and the (Misapplied) 
Immigrant Explanation of Black Inequality," Nevada Law Journal, 5 no. 6 (Fall 2004): 6. 
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culture, which left them living in poverty.  In the early years of the 
twentieth century, sociologists, along with other scholars, searched for 
the reasons behind this failure to assimilate.  Seeking a cultural 
explanation for the poverty rates of African-Americans, Frazier's work 
built upon the Chicago School of sociology, arguing that the loss of "folk 
culture" in the city was a contributing factor.11 
As part of his cultural study, Frazier's work attacked the long-held 
belief that African-American women were more promiscuous than women 
of other races; this suggested that illegitimacy was the normal state for 
African-American children.12  Frazier's thesis, presented in his work The 
Negro Family in the United States, explained that crisis after crisis 
buffeted the African-American family through the centuries.  His 
research traced large patterns of cultural development in these families.  
For him, slavery had destroyed the culture that had originated in Africa.  
After slavery, a family pattern Frazier termed "matriarchy," provided 
cultural stability during the "crisis of emancipation," which was followed 
by the urban crisis.  Acceptance of illegitimacy accompanied the 
matriarchy that Frazier described.  This, according to Frazier and others, 
in addition to higher divorce rates, more frequent remarriages, and "more 
casual discipline," led to the construction of an African-American culture 
                                                 
11 White, ”Turner Thesis, Black Migration," 7-8. 
12 See Winthrop Jordan, The White Man's Burden, Historical Origins of Racism in the 
United States, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974) for more on the origins of 
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fundamentally different from the American culture at large.  Additionally, 
in his work Frazier highlighted the pernicious aspects of this culture, 
including "abandoned mothers, the roving men, [and] the sexually 
experienced youth."13 
In the 1930s, when Frazier was conducting his research, studies 
suggested that a large number of illegitimate children lived in African-
American families.  Frazier's statistics showed that in 1931, in Macon 
County, Alabama, 122 women in 114 families had given birth to 191 
illegitimate children.  For Frazier, these illegitimate children were a 
consequence of social and economic factors.  The stories in Frazier's 
book suggested that a first husband often died or abandoned his first 
wife.  Once this happened, the woman then either remarried or "couldn't 
be bothered" with another husband.14 
Frazier was concerned about the morality of women who bore 
nonmarital children.  However, he blamed this immorality partly on the 
city and its accompanying, "poverty, ignorance, the absence of family 
traditions and community controls, and finally the sexual exploitation of 
the subordinate race by the dominant race."15  According to Frazier's 
statistics, illegitimacy in the 1930s was five to ten times higher for 
African-Americans than for European-Americans.  By 1943, this 
                                                 
13 Frazier, The Negro Family in the United States, viii-xi.  Although Frazier used the 
term "matriarchy," implying that women held all the power, a more accurate term would 
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14 Ibid., 92-94. 
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"immorality of exploited women" led to an increased rate of illegitimate 
children, up to 165.2 per 1,000 births.  In defense of African-American 
culture, Frazier took issue with earlier writers, such as Kammerer, who 
blamed African-American illegitimacy rates on poor morals.  For Frazier 
and the scholars he influenced, illegitimacy was an unfortunate side-
effect of the matriarchal African-American culture, which they saw as a 
defense mechanism against slavery.16  Although Frazier's work 
eventually fell out of favor, there are hints of the pattern he described 
within the Levy family; Louise's oldest son had a different last name than 
his younger siblings.  This suggests that the patterns Frazier described 
may have been accurate to some degree, even if the causes behind those 
patterns were not.  For Frazier, the matrifocal nature of African-Amercan 
urban families explained why they had not achieved full assimilation into 
American culture.  The scholarly exploration of African-American families 
that began in the 1930s continued after World War II. 
Before World War II, the preferred explanations behind the 
“problem of illegitimacy” had been physical, social workers blaming the 
environment or a person's biological makeup.  After World War II, Ricki 
Solinger states in her work Wake Up Little Susie, Single Pregnancy Before 
Roe v. Wade, psychological causes were sought.17  At the same time, race 
became an important analytical tool in the social workers' arsenal. 
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According to Peter Novick, after World War II, African-American history 
emphasized oppression with the intent of promoting a sense of guilt in its 
European-American audience.  In his work That Noble Dream: The 
"Objectivity Question," and the American Historical Profession, Novick 
discusses two categories of African-American history.  The first wave 
focused on the contributions that African-Americans had made to 
American society.  However, the field was limited, leading to a second, 
integrationist, wave.  This historiography on African-Americans moved 
from seeing slavery as benign to blaming it for the problems faced by 
African-Americans in the mid-twentieth century.18  With this particular 
focus, drawing on Frazier's work was logical. 
One of the scholars' "discoveries" during this period was that 
significant changes had occurred in African-American families during the 
mid-twentieth century.  According to research by Anne L. Dean, between 
1940 and 1965 African American families took one of three paths.  The 
first of these she described as, "Up the ladder of social and economic 
status."  Dean admitted that this path was only open to a "relatively 
small percentage of better-educated African-American men and women."  
Her second path for the African-American family was to "maintain the 
status quo."  Economically and socially, these families did not have the 
advantages of the first group and remained on plantations when they 
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lived in agricultural situations.  Finally, those who could not stay on the 
plantations and had no access to better education went "downhill," 
forming an African-American underclass.19 
Studies like Dean's relied on the theory that slavery had 
permanently changed African-American culture for the worse.  Like 
Frazier and others, Dean's work attempted to explain the poverty faced 
by African-American families based on failure to assimilate and culture.  
Dean saw out-of-wedlock birth as a strategy for strengthening cross-
generational ties, since it was less likely that African-American men 
would remain involved with their families.  According to Dean, when a 
young woman became a single mother, she relied on her mother and 
grandmother for help raising the child, enforcing the matriarchal system 
that Frazier had first described.20  Researchers, like Dean and Frazier, 
uncovered and publicized stories that focused on "outside women" in 
which African-American men boasted of having multiple women and "an 
indeterminate number of children" by those women, along with 
anecdotes featuring women who brought home different men every night. 
These ethnocentric cultural beliefs influenced the official reports 
that informed President Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty, which was 
announced in January 1964.  When Johnson and his advisors set out to 
fight this war, they saw correcting the social ills facing African-Americans 
                                                 
19 Anne L. Dean, Teenage Pregnancy: The Interaction of Psyche and Culture, 
(Hillsdale: The Analytic Press, 1997), 27-28. 
20 Ibid., 30. 
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as key to winning the battle.21  One of the central sources of information 
regarding African-American families was the Moynihan Report.  Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, assistant secretary of labor, completed the report in 
March 1965.  The report stated, "At the heart of the deterioration of the 
fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro family." 22  In his 
article, White explains that for Moynihan and others in the 1960s, the 
quality of the culture became more important than whether or not it had 
been assimilated into the dominant American culture.  Because of this 
change in focus, the role of racial segregation and discrimination in 
African-American poverty was deemphasized.23  The Moynihan report 
produced a "storm of protest," according to Novick.  Critics included 
African-Americans as well as European-American liberals and radicals.  
Despite the protests and the prominent position Lee Rainwater gave the 
report in his work, The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy, 
at the time, Novick concludes that the Moynihan report failed to 
"reorient" federal policy, although it did spur on black history.24 
Moynihan's argument, in brief, consisted of three parts.  First, the 
deterioration of the African-American family was illustrated by three 
characteristics.  Nearly a quarter of urban couples were involved in 
"dissolved" marriages, the same percentage of births was illegitimate, and 
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23 White, "Turner Thesis, Black Migration," 8. 
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women headed a quarter of African-American families.  He added that 
these female-led families were more likely to be "welfare depend[ant]."  
Moynihan's second aspect looked at the "roots of the problem," which lay 
in slavery, reconstruction, and "the Negro man['s position], in 
urbanization, in unemployment[,] and poverty."  Reiterating yet another 
common stereotype of African-Americans, Moynihan also blamed high 
fertility for their impoverishment.  His last point, labeled "the tangle of 
Pathology," brought together the ethnocentric research from the previous 
decades.  Moynihan echoed Frazier's matriarchy theory, calling attention 
to the tendency for women to fare better interpersonally and 
economically than men and thereby to dominate family life.  In addition 
to matriarchy, Moynihan felt that the "tangle of pathology" included the 
failure of youth, African-American children who did not learn as much in 
school as European-American children.  These children left school earlier 
and contributed to higher rates of delinquency and crime.  Moynihan's 
report also claimed that African-Americans disproportionately failed the 
armed forces qualification test, suggesting they were less competitive in 
the workforce, and that the "alienation" African-American men 
experienced resulted in their withdrawal from stable, family-oriented, 
society.25 
The report attempted to lay out the problems faced by African-
Americans and traced them to causes beyond the reach of ordinary 
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people.  It read heavily of victimization and denied African-American 
agency.  In contrast to the "tangle of pathology" seen in African-American 
families, Moynihan stated that the "white" family had achieved stability.  
The Moynihan report, along with the work of the other scholars 
highlighted here, lends insight into how public officials viewed African-
American families, especially urban African-American families, in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. 
Moynihan's basic findings were made public on June 4, 1965, 
when President Johnson addressed Howard University.26  After the 
speech, the media entered the debate over the supposed pathology found 
in African-American families.  Mary McGrory of The Washington Star 
interpreted the speech to mean that "[African-Americans] [had to] come 
to grips with their own worst problem, 'the breakdown of Negro family 
life.'"27  However, the report actually stated that there was no reason to 
suppose matriarchal family arrangements were less practical but that 
American society rewarded patriarchy.  Moynihan stated, "A subculture, 
such as that of the Negro American, in which this [patriarchy] is not the 
pattern, is placed at a distinct disadvantage."  In other words, successful 
middle-class, African-American families had adopted patriarchy.28 
Mary Keyserling, head of the Women's Bureau of the Department 
of Labor, took issue with the Moynihan Report's finding and defended 
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African-American women, as did civil rights advocate, Pauli Murray, 
whose well-known article "Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination 
and Title VII" presented the parallel discriminatory practices faced by 
women and African-Americans.  The August 9, 1965, issue of Newsweek 
summarizing the Moynihan Report prompted Murray to describe the 
report as, 
a great disservice to the thousands of Negro women in the 
United States who have struggled to prepare themselves for 
employment in a limited job market which is not only highly 
competitive but which, historically, has severely restricted 
economic opportunities for women as well as Negroes.29 
 
Public versions of the report downplayed illegitimacy, "because of 
the inflammatory nature of the issue with its inevitable overtones of 
immorality."30  The statistics regarding illegitimacy used by Moynihan 
showed a marked increase in the percentage of African-American 
children born outside a traditional marriage.  For example, in New 
Orleans, in 1950, there were 134.8 illegitimate children born per 1000 
nonwhite births.  In 1962, that ratio had increased to 183.8.31  These 
statistics and those found in similar reports fueled a growing concern, 
which was then fanned by politicians whose constituents felt that a 
growing wave of illegitimate children offered proof of America’s 
degradation.  What seemed overlooked by these reports was the fact that 
the United States was experiencing the Baby Boom, a sharp increase in 
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birth rates for all categories that stretched from the end of the Second 
World War to the mid 1960s. 
Through the late 1950s and early 1960s, the public's increasing 
concern over illegitimacy was "expressed in the many newspaper and 
magazine articles, editorials, special reports, and legislative debates 
across the country," stated a government-ordered report on illegitimacy 
entitled Illegitimacy and its Impact (1960).  The Senate Appropriations 
Committee ordered the Bureau of Public Assistance to create the report 
to study, "the problems giving rise to the increase in illegitimate births 
and their impact on [welfare] program[s]."32  The report cited evidence 
that suggested that an increasing fear over nonmarital births existed in 
the United States and that many felt the increase meant an end of 
American morality.  "Traditionally, the American people believe[d] that 
the family unit [was] the very core of individual and national strength," 
the report continued.33  An increase in nonmarital children suggested a 
decrease in family strength. 
This concern over the loss of morality could also be seen in popular 
magazines, including Ebony, whose target audience was African-
American.  An article in 1952 began with the headline "Illegitimacy 
increases as teen-age morals decline."  It went on to explain that "a 
recent survey by a large magazine," found that 69% of teenage girls 
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Dependent Children Program, (Washington D. C., April, 1960), iii. 
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wanted a baby.  The article equated this percentage with an estimated 
50,000 illegitimate children born annually and warned that, "Because 
records are often falsified in such cases, and because fourteen states do 
not even report these births as illegitimate, the real figure is considerably 
higher."  The article then highlighted increased numbers of teen 
pregnancies in Chicago and New Jersey.34 
In addition to the feared moral decline and despite the fact that 
there was some evidence to the contrary, many felt that welfare 
payments acted as an incentive for women to have children out-of-
wedlock and remain unmarried, or for the fathers of these children to 
shirk their financial responsibility.35  On August, 9, 1959, the New York 
Times featured a column titled, "Illegitimacy Rise Alarms Agencies."  It 
told the same story as previous research, illegitimacy rates were rising, 
pointing to a decline in American morality.  Additionally, the subheading, 
"White Rate Drops," illustrated the disparity between African-American 
and European-American illegitimacy rates.  According to the article, the 
more than 200,000 illegitimate children born annually received an 
average of $27.29 dollars a month in welfare benefits.  Leonard Gross' 
Saturday Evening Post article, "Are We Paying an Illegitimacy Bonus?" 
from the following January, opened with a pair of vignettes that 
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encapsulated the popular understanding of African-American single 
mothers and their relationship with the federal government. 
In Philadelphia, […] the district attorney had stated that 'a 
hard-core group of young colored girls' in that city could be 
found 'down at the corner taproom…buying drinks for the 
boy friend' with public funds intended to feed their 
illegitimate children.  In several states legislators had 
charged that promiscuous women were conceiving babies 
out of wedlock in a deliberate attempt to live off the 
taxpayers. […] How I asked the welfare director, had a 
program so humanely conceived become as much an object 
of public scorn as the illegitimate children it was increasingly 
obliged to keep alive?36 
 
The last line of this missive, regarding an increasing obligation to 
keep nonmarital children alive upholds the belief that their 
numbers were increasing. 
Indeed, while some states did not record legitimacy status on 
a child's birth certificate and could offer no statistics, research 
showed that the rate of illegitimacy tripled between 1947 and 
1950.  According to the public rhetoric, most of these children were 
born to African-American women, although illegitimacy rates for all 
races increased after the war.  As researchers searched for causes 
behind the increase, they often relied on racial stereotypes to 
interpret their data.  As Rickie Solinger has shown, while the stain 
of illegitimacy could be taken from "white" women and their 
children, it became permanent for "black" ones.  In both popular 
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culture and research findings, European-American single mothers 
were typically described as middle class, producing an adoptable 
baby.  After the baby was born, a European-American woman 
could still be a wife, so long as she gave up the baby and "changed 
her ways."  Her pregnancy was a temporary, neurotic episode.  For 
example, Solinger explains, if a European-American woman 
wanted to keep her baby, she was diagnosed as immature and 
mentally ill.37 
Leontine R. Young's Out of Wedlock: A Study of the Problems of the 
Unmarried Mother and her Child illustrates this attitude.  According to 
Young, "Girls" who chose to keep their children and return home, 
[came] from severely neurotic homes, and their return with 
the baby is tantamount to a sentence of future damage and 
unhappiness for both.  In many cases acute rivalry develops 
between the girl and her mother for possession of the child, 
who becomes in effect a pawn between the two. 38 
 
Young saw illegitimate children in this situation having, "no clearly 
established place … either in the home or the community."39  In contrast, 
pregnant African-American women were defined as "the product of 
uncontrolled, sexual indulgence," and the absence of psyche.  Young 
stated that African-American unwed mothers had no personality 
structure.  According to Young and others, African-American single 
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mothers were chronically poor, and, as Solinger wrote, burdened by a 
baby that would not be adoptable or adopted.  They were both 
“unrestrained, wanton breeders” and “calculating breeders for profit,” 
depending on who was talking and why.  It appears that many experts of 
the 1950s and 1960s ignored any exceptions to these stereotypes.40 
Although aspects of the debate over the number of 
nonmarital children were overtly racially neutral, by the 1960s, 
illegitimacy was understood to be a "black problem," and single, 
African-American mothers and their children became a target.  
Stories like those presented in the above examples reinforced the 
stereotypes that had marked African-Americans for centuries. 41  
For many, both within the academy and the public at large, 
poverty and illegitimacy had become a "natural" part of African-
American culture.  As the Civil Rights Era moved forward and 
these political debates turned to address the poor, the early 
ethnocentric studies, like Frazier's, informed the conversation.  In 
fact, Frazier's The Negro Family in the United States (1939) was 
reprinted in 1966, giving new life to the matriarchy argument. 
Policy officials who were interested in regulating illegitimacy 
admitted that children born outside of a traditional marriage were “an 
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age-old problem” that resulted from “a complex of many factors – social, 
emotional, legal, and economic.”  Officials saw the family and life 
circumstances of illegitimate children as, "deprived of parental support,” 
and “frequently in financial need.”  It was believed that  
many of these families [came] from parts of the community 
in which living conditions [were] poor and crowded, facilities 
[were] the most meager, opportunities for education and 
health [were] minimal, and where opportunities for acquiring 
the work skills needed in today's economy [were] lacking.42 
 
For single women of any race who found themselves pregnant and 
facing life as described by the Bureau of Public Assistance's report, one 
possible solution was to give their child up for adoption.  According to 
the Bureau's report, in 1958 between 94,000 and 96,000 children were 
adopted in the United States.  In the states that kept track, more than 
half of them were illegitimate.  However, only 9% were "nonwhite" babies.  
"In some communities, there were ten suitable applicants for every white 
infant," the report stated.43  This simple statement hardly exposes the 
complex problem facing nonmarital African-American children and a 
brief exploration of that problem may provide some explanation for why 
Louise Levy had decided to raise her five children alone. 
 While European-American single mothers were shamed because of 
their actions, African-American women were blamed for a population 
explosion, higher welfare costs, unwanted babies, and poverty's grip 
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upon the African-American community in general.  And, while European-
American women were expected to give up their babies, African-American 
women were expected to keep theirs.  In fact, African-American women 
who attempted to give up their babies for adoption in the 1950s were 
often charged with desertion.44 
One cause behind the disparate adoption numbers regarding race 
was the fact that "white-run" agencies held African-American childless 
couples to standards so high few could meet them.  Because of this and 
the widely-held belief that interracial adoption was detrimental to the 
child, few African-American couples were able to adopt and African-
American babies spent long periods in foster homes or institutions before 
being adopted, if they were adopted at all.  Studies in the 1960s showed 
that many African-American women did not favor adoption.  They 
believed that once a woman had a child, that child was her responsibility 
and that a person did not give up a baby to a stranger.  Because of this, 
single African-American women kept their babies, seeing it as the better 
alternative.45 
The African-American women who kept their babies held a central 
position in the Civil Rights Era discourse surrounding welfare and Aid to 
Dependent Children (ADC) and its later incarnation Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC).  High rates of African-American illegitimacy 
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played into the debates over continued school segregation, restrictive 
public housing and other exclusionary policies, in addition to the welfare 
reform struggle.  Several popular views regarding African-American 
nonmarital children affected the debate surrounding them.  First, these 
babies were believed to be the product of a pathology, either based on 
race or gender.  Additionally, many saw African-American nonmarital 
children as predisposed to depravity.  Because of this, some believed that 
the "white" majority had a moral obligation and a right to interfere with 
African-American single mothers and their children.  At the same time, 
many officials believed, because of their slave past, African-American 
unwed mothers needed less community support, since it was natural for 
them to have children out of wedlock.  Consequently, these officials 
balked at using taxpayer funds to support "unwanted" illegitimate 
children.46 
In her work The Color of Welfare, How Racism Undermined the War 
on Poverty, Jill Quadagno explores the racial inequalities that doomed 
welfare policies to failure.  The mothers pensions tradition stemming 
from the Progressive era formed the basis for ADC with the adoption of 
the Social Security Act of 1935.  From this beginning, the program 
incorporated a racial division.47  Because States retained control over 
who received the federal grants, white widows were most likely to receive 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 187-190.  
47 Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
119. 
 110 
     
ADC in the 1930s.  Caseworkers supervised the families receiving aid.  
This supervision, according to The Moral Construction of Poverty, Welfare 
Reform in America by Joel F. Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld, included 
"home management, diet, cleanliness, school attendance, and, of course, 
moral behavior."48 
After World War II, the Baby Boom added to the number of 
children relying on ADC funds for support.  In 1940, approximately 1 
million children received welfare benefits.  In 1950 the number had 
doubled, and it tripled by 1960.  This upward trend continued through 
the 1960s until, by 1970, nearly 9 million children were receiving AFDC 
benefits.49  During these same decades, the recipients changed.  Widows 
were replaced by women who had divorced or never married.  An 
increasing number of minority groups populated the rolls, as well.  This 
increase in recipients was accompanied by an increase in cost, from 
$550 million in 1950 to $4.8 billion by 1970.  The majority of these 
recipients, 44% by 1975, were African-American.50 
Although she focuses on welfare before 1935, many of the 
problems that Linda Gordon illuminates in her work, Pitied But Not 
Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare 1890-1935, continued 
to haunt ADC and AFDC into the 1960s.  "ADC offered some federal 
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protection to mothers left without male support," Gordon wrote, 
"providing women a measure of economic insulation against total 
dependence on men."  However, it quickly became one of the most-hated 
programs of the federal government.  Criticism of ADC and AFDC pointed 
to fundamental flaws within the program's framework.  Often, in order to 
qualify for ADC, a client had to dispose of all their resources, becoming 
more impoverished before they could qualify for aid.  Additionally, if any 
resources were gained, the ADC benefit was reduced.  This policy 
punished self-improvement.  Work was also punished.  Stipends were 
reduced when wages were earned.  "[ADC's] proclaimed mission was to 
keep mothers at home but its workings produc[ed] the opposite effect."  
ADC was unique among welfare programs, according to Gordon, in that 
it employed a morality test in order to qualify for the benefit. 51  "The 
presence of a man in the house, or the birth of an illegitimate child, 
made the home unsuitable."52  This morality test was often based on 
Suitable Home laws, which were passed by the states.  These laws, and 
others, attempted to distinguish the "deserving poor" from those who 
were "undesirable."53  As Martha F. Davis explains in her book, Brutal 
Need, Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960-1973, "By 1960 
                                                 
51 Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare 
1890-1935, (New York: Free Press, 1994), 287, 297-98. 
52 Ibid., 297-98. 
53 There are many excellent works that explore the distinction between the deserving 
poor and those who were undesirable.  In addition to Handler, Moral Construction of 
Poverty, see Herbert J. Gans, The War against the Poor: The Underclass and Anti- 
Poverty Policy, (New York: Basic Books, 1995).   
 112 
     
the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor within the 
AFDC program had become stark indeed."54 
One of the more infamous attacks against nonmarital children on 
ADC occurred in Louisiana under that state's Suitable Home law.  In the 
summer of 1960, the Louisiana legislature and Governor Jimmie H. 
Davis passed a law that denied public assistance to over 23,000 
nonmarital children, removing them from the rolls.  This incident 
prompted Winifred Bell to write Aid to Dependent Children in 1965.  Her 
research into welfare policy showed that the term "illegitimate" had to be 
redefined by state legislatures as they grappled with laws related to 
children and ADC benefits.  This was necessary as the common usage 
definition of the word did not always fit with the use that the legislative 
policies required.55  Bell also found that after passage of Louisiana's 
Suitable Home law, a large number of families were coerced into 
withdrawing from the welfare rolls.  Others may have been discouraged 
from applying.56  It is possible that Louise Levy fell into one of these two 
groups.  Yet, this coercion did not curtail welfare expenditures and 
drastic measures were taken. 
The 23,459 children who were kicked off the rolls lost their support 
that summer because either their parent had given birth out-of-wedlock 
                                                 
54 Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960-
1973, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 9. 
55 Solinger, Wake Up Little Susie, 22; Winifred Bell, Aid to Dependent Children, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 127. 
56 Bell, Aid to Dependent Children, 130-31. 
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after receiving their first welfare payment or caseworkers felt that the 
parent's behavior might have led to the birth of another child.  The 
families were left with no support.  Sixty-six percent of the children 
receiving ADC in Louisiana in 1960 were African-American but 95% of 
the children kicked off the rolls were African-American.  "Clearly 
Louisiana's new definition of "unsuitability" fell disproportionately on 
Negro children," Bell concluded.  Additionally, she continued, "About 
30% of the children [who were kicked off the rolls] were legitimate by any 
definition of the term," suggesting that the loss of benefits was racially 
motivated.  Complaints over these statistics led to a reinstatement of the 
children's benefits later that year, though each family had to reapply and 
many who did were denied.  Louisiana's law was only one of many state 
measures aimed at controlling illegitimacy, and all of them relied upon 
information tainted by beliefs regarding the "wrongness" of African-
American culture.57 
Spurred on by continued budget concerns, several other proposals 
were made to curb the perceived rising tide of illegitimate children 
receiving welfare benefits.  The Bureau of Public Assistance's report 
claimed that there were, "persistent efforts in some states to punish 
parental immorality resulting in an illegitimate birth."58  In addition to 
forced sterilization for mothers of illegitimate children, other proposals 
                                                 
57 Bell, Aid to Dependent Children, 137-38, 140-141.  
58 Bureau of Public Assistance, "Illegitimacy,” 51. 
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exposed by the Bureau's report included exclusion of illegitimate children 
from benefits if they were the second or subsequent child born out of 
wedlock.  However, most of these proposals, if they became law, were 
deemed unconstitutional or vetoed by the State's governor.  One governor 
wrote, "All good citizens abhor immorality and pity the plight of an 
illegitimate child--in whose face the door of hope is practically closed at 
the moment of birth."  Of course, lost in the hysteria surrounding ADC 
benefits and the "growing number" of nonmarital African-American 
children were the children themselves.  As with most debates over them, 
the adults talked about children as an amorphous concept, losing sight 
of the actual people who were affected by their decisions.59 
In an attempt to counter the heated rhetoric of the debate, a 
number of scholars, such as Clark E. Vincent, joined with the Bureau of 
Public Assistance's report, attempting to improve society's understanding 
of African-American nonmarital children.  In "Illegitimacy in the Next 
Decade:  Trends and Implications," Vincent provided a brief history of the 
research related to illegitimacy.  For him, the key moment had come 
during the 1950s and 1960s, when illegitimacy became a symptom of a 
sick society.60  He explained how increased political rhetoric, related to 
increased expenditures, had increased study of the problem.  Elizabeth 
Herzog criticized the tone of this political rhetoric in her work, 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 52. 
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Welfare 43, no.10 (1964), 516. 
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"Unmarried Mothers: Some Questions to be Answered and Some Answers 
to be Questioned."  Herzog felt that the past scholarship failed to define 
the problem.  She asked what was everyone so worried about, births, 
"extramarital conception" or "extramarital coitus?"  "Our galloping 
publicity makes us more familiar with the absolute than with the relative 
picture," she chided.  Herzog suggested that the rise in illegitimate births 
was not unusual. It was merely keeping pace with the Baby Boom and 
the increase in all births that was seen after World War II.61 
The hysteria that Herzog speaks against appears to have grown 
from the long-held concern over spending tax money, in the form of 
welfare payments, on illegitimate children.  Fortunately, the Bureau's 
report showed that the concern over tax money supporting immoral 
“Welfare Queens” was misplaced.  "The great majority (over two-thirds) of 
the children under 18 who were born out of wedlock are living with 
natural parents or relatives,” William L. Mitchell, Commissioner of Social 
Security, reported.  “Only one out of eight is receiving support through 
the Aid to Dependent Children program.”62 
The report found that children living with a single mother were, 
"among the neediest in the Nation," but only a small percentage ever 
received ADC benefits.  "The great majority of all children born out of 
wedlock-- about 87 percent-- are being supported by parents, relatives, 
                                                 
61 Elizabeth Herzog, "Unmarried Mothers: Some Questions to be Answered and 
Some Answers to be Questioned," Child Welfare, 41 no. 8 (1962), 340, 341. 
62 Bureau of Public Assistance, "Illegitimacy,” iii. 
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or through sources other than aid to dependent children," the report 
concluded.  Many unmarried parents had come from impoverished 
families themselves and most ADC mothers worked, even if they had 
young children.  Overall, only 13 percent of nonmarital children living 
with their natural parents or other relatives received ADC benefits.  Of 
the 87 percent who did not receive ADC payments, just over 55 percent 
lived with their natural parents or relatives, 30 percent lived in adoptive 
homes, while just 1 percent lived in an institution or with a foster 
family.63 
The racial breakdown of these statistics is illustrative of the social 
conditions Louise and her children faced in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.  Of European-American nonmarital children, 70 percent had been 
adopted and did not receive ADC payments.  Nearly 20 percent lived with 
their parents or other relatives, again without ADC benefits.  Only 9.2 
percent of European-American nonmarital children lived with their 
parents and received ADC.  For African-American nonmarital children, 
the percentages paint a different picture.  Only 5 percent lived in 
adoptive homes, while 78.4 percent lived with their parents.  Neither of 
these groups received ADC payments.  Only 15.5 percent lived with their 
parents and received ADC benefits.64 
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Unfortunately, this report focused on nonmarital children who 
received state aid and Louise Levy did not, according to the court 
records.  However, because she worked as a domestic, it is safe to 
assume that her children resided in "a home of meager income."  
Although the politicians did not have to worry about her children 
receiving tax money, the fact that she had five children would have 
marked the family as an example of "degraded morals."65 
Other aspects of the Bureau's report can be used to glimpse the 
world that the Levy children lived in as it covers the years 1940 to 1957, 
roughly the years in which the Levy children were born.66  Many families 
who received ADC payments were "partially self-supporting," deriving 
almost half their income from the mother's wages and contributions 
made by fathers.  According to the report, more than fifteen percent of 
mothers worked full or part time.  While Louise worked to support her 
family, there is no mention in the court documents of paternal support 
for any of the children.67  The report also included the previously 
mentioned racial stereotypes, which affected their findings. The report 
found "A variety of aspects – cultural, economic, legal, social, moral, and 
                                                 
65 Ibid., iii.  
66 According to court records, the children were to receive $1,000 dollars a year 
until the age of majority.  Working backwards from the monetary figures, the oldest of 
Louise's children was born around 1947 and her youngest around 1958.  There 
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three years difference does not necessarily change the social milieu surrounding the 
Levy family. 
67 Bureau of Public Assistance, "Illegitimacy,” 3. 
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psychological," that caused illegitimacy.  The first of these was, "[A] lack 
of integration of families and individuals."  By this, the report’s authors 
meant cultural variations that existed between classes and races.  The 
authors saw the variation in culture, specifically the African-American 
culture first reported in Frazier's work, as one reason that people "[did] 
not measure up economically, educationally, vocationally, physically, or 
socially."  The report continued, 
The fact that illegitimate births are relatively more numerous 
among Negroes than among whites can best be understood 
by viewing it against the cultural background of the Negro 
family […] the family culture of many of the lower strata 
Negroes is that of the old southern rural community.68 
 
As a "lower strata Negro," Louise was seen as the natural head of the 
family, and the lack of a father was construed as normal. 
Although outrage over the "fact" that black women were having 
black babies at taxpayers' expense grew, the truth was that very few 
families with nonmarital children actually received ADC benefits.  And 
the benefits they did receive, which ranged from $19.00 to $26.00 dollars 
per month, did not cover the cost of raising a child.69  While politicians 
associated African-American nonmarital children with rising welfare 
costs, the true cause was more complex.  Rising costs were not just from 
illegitimacy.  "Between 1953 and 1959, the number of families headed by 
women rose 12.8 percent while the number of families rose only 8.3 
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percent," according to Solinger's research.  Overall, the ADC caseload 
increased because of an increasing number of children and families, as 
well as an increase in divorce, separation, desertion, and illegitimacy.70  
Mitchell was quoted in the report as saying, 
The plight of the children born under this handicap 
[illegitimate] may well be a matter of concern.  They are 
children whose future is at hazard by reason of their lack of 
a complete family, and frequently because of lack of 
sufficient income to assure their normal growth and 
development.71 
 
This sentiment echoes the concern that law and policy makers 
have often tied to the existence of nonmarital children throughout the 
centuries.  The rhetoric often implied or stated outright that nonmarital 
children were a threat or left at a disadvantage because they did not 
reside within a "normal" family.  Mitchell also addressed the "humiliation 
and deprivation" that nonmarital children felt based upon their birth 
status, though he did not quote any actual examples of these emotions.72 
Ultimately, the Bureau of Public Assistance’s report reached the 
same conclusions that Herzog had.  Although the number of nonmarital 
births was increasing through the years, the overall percentage was still 
relatively low, only between 3.8 and 4.7 nonmarital births per 100 live 
births.  Both "whites" and "nonwhites" contributed to this increase and 
the number of nonmarital children was greater in urban areas than in 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 193. 
71 Bureau of Public Assistance, "Illegitimacy,” iii. 
72 Bureau of Public Assistance, "Illegitimacy,” iii. 
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rural ones.  Yet, the numbers driving the racialized hysteria could be 
found in the Bureau's report.  According to their statistics, in 1957, there 
were 7,458 nonmarital births in Louisiana, 6,732 of them "nonwhite."  
For New Orleans, of the 1,406 nonmarital births that year, 1,108 were 
"nonwhite."73  For the Levy family, Louise’s children were not unusual. 
 Despite Herzog's and the Bureau's attempt at reason, hysteria over 
"welfare queens" informed legal policy during the 1960s.  Gray and 
Rudovsky, Norman Dorsen's researchers, suggested in their work that 
some of the discrimination faced by nonmarital children in Louisiana 
may have been legally sanctioned as part of a larger plan to discriminate 
against African-Americans.  They based this claim partly on an 
emergency session of the Louisiana legislature that instituted new 
measures penalizing nonmarital children and their parents.  "Under this 
new law," the researchers wrote, "conceiving and giving birth to two or 
more illegitimate children was a crime for both father and mother."74  The 
controversial legislative package was later repealed.  However, punitive 
legislation was not limited to Louisiana or the Deep South.  Laws related 
to nonmarital children were uneven, with each state, each jurisdiction, 
being different.  "Even within one jurisdiction, the law often does not 
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stand out with clarity (original emphasis)," Krause wrote in his 1969 
article "Why Bastard, Wherefore Base?"75 
Krause's earlier article, "Equal Protection for the Illegitimate," 
appeared before Levy reached the Supreme Court.  In it, Krause equated 
the psychological problems of bastardy with that of racial discrimination.  
He quoted Nandor Fodor's "Emotional Trauma Resulting From 
Illegitimate Birth," in the Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry,  
In the case of illegitimate birth the child's reactions to life are 
bound to be completely abnormal.  ...  To be fatherless is 
hard enough, but to be fatherless with the stigma of 
illegitimate birth is a psychic catastrophe.76 
 
However, Krause backed down from calling for complete equality 
on behalf of illegitimate children, "this writer will not argue that all 
distinctions between the legitimate and the illegitimate are not of proper 
concern to the state in its exercise of its police power (original 
emphasis)."  For him, the real reason behind the legislative 
discrimination was prejudice, rooted in medieval church doctrine.77  
Given the long traditions this study has already explored, there appears 
to be some truth in Krause's conclusion.  His article ended with a series 
of rhetorical questions that laid out past discrimination against 
nonmarital children and ended with a call for change, 
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Would our courts today uphold laws that barred illegitimates 
from public office, such as judgeships, that reduced criminal 
penalties for the murder of an illegitimate to farcical levels, 
that prevented illegitimates from appearing or being 
witnesses in court, that denied them burial and that 
provided for escheat of their bodies to medical schools upon 
their deaths?  […]  If these disabilities, all of which the 
illegitimate once bore, offend our modern sense of justice, we 
should question the part of the burden that remains with all 
deliberate speed.78 
 
Shortly after Krause's article appeared, the Levy case reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court, headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren.  There, Norman 
Dorsen would take up the comparison equating illegitimacy to race and 
arguing against the long-held tradition of discouraging promiscuity by 
punishing children.  The argument that Dorsen presented to the 
Supreme Court represented the first strike against one aspect of, "the 
part of the burden that remains."  In the case of the Levy children, that 
burden related to inheritance rights and death benefits.  Throughout his 
brief and the oral arguments, Dorsen ignored the swirling prejudice that 
surrounded African-American nonmarital children at the time.  Instead, 
he argued that all children were equal before the law. 
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CHAPTER 5 
BEFORE THE WARREN COURT 
In 1968, Levy v Louisiana joined the long list of civil rights cases 
decided by the Warren Court.  To place this case into its proper context, 
the chapter examines the leading role of historical actors, especially 
Norman Dorsen, who argued for equal rights for illegitimate children.  It 
also delves into the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
details the dispute over wrongful death suits on behalf of illegitimate 
children.  Although the emphasis is on Dorsen's winning argument in 
Levy, the defense mounted by Louisiana is also significant.  While a full 
analysis of the Warren Court is beyond the scope of this chapter, it does 
provide an overview the court’s membership because who the justices 
were helps to explain essential features of the Levy decision. 
The Supreme Court of the 1960s, headed by Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, is perhaps best known for its social activism.  Decisions passed 
by the Warren Court changed American law and society, affecting the 
country into the twenty-first century.  And according to many scholars, 
the Warren Court influenced the legal systems of other nations as well.1  
The journalists Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong described Warren as 
being more interested in basic fairness than legal rationale in their 1979 
                                                 
1 See Earl Warren and the Warren Court: The Legacy in American and Foreign Law, 
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work, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court.2  This concern for fairness 
surfaced in the decisions that the Court passed down.  In addition to the 
second argument of Brown v Board of Education and a number of cases 
that pitted the NAACP against various southern states, as Chief Justice, 
Earl Warren presided over Bell v. Maryland (1964), Cox v. Louisiana 
(1965), and Loving v. Virginia (1967) through the tumultuous Civil Rights 
Movement of the sixties.3 
 In these and other decisions, the court often divided along 
ideological lines.  The "liberal bloc" included Chief Justice Warren (1953-
1969) and Justices William O. Douglas (1939-1975), William J. Brennan 
(1956-1990), Abe Fortas (1965-1969), and Thurgood Marshall (1967-
1991).  On race and civil rights issues, these five were often joined by 
Hugo Black (1937-1971) and Byron R. White (1962-1993).  In addition to 
racial civil rights issues, the Warren Court wrestled with issues of civil 
rights for those convicted of crime and the expansion of due process as 
seen in cases like Robinson v. California (1962), Gideon v. Wainwright 
(1963), and Malloy v. Hogan (1964).  However, these decisions and other 
similar ones led the public to fear that the Warren Court was "soft on 
crime."4  In his 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon took 
                                                 
2 Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court, (New 
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3 Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 39-43.  The NAACP cases 
included NAACP v. Alabama, NAACP v. Button, and Brown v. Board of Education II.  
4 Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren, 13-14; Horwitz, The Warren Court, 93; 
Keith E. Whittington, "The Burger Court (1969-1986)," in The United States Supreme 
 
 125 
     
advantage of this growing sentiment.  Woodword wrote that Nixon ran 
against Warren as much as he did against Herbert Humphrey; one of 
Nixon's campaign promises was to appoint strict constructionists who 
would "refrain from imposing their 'social and political viewpoints on the 
American people.'"5 
 Although Warren was confident that Robert Kennedy would win 
the presidency, when Kennedy was assassinated on June 5, 1968, 
Warren believed that the chance of the Democrats holding the White 
House passed with him.  Warren described Nixon as "weak, indirect, 
awkward and double-dealing," and he was concerned about serving on 
the Supreme Court under Nixon.6  As the political scientist Keith 
Whittington has noted, "At the age of 77, Warren knew that his health 
could not hold out indefinitely, and he explained to [President] Johnson 
that he wanted a successor who shared Warren's vision of the Court and 
the Constitution."  Therefore, on June 11, 1968, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren handed over his resignation letter, confident that Abe Fortas 
would replace him as head of the Court.7  These were the circumstances 
that surrounded the late May announcement of the Court's decision in 
Levy, making it one of the last cases associated with Chief Justice 
                                                                                                                                                 
Court, The Pursuit of Justice. ed. Christopher Tomlins. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2005), 301. 
5 Whittington, "Burger Court," 301; Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren, 4. 
6 Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren, 4. 
7 Whittington, "The Burger Court," 300. 
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Warren while he still believed Robert Kennedy would win the White 
House and his liberal legacy would be safe for the near future. 
In Levy, the arguments about nonmarital children remained the 
same as they had always been.  Society should not hold illegitimate 
children accountable for the actions of their parents, on one side.  On the 
other, the discrimination of illegitimate children encouraged traditional 
marriages and was necessary to maintain the strength of American 
families.  This time, the children would win, but the Levy children were 
not the first children to find justice before the Warren Court. 
One of these juvenile cases, In re Gault, which changed juvenile 
court proceedings and allowed children the benefits of due process, 
served as a precursor to Levy.  In Gault, a teenage boy was accused of 
making an obscene phone call.  Because he was a juvenile, his case fell 
under juvenile court rules that did not allow for confrontation with his 
accuser, or the provision against self-incrimination.  When the judge 
found Gault delinquent, he sentenced the fifteen-year-old to an industrial 
school.  This meant, in effect, he could potentially spend six years in 
confinement for a single phone call.  The lack of due process in Gault's 
case brought the ACLU into the fight and the case to the Supreme Court 
in December 1966. 
The ACLU assigned Norman Dorsen to litigate Gault's case.  As 
was mentioned in chapter one, Dorsen's legal career began in the 1950s.  
During those years, among other things, he worked as Assistant to the 
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General Counsel of the Army for the Army-McCarthy hearings,8 and later 
clerked for Justice John Marshall Harlan II.  Dorsen became a law 
professor at New York University Law School in early 1961.  At the same 
time, he became active in the ACLU and by 1967, he was a member of 
the board of directors. 
On May 15, 1967, Justice Fortas handed down the majority 
opinion for the court in Gault, extending due process to children during 
adjudicatory hearings in juvenile court.  Upon learning of Dorsen's 
successful argument in Gault, Adolph Levy, the Levy children's attorney, 
contacted him, asking if Dorsen would be interested in taking on the 
case.  After studying the lower opinion, and consulting with the ACLU's 
legal director, Melvin Wulf, Dorsen agreed to represent Thelma Levy in 
her attempt to secure wrongful death benefits for Louise's children.  
Working with three law students from the New York University law 
school, he prepared the brief.9 
Dorsen's brief, which was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in 
December 1967, challenged the validity of Louisiana's Article 2315 based 
                                                 
8 James L. Oakes, "Norman Dorsen: A Tribute," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
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on the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10  The 
court used two standards of scrutiny when exploring issues of 
constitutionality under this clause.  The first of these, minimal scrutiny, 
presumed that statutes were constitutional if the law in question had a 
rational reason.  Because of this presumption of constitutionality, the 
court adopted a "hands off" approach, deferring to the states' authority.  
Under this rational basis test, most state and federal laws were deemed 
constitutional. 
In the mid-twentieth century, the second level, strict scrutiny, 
developed, in cases that involved racial discrimination.  The evolution of 
this strict reading of the law in relation to civil rights can be seen in two 
court cases, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) 
and Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  In Carolene, the 
court deferred to the experience of the legislature regarding economic 
matters.  However, footnote four stated that cases that involved 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as the First Amendment’s protection 
of free speech, might require closer scrutiny.  Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, 
writing the court's opinion, thus concluded that cases harboring 
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities," could require "a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry" than other cases 
                                                 
10 The first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment read, "No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
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because of the threat to their civil rights.11  Nearly a decade later, Justice 
Black, delivering the opinion in Korematsu, expanded upon this footnote. 
Korematsu was one of several cases brought before the U.S. 
Supreme Court relating to the internment of Japanese-American citizens 
during World War II.  Fred Korematsu, a Japanese-American ordered to 
leave his home along the Pacific Coast after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
chose to remain in the area.  Justice Black's opinion set forth the 
principle that, "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect."  He emphasized that these 
statutes are not necessarily unconstitutional but must be, "subject[ed] 
[…] to the most rigid scrutiny."  However, Black argued that Korematsu's 
internment was justified by military necessity and overlooked evidence of 
racial discrimination.12 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, civil rights cases relied upon 
these two positions, strict scrutiny, and minimal scrutiny.  However, to 
                                                 
11 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Page 304 U. S. 155, 
footnote 4.  Found at Justia.com http://supreme.justia.com/us/304/144/case.html 
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Justia.com, http://supreme.justia.com/us/323/214/case.html, [Accessed on 
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decision remains "good law." 
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present a winning argument in Levy, Dorsen aimed for  middle ground, 
attempting to expand strict scrutiny to classifications beyond racial 
categories.  Despite the fact that the Levy children were African-
American, Dorsen saw the injustices faced by nonmarital children as an 
issue transcending race.13 
In his brief, Dorsen stressed that the court had already created two 
standards related to the Levy case.  The first required that the court 
examine the characteristic or trait, such as race, gender, or creed, which 
determined the classification that the law relied upon.  This fundamental 
point rested on precedent found within a number of cases related to the 
unfavorable legal treatment of Japanese-Americans.  Dorsen argued that 
by examining various racial classifications, the court had often found 
some were "by their nature suspect."  As an example of this ruling, he 
cited Oyama v. California, 332, US 633 (1948), insisting that it, 
"[brought] us even closer to the instant case."14 
In Oyama, the Court had struck down California's Alien Land Law, 
claiming that it had inflicted harm on a child, simply because his father 
was of Japanese origin and ineligible for citizenship.  The 1913 California 
Alien Land Law represented just one of many acts of legal discrimination 
against Asian immigrants living in the United States; perhaps the most 
infamous of these measures were the Chinese Exclusion Acts.  
                                                 
13 Norman Dorsen, email correspondence with author, 4/20/2010. 
14 Levy Notes; Nov 6, 1967; Norman Dorsen Papers; TAM 251; 32; 11;  David R 
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California's Alien Land Laws denied Japanese immigrants the right to 
own any "legal or beneficial interest in agricultural land." 
Roger Daniels wrote one of the earliest works on the Alien Land 
Laws entitled, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in 
California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion (1962).  In 1913, two 
different Alien Land Laws were proposed to the California legislature by 
both Democrats and Progressives.  One barred all immigrants from land 
ownership and the other barred only those who were ineligible for 
citizenship.  From these bills, the law that was enacted "limited leases of 
agricultural land to Japanese to maximum terms of three years and 
barred further land purchases by Japanese aliens."  However, it was easy 
to avoid the intent of the law.  If the land was part of a business, 51 
percent of the stock was held by American citizens.  If it was simply land 
owned by a family, the title was placed in the name of an American-born 
child (Nissei).15 
By 1920, Japanese farmers in California were earning 10 percent 
of the state profits from agriculture.  A new Alien Land Law was passed 
with the intent of closing loopholes that had been found in the 1913 
law.16  The 1920 version prohibited transferring land to Japanese 
nationals, barred any lease of land to them.  Nor could they acquire the 
                                                 
15 Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California 
and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1962,1977), 58, 63. 
16 Daniels, Politics of Prejudice, 87. 
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land by purchasing it through a land corporation as they had done 
previously.  This law also attempted to stop the practice of placing land 
in a child's name by forbidding Japanese parents from acting as 
guardians to their Nissei children.  This last provision was struck from 
the law as unconstitutional.17 
Yet, in 1923, the remaining provisions of the land laws had been 
approved by the Supreme Court, which determined that "the distinction 
between aliens eligible for citizenship and those ineligible for citizenship 
was a reasonable classification because it was borrowed from a rule 
established by Congress."  However, this decision was revisited in the 
wake of World War II.  Before the war, Kajiro Oyama, a first generation 
Japanese immigrant (Issei) purchased two parcels of agricultural land 
and had them deeded to his American-born son, who was eligible to own 
property.  After Pearl Harbor, when the Japanese were evacuated from 
California, the state confiscated the land.  Several months later, when 
the Oyamas were released from their internment camp, they sued for the 
lost land, and their appeal eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court.  
This time, the court decided in favor of the American-born son because 
California's actions denied him the right to own property simply because 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 88.  The Alien Land Laws also affected Chinese immigrants, see Sucheng 
Chan, This Bittersweet Soil: The Chinese in California Agriculture, 1860 to 1910, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).  For more on the legal struggle the 
Japanese immigrants undertook against these laws see Yuji Ichioka, "Japanese 
Immigrant Response to the 1920 California Alien Land Law," Agricultural History 58, No. 
2 (Apr., 1984): 157-178. 
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his father was from Japan.18  In the final ruling on Oyama, the Court 
wrote, "distinctions based on ancestry are 'by their very nature odious to 
a free people.'"19  It was this argument that Dorsen used to solidify his 
appeal on behalf of the Levy children. 
Dorsen also drew upon Korematsu.  In addition to the previously 
mentioned discussion regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
Dorsen drew to the court's attention, Justice Robert H. Jackson's 
dissenting opinion stated that Korematsu could not be held responsible 
for his ancestor's actions.  Guilt was not inheritable.20  Dorsen thus 
equated holding nonmarital children responsible for the actions of their 
parents to the shameful treatment that Japanese-American citizens had 
endured during World War II. 
The second standard that Dorsen claimed related to the Levy case 
explored the purpose of the statute and the basis for the classification.  
By the late 1960s, a well-established constitutional principle existed 
regarding legal classifications.  The categorization of people, in 
relationship to a law, had to be based upon a feasible similarity between 
the law and the category that was created.  While the Equal Protection 
Clause does not always require that there be an obvious relationship, in 
the Levy case, there was "a complete lack of reasonable relation between 
                                                 
18 "Notes and Recent Decisions," found in Asian Americans and the Law (vol. 2):  
Japanese Immigrants and American Law: The Alien Land Laws and Other Issues, 
Charles McClain ed.,  A Garland Series, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 171-
172, reprinted from the California Law Review 36, (1948). 
19 Appellant Brief, Levy, 21-22 
20 Korematsu v. United States, as quoted in Stier, "Corruption of Blood," 731. 
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the two." 21  In other words, there was no logical reason to deny death 
benefits to illegitimate children while allowing legitimate children, 
including adopted children, to recover under the same circumstances.  
Since the purpose of any wrongful death statute was to provide for 
support of dependents after the death of a parent, if illegitimate children 
were not covered by the act, it defeated the purpose and the law was 
meaningless.  Wrongful death statutes allowed for the support of 
children who would otherwise become a burden upon the state. 
As part of this argument, Dorsen reiterated Adolph Levy's original 
point that Louise was a good mother and loved her children no less than 
she would have if they had been legitimate.  For Dorsen, this aspect of 
the argument was not meant to combat the stereotypical impression of 
African-American families.  As a point of interest, Dorsen did not 
approach the argument in racial terms, since the record showed no 
evidence of racial discrimination.  Instead, Louise's depiction as a "good 
mother" related to the important position Louise occupied in the lives of 
her children.  Because they were nonmarital, losing their mother was 
worse than it would have been for children born into a traditional 
marriage, since there was no second parent to continue raising them.22 
Based on these two standards, Dorsen concluded that Article 2315 
created two classes of children, one that could not sue for wrongful death 
                                                 
21 Appellant Brief, Levy, 6, 10. 
22 Norman Dorsen, email correspondence with author, 4/20/2010; Appellant Brief, 
Levy, 12. 
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benefits and one that could.  Further, the ability to sue for wrongful 
death was unrelated to legitimacy and illegitimacy.  Therefore, the state 
had not justified the classification, according to Dorsen.  Dorsen 
attacked the Louisiana law by claiming that the statute was further 
suspect because "Louisiana is the only state that deprives illegitimate 
children of the right to sue for the wrongful death of their mother."23  The 
majority of jurisdictions allowed children to sue for the death of their 
mother and only limited suits regarding the death of a father. 
The first point above, that some classifications based on race or 
ancestry are "constitutionally suspect" led Dorsen to the argument that 
an illegitimate child's status was "like his race and ancestry and has 
nothing whatever to do with his own actions or conduct."  He expanded 
upon this argument and returned it to the case at hand by adding, 
There is no room for the State to claim that the 
discrimination here should be sustained if there is any 
"rational basis" to support it.  Accordingly, there should be 
no constitutional distinction between discrimination based 
on illegitimacy and that based on race; discrimination 
against illegitimates also should be "constitutionally 
suspect."24 
 
Related to this argument regarding constitutionality, Dorsen 
mentioned that statutes related to illegitimacy "[fell] most heavily on 
Negroes," and admitted that some of them may have been designed 
                                                 
23 Appellant Brief, Levy, 7. 
24 Appellant Brief, Levy, 7, 8-9. 
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specifically to hurt African-Americans.25  In the brief, a footnote provided 
statistics on African-American illegitimacy.  Out of more than 9,000 
illegitimate children born in 1964, 8,441 were African-American.  Dorsen 
also tied illegitimacy to slavery and miscegenation, a common theme in 
the 1960s, as the previous chapter showed.  However, Dorsen never 
returned to this aspect of his argument in the brief.  In fact, during oral 
arguments, he denied arguing that Article 2315 was a racist statute.  For 
him, the fact that the Levy children were African-American was 
secondary to the fact that they were born outside a traditional marriage.  
As Dorsen said, the case was, "much broader than race."26 
Dorsen pointed out as he continued the attack against Article 
2315, that Louisiana law forced both mothers and fathers to support 
their illegitimate children.  If parents were forced to support their 
children, "it is bizarre to deny them a cause of action against a 
wrongdoer who caused the death of their mother," he concluded.  Dorsen 
highlighted one final, illogical, aspect of the case.  Article 2315 provided 
for the recovery of wrongful death benefits for adopted children.  Yet, the 
Louisiana courts had chosen to deny these same benefits to the Levy 
children. 
Finally, Dorsen took issue with the lack of justification in the lower 
court's verdict and the Louisiana State Supreme Court's decision not to 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 8-9. 
26 Norman Dorsen, email correspondence with author, 4/20/2010. 
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hear the case.  The lower court's final justification for denying benefits to 
the Levy children was that "it discourage[d] bringing children into the 
world out of wedlock."  However, little if any evidence existed to suggest 
that statutes against illegitimate children actually discourage their 
parents from creating them.  Dorsen elaborated upon this point,  
The attempted justification is offensive to common sense.  It 
would be truly remarkable if persons contemplating or in the 
process of producing a child out-of-wedlock would be 
deterred by the possibility that the child would not be able to 
recover for their wrongful death.27  
 
Limiting wrongful death claims did not discourage promiscuity, one of 
the common reasons for discriminating against nonmarital children, 
Dorsen's argument concluded.  Nor, in this case, did it protect the rights 
of legitimate children, since Louise did not have any.28 
Two amicus curiae briefs, one from the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund, and another from the executive Council of the Episcopal Church 
and the American Jewish Congress joined Dorsen's brief.  Krause 
continued to play a role in the fight for illegitimate children's equality, 
submitting the Amicus Curiae brief on behalf of the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund and the National Office for the Rights of the Indigent (NORI).  Its 
presence shows that despite Dorsen's attempt to divorce race from birth 
status, the fact remained that the Levy children were African-American 
and represented for many one more aspect of legal racial discrimination.  
                                                 
27 Appellant Brief, Levy, 14.  
28 Ibid., 12, 14-17. 
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The issues that were addressed in Krause's amicus brief included a 
concern for the poor and a belief that laws related to illegitimacy acted as 
covert racial discrimination because they affected African-Americans 
more often than other races.  According to the amicus, this occurred 
because African-Americans were more likely to be born out of wedlock 
and less likely to be adopted.  As has been shown, scholarship supported 
both these points.29 
When the Louisiana Court of Appeal upheld the district court's 
dismissal, it was because they had used a strict interpretation of the 
statute and found that "illegitimacy" was not "race, color, or creed."  Both 
Dorsen's and Krause's briefs argued against this finding.  Krause's 
amicus brief stated that Article 2315 was discriminatory because the 
majority--95.8% was the statistic he quoted--of nonmarital children born 
in the United States were African-American. 30  Louisiana had argued 
that discrimination against nonmarital children was undertaken as a 
way to safeguard the morals and general welfare of society by 
discouraging the birth of children outside of wedlock.  Krause's brief 
declared this argument "bogus."  As stated earlier, laws that 
discriminated against nonmarital children did not succeed in curbing 
illicit sex.  The rising number of nonmarital children born in the United 
                                                 
29 NAACP Legal Defense Fund Amicus Curiae Brief, Levy, 2-3. 
30 Ibid., 5-6. 
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States through the middle of the century offered proof of the failure of 
this policy. 
The other fundamental flaw in these laws was that they punished 
one person in the hopes that it would affect the behavior of another.31  
According to Krause, two additional reasons existed for disavowing the 
conclusion that laws targeting illegitimate children protected the family 
and upheld morality.  The amicus brief argued that if the statutes were 
meant to protect families, logically, they could not apply in any case 
involving a single-parent's death because with that parent's death, there 
was no longer a family to protect.  Although this point is arguably faulty, 
Krause's reasoning once again returned to the argument that Louise Levy 
loved her children, whether they were legitimate or not.  Finally, the 
wrongful death benefit allowed survivors to collect money in exchange for 
loss of parental support, which kept a child from becoming a burden on 
the state.  Krause argued that barring illegitimate children from this 
benefit would increase the likelihood of them becoming dependent and 
that it was more logical to allow illegitimate children to collect wrongful 
death benefits.  The brief called attention to the fact that the law did not 
actually forbid illegitimate children from collecting but that the courts 
had interpreted the law in that way.  Of particular significance, it pointed 
                                                 
31 NAACP brief, Levy, 10-12.  The statistics quoted by the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund, which came from the U.S. Census Bureau (1965) gave a total of 4,098,000 live 
births of which 259,400 were illegitimate for the year 1963.  This number increased to 
291,200 illegitimate children born in the year 1965. 
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out, was the fact that other laws in Louisiana, such as the Workman's 
Compensation Act, allowed illegitimate children to collect benefits for the 
loss of a father if they were dependent on him.32 
The final aspect of Krause's argument was that Louisiana, as a 
southern state, had a long history of discriminatory laws.  Even if Article 
2315 was not intended to be discriminatory, it had become part of a 
larger pattern of legal inequality against African-Americans.  Because of 
this, Krause urged the Supreme Court to find the law unconstitutional 
and in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
He cited Loving v. Virginia, with its anti-miscegenation ruling, to support 
the position that if people were allowed to marry whomever they chose, 
regardless of race, then a child's relationship with his or her mother was 
an equally vital part of the pursuit of happiness.33  These arguments 
from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's amicus brief added important 
details to the racial discrimination aspect that Dorsen had only touched 
on.  Equally interesting, given the ancient traditions that had originally 
led to inequality for illegitimate children, Krause's amicus brief was 
joined by an amicus from the Executive Council of the Episcopal Church 
and the American Jewish Congress, written by Leo Pfeffer, Howard M. 
Squadron and Joseph B. Robison. 
                                                 
32 NAACP brief, Levy, 13-14. 
33 Ibid., 21. 
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The submission of the amicus from the Church organizations 
prompted an announcement in the New York Times, dated December 26, 
1967, under the headline "Protestants and Jews Back Illegitimates' Right 
to Sue."  Their amicus brief focused on property rights and joined Dorsen 
in equating illegitimacy to race.  However, when these groups discussed 
the subject of discrimination and inequality regarding illegitimacy, the 
religious roots of this unequal treatment appeared to have been 
forgotten, or perhaps, ignored.  Both church organizations were 
interested in preserving democracy by opposing infringements on 
liberties and protecting civil rights.  They joined the suit partly because 
they were concerned by the "deepening gulf" between the wealthy and the 
poor in the United States.  Their main point was that the socio-economic 
differences between socio-economic groups could often be found in, 
"legislation based on outmoded concepts of caste and status."34 
The church organizations believed that discrimination against 
illegitimate children was equal to "discrimination based on race and 
other accidents of birth."  They were concerned that laws such as Article 
2315 stood in the way of solving the problem of poverty in America.  They 
also felt that the statute, as it had been interpreted by the lower court, 
deprived the children of their liberty.35 
                                                 
34 Executive Council of the Episcopal Church and the American Jewish Congress 
Amicus Curiae Brief, Levy v. Louisiana, 3. 
35 Episcopal and Jewish Congress brief, Levy, 3-4. 
 142 
     
Finally, the organizations felt obliged to add their amicus brief 
because the decision barring illegitimate children from wrongful death 
suits was arbitrary and irrational and "perpetuates [and] reinforces 
invidious distinctions and a badge of inferiority."  One of the church 
organizations' points was that punishing the children for the wrongs of 
their parents was oppressive.  "In primitive times it was not uncommon 
to punish children for the iniquity of their parents," they wrote.36  Yet, 
over the centuries, law and punishment had changed.  The justification 
behind criminal law was not revenge but deterrence.  They wrote that the 
prejudice shown toward illegitimate children was based on, 
complex combinations of historical, psychological and 
sociological factors. […] The marital status of one's parents, 
like race, should be an utterly neutral factor in determining 
what benefits an individual receives.  Discrimination based 
on the marital status of one's parents, like discrimination 
based on the color of one's parents, shocks the conscience 
because of its fundamentally irrational unfairness.37 
 
The counsel for the church organization reached the conclusion that, 
Article 2315 and the lower court's interpretation of it "[reflected] the 
ancient shame and obloquy suffered by children of unwed mothers."38  
Knowing the centuries of religiously sanctioned discrimination against 
nonmarital children, this sentiment seems incongruous at first, although 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 4, 18. 
37 Ibid., 20, 25. 
38 Ibid., 10-11. 
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it does bring the story of the discrimination of children born outside of a 
traditional marriage full circle. 
In addition to reiterating the points that were already made in the 
two previous briefs, the churches' brief addressed the question of 
whether or not the Supreme Court could interfere with Louisiana's 
statute.  The brief first addressed the point that the suit for wrongful 
death was a property action and the court had a history of not interfering 
in business transactions.  However, Levy was not a matter of business or 
industrial practices but of the loss of property, namely wrongful death 
benefits, without due process.  They saw no reason to exclude illegitimate 
children from wrongful death benefits as it did not serve any state 
purpose and was not "in the public interest."39 
The amicus brief also attacked the state's position that the statute 
was necessary as "it discourages bringing children into the world out of 
wedlock."  Responding to this argument, the attorneys wrote, 
We believe that, where the constitutional rights of so 
'discrete and insular' a minority as illegitimate infants are at 
stake, this Court is not bound by such a statement and may 
look into the reality of the situation.40 
 
For the church, the exclusion of illegitimate children represented hidden 
racism equivalent to the "grandfather clause," as seen in Guinn v. United 
States, 238 US 347, 365 (1913), and invalid redistricting as it appeared 
in Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 US 339 (1960). 
                                                 
39 Episcopal and Jewish Congress brief, Levy, 5-7, 9-10. 
40 Ibid., 10. 
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Finally, the churches' brief suggested that normally, the courts 
could not "pass upon the wisdom of legislation" nor make decisions 
regarding alternative approaches.  The court had to leave these questions 
to the legislature.  However, they argued, in this instant the "Legislature 
has determined that the "general welfare" calls for the sacrifice of the 
welfare of defenseless little children," and the Court must interfere on 
behalf of an oppressed minority.41  The Court had done this before, as 
early as 1886, the brief argued, reminding the Court of Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins 118 US 356 (1886), in which it was determined that, "where a 
particularly disadvantaged group is involved, state action which 
ordinarily might be neutral and hence lawful may in the particular 
circumstances be oppressive and hence unconstitutional."42 
Although the amicus briefs had addressed race and the legal 
discrimination of African-Americans, in his brief, Dorsen spent little time 
arguing the case in relationship to the fact that the Levy children were 
African-American.  Dorsen limited his discussion of race to a single 
sentence and some footnoted statistics, as quoted above.  Additionally, 
his private notes regarding the formation of his brief appear to rule out 
an exclusively African-American racial argument in favor of a broader 
reading of the law.  Thus, every step of his argument was a pointed 
attack against the illogical treatment that the Levy children had received 
                                                 
41 Episcopal and Jewish Congress brief, Levy, 16. 
42 Ibid., 18. 
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from a court system determined to retain power over a group of second-
class citizens, illegitimate children instead of African-Americans. 
 In response to these arguments, the appellee's brief, submitted on 
behalf of the State of Louisiana, Dr. Wing and his insurance company, 
and Charity Hospital of New Orleans, maintained that no discrimination 
had been shown in the interpretation of Article 2315.  The lead author of 
this brief appears to have been William A. Porteous Jr., Dr. Wing's 
attorney, although oral arguments were presented by William A. Porteous 
III.43  In its brief, the state argued four main points.  First, the statute 
was not discriminatory because illegitimate children of all races were 
denied wrongful death benefits.  Their second and third points argued 
against Dorsen's reading of the law.  According to the state, the law did 
not deprive the children of property without due process, nor was it a 
penal statute "penalizing persons on account of their status."  The state's 
final point affirmed that Louisiana law protected the rights of 
illegitimates.44 
The state's argument pointed out that under common law, there 
was no wrongful death benefit to be inherited.  During oral arguments, 
Porteous made a point of this, stating that under Article 2315, wrongful 
death benefits were a privilege, not a right.  Legislation had created the 
                                                 
43 Appellee's Brief, Levy, unpaginated title page.  The other names on the brief 
include William A. Porteous III, Dr. Wing's attorney, Jack P.F. Gremillion, Attorney 
General for Loiusiana, Dorothy D. Wolbrette and L.K. Clement, Jr. Assistant Attorney 
Generals, and Ingard O. Johannesen, attorney for the Board of Administrators of the 
hospital. 
44 Ibid., 2-3. 
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law and, because of that, it had to be subject to a strict scrutiny, which 
allowed the state courts to interpret Article 2315 as excluding illegitimate 
children.  And, the brief maintained, it was the state court's prerogative 
to read the law as they chose; the Supreme Court had no business 
interfering.45 
In response to Dorsen and Adolph Levy's argument that Louise 
had loved her children, the state claimed that Louise's love of her 
children and status as "a good mother" had no bearing on the case.  "The 
law … speaks of its beneficiaries only in terms of status," they wrote.  
Additionally, the state attempted to turn this argument against the 
appellants suggesting that to make an exception for the Levy children 
because their mother loved them as if they were legitimate would actually 
discriminate against unloved illegitimate children.46 
According to the State, the status of illegitimate children was more 
important than their race, an aspect of their argument that echoed 
Dorsen's.  Further, treatises on English law made it plain that the word 
"child," when used within a statute, held the limited meaning of 
legitimate child.  Under Louisiana law, the state argued, it would have 
been possible to legitimate the Levy children.  If only Louise had married 
the children's father, "the Levy children would have enjoyed all of the 
                                                 
45 Levy v. Louisiana Oral Arguments, 267-684 Case #508, Oral Arguments of the 
Supreme Court, available from the Special Media Archives Services Division (NWCS) 
National Archives and Records Administration, Room 3360, 8601 Adelphi Road, College 
Park, MD 20741-6001; Appellee's Brief, Levy, 4-5, 22-26 in passim. 
46 Appellee's Brief, Levy, 6, 12. 
 147 
     
rights of legitimate children."  Additionally, if she had chosen to remain 
unwed, she could have legitimated the children by declaring them 
legitimate in front of two witnesses and a notary public.47  The problem 
with these arguments lies in the question of who is capable of acting on 
these possibilities.  Louise Levy would have had to sign the forms or 
chosen to marry.  Her children had no say in the situation.  However, as 
illegitimates, they remained liable for their mother's choices. 
In answer to the argument that laws related to nonmarital children 
were more burdensome on African-Americans than on other groups, the 
state responded, "The fact that Negroes may be more affected by the 
requirement of legitimacy does not render the statute void."  According to 
the state, Article 2315's main purpose was to "encourage and preserve 
legitimate familial relationships."  Additionally, the statute and similar 
laws promoted traditional marriage in order to regulate property 
inheritance, an aspect of Louisiana law that retained its importance into 
the 1960s as property ownership continued to equate to social status.48 
These briefs were supported by oral arguments in late March, 
1968.  When Dorsen, who was on sabbatical at the time, delivered his 
oral argument, he faced his well-respected, former boss, Justice Harlan.  
Although the oral arguments presented condensed versions of the points 
already detailed in the court briefs, they further illuminated the 
                                                 
47 Appellee's Brief, Levy, 7, 12. 
48 Ibid., 17, 29. 
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questions raised by Levy and showed how Dorsen attempted to increase 
the reach of strict scrutiny while avoiding race on one side and a rational 
basis test on the other.  If the case could be decided only upon the 
question of race, then nonmarital children of other races would remain 
open to discriminatory practices.  And if the court found that the law 
stemmed from a rational basis, no nonmarital child would gain equality. 
The state's most important line of defense in the oral arguments 
was that over forced heirship and the state's right to define who belonged 
to a family.  Forced heirship, a quirk of Louisiana law discussed 
previously, played a significant role in the creation of laws distinguishing 
between the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children, Porteous 
argued.  According to Porteous, this "unique policy" demanded that title 
examiners be able to find every legitimate heir.  He stated, "Hence you 
can begin to appreciate why the question of status in family is so 
important to Louisiana."  He suggested that laws discriminating against 
illegitimate children were a necessary aid in this grueling task.  Porteous 
also justified the discrimination against illegitimate children by drawing 
on "strong family traditions" found in the Code Napoléon.49  His 
argument, as presented, showed that legally belonging to a family was 
very important under Louisiana law.  The principle of inheritance being 
dictated by status within a family could be traced all the way back to the 
Roman Paterfamilias.  There too, the illegitimate child had been denied 
                                                 
49 Levy v. Louisiana Oral Arguments. 
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inheritance rights.  Article 2315 simply continued this ancient tradition.  
However, the Court was concerned.  The principle of forced heirship had 
not been mentioned by the lower court and there was no precedent to 
draw upon.  In the end, it was Porteous' own opinion that Article 2315 
related to forced heirship.50 
Related to this, the second point of interest in the oral arguments 
discussed whether or not there was a rational basis for the classification 
of children as legitimate or illegitimate.  If such a basis existed, the Court 
had no reason to find Article 2315 unconstitutional.  Justice Thurgood 
Marshal broached the subject first, asking Porteous, "What basis is there 
for this classification [of illegitimate]?"  When Porteous asked for 
clarification, did the Justice mean a rational basis, Marshall replied, "No, 
I'm talking about any basis."51 
Thurgood Marshall, who had successfully argued Brown v Board of 
Education in 1955, joined the Supreme Court in 1967 as the first 
African-American Justice, despite the fact that his appointment was 
challenged by Southern Democrats.  For two years, he formed a part of 
the liberal wing of the Warren Court, with Warren, Douglas, Brennan 
and Fortas.  After the formation of the Burger Court under Nixon, he 
joined with Brennan and later Harry Blackmun.  In the forward to 
Randall W. Bland's Justice Thurgood Marshall, Crusader for Liberalism, 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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his Judicial Biography, Henry J. Abraham described Marshall as one of 
the "most reliable, most predictable liberal activists on the high bench, 
voting together [with Brennan] in almost all cases involving claims of 
denial of civil rights and liberties."52  During the Levy oral arguments, in 
response to Marshall's questioning, the defense insisted that the 
classification of individuals was fundamental to legislation.  However, 
Porteous could offer no definitive rational basis for the law and 
concluded that the court should presume it existed, since Article 2315 
was part of long-held public policy in Louisiana.53 
Finally, the Levy discussion turned to race.  As Dorsen stated, he 
couched his argument in the fact that the children were illegitimate, not 
in the fact that they were African-American.  As part of his opening 
remarks, Dorsen reiterated his point that illegitimate children were a 
"discrete and insular minority" with characteristics "similar to the racial 
classification" that the court had dealt with for years.  Dorsen highlighted 
the prejudice faced by illegitimate children and equated their treatment 
with racial prejudice.54 
Porteous' opening statement, "How far are we going to go with the 
Fourteenth Amendment?" led to a reminder that the court had 
traditionally used two criteria, one a strict set of standards that applied 
                                                 
52 Randall W. Bland, Justice Thurgood Marshall, Crusader for Liberalism, His Judicial 
Biography, (Bethesda: Academica Press, LLC, 2001), vii. 
53 Levy v. Louisiana Oral Arguments. 
54 Levy v. Louisiana Oral Arguments. 
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to racist or racial statutes, making them automatically suspect.  The 
court interrupted his argument to reply that they thought Louise's race 
immaterial.  Porteous agreed.  And although Dorsen denied it, Porteous 
accused the appellee's brief of attempting to paint Article 2315 as a racist 
statute.  "And I submit," Porteous continued, 
that the appellants are therefore trying to bring this statute 
within the purview of those cases, Loving v Virginia, 
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, et cetera, where the statute is 
automatically suspect.  And only the most overriding public 
policies may justify it.55 
 
This exchange shows the fine line Dorsen's argument tread.  
Despite the fact that the majority of reported nonmarital children born 
were African-American and working against the popular perception that 
illegitimacy was a "black problem," Dorsen remained steadfast in his 
analysis of the situation.  Illegitimacy was similar to race, but not 
identical.  And the discrimination suffered by illegitimate children was 
unjustified.  However, while it was not a racial issue, the argument 
returned to racial precedent.  Nonmarital children were denied rights 
based on the label they were given, not the actions they had taken.  This 
label followed them throughout their lives, and no action on their part 
would change it.  In this way, they formed a "discrete and insular 
minority."  As children, they had no lobby and no way to petition for 
change.  They were disenfranchised just as earlier racial groups had 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
 152 
     
been.  For these reasons, illegitimate birth status deserved to be treated 
similarly to racial status. 
 When Levy came up in conference, March 29, 1968, Warren 
indicated that he believed the case was simple.  "I can't see any interest 
'that the state can have to exclude illegitimate children for the loss of 
their mother by a tortious act.'"  For Black, the argument swung the 
other way, "This has been an acceptable classification for generations.  
It's bad state policy, but I can't say that it's not a rational one."  
According to Bernard Schwartz' work, Douglas' opinion reversed what 
Warren had said in conference.  His draft, which was omitted from the 
final Levy decision, stated, "Here we are not concerned with alleged 
'wrongdoers' but with people born out of wedlock who were not 
responsible for their conception or for their birth."56 
On May 20, 1968, the court ruled in favor of the Levy children and 
Justice William O. Douglas issued the court's opinion.  Justice Douglas 
began with the assertion that "illegitimate children are not 'nonpersons.'  
They are humans, live, and have their being.  They are clearly 'persons' 
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 57  As Dorsen had argued and the state had maintained, 
the fact that the Levy children were African-American was less relevant 
                                                 
56 Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief, Earl Warren and His Supreme Court -- A Judicial 
Biography, (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 715-716. 
57 Opinions from http://supreme.justia.com/us/391/68/case.html, [Accessed on 
3/31/2010]. 
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to the case than was their status as illegitimate children.  The Supreme 
Court also found the classification of illegitimacy unrelated to the ability 
to sue for wrongful death and survivor benefits.  At the end of his 
opinion, Justice Douglas wrote, "We conclude that it is invidious to 
discriminate against them when no action, conduct, or demeanor of 
theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother.58 
Justices Harlan, Black, and Potter Stewart dissented, disagreeing 
on two of the majority's points.  First, they felt that discrimination 
against illegitimate children was necessary to strengthen the position of 
formal marriage within society.59  Harlan wrote, "These decisions [in Levy 
and Glona] can only be classed as constitutional curiosities."  He 
concluded that the majority opinion was best described as "brute 
force."60  In addition to questioning the validity of the argument that love 
played a role in deciding who had a claim to wrongful death benefits, the 
dissenters concluded that the state's had the right to choose who could 
claim these benefits and how a family was legitimately formed.  The 
arbitrary nature of the categories created by the states was not the 
court's concern, but the legislature's.  Harlan stated that he was "at a 
loss" to understand the swing that the court had made in deciding 
familial relationships based on biology instead of legal ties, which it had 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 Gray and Rudovsky, "The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate," 17-18. 
60 Harlan's Dissent, Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. 391 U.S. 76. Found at 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/391/73/case.html [Accessed on 9/01/2010].  Because 
Levy and Glona were heard in tandem, Harlan's dissent applied to both cases. 
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upheld previously.  According to a number of sources, the word "child" 
when used in wrongful death statutes meant only a legitimate child, and 
illegitimate children had been traditionally excluded in America and 
Canada.61  His citations do not mention French sources, suggesting that 
Louisiana's Civil Code tradition was not an issue for the Supreme Court. 
 Additionally, Harlan did not see the classification of illegitimate 
children as a minority group as inherently suspect.  Therefore, the 
question was not open to strict scrutiny.  For Harlan, the strictest 
scrutiny pertained only to cases of racial discrimination.  His reasoning 
can be found in his dissent in Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970), in 
which he explains his understanding of the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In that dissent, he wrote, "I am of the opinion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority of 
the States to allocate their political power as they see fit."  Instead, for 
Harlan, its purpose was to ensure racial equality for only a short time 
after the Civil War and it only applied to the former Confederate States.62 
With the Supreme Court's ruling, the case was returned to the 
lower courts.  Porteous, on behalf of the defendant parties, appealed the 
decision.  It is within that appeal that Levy's true legacy is most plainly 
voiced, "The Court has fundamentally altered the interpretative 
guidelines of the equal protection of the laws clause by making the test of 
                                                 
61 Harlan's Dissent, Glona, 76-79, footnote 2/2. 
62 Harlan's Dissent, Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. at 154 and 170.  Found at 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/400/112/case.html [Accessed on 9/17/2010]. 
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constitutionality rationally in the mind of the court."63  This fundamental 
alteration was the beginning of intermediate, or heightened, scrutiny, a 
level of consideration residing between the strict scrutiny of statutes 
based solely on race, and the deference to state legislatures and 
presupposition of constitutionality.  Because heightened scrutiny came 
into existence with relation to non-racial categories, it divorced the equal 
protection clause from previous interpretations that limited it to race, 
creed, or color.  From Levy forward, equal protection could be granted to 
any labeled category of person.  The appeal was denied, but Louisiana's 
Supreme Court wished to have the final say. 
 Usually, when the Supreme Court overturned a case, it returned to 
the lower court for action.  However, upon Levy's return, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court and District Court reinterpreted the higher court's 
decision.64  The Louisiana Supreme Court informed Adolph J. Levy that 
they would hear his oral arguments in November 1968 and they asked 
him to submit a brief that, 
cover[ed] the effect of the United States Supreme Court's 
opinion upon Article 2315. […] whether it knock[ed] out that 
portion pertaining to legitimate children, or if it tend[ed] to 
amend the statute, and, if so, by what authority [could] the 
Supreme Court of the United States amend a state statute, 
etc.65 
 
                                                 
63 Appellee Brief for Rehearing, Levy, 2. 
64 Gray and Rudovsky, "The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate," 9. 
65 Dorsen's papers, Letter to AJ Levy from Supreme Court of LA dated 6/27/1968. 
Box 32 folder 16. 
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Melvin Wulf, legal director of the ACLU, replied that he thought it would 
not be, "too difficult to get up a little brief to explain to them exactly what 
the Constitution and United States Supreme Court [were] all about."  The 
lower court then interpreted the Supreme Court's decision to mean that 
nobody could inherit wrongful death benefits from their mother!  As 
Dorsen stated, "the state maintained that this eliminated discrimination 
against the illegitimate children (we would now call them nonmarital 
children) because they were being treated like everyone else."  Together 
with Dorsen, Levy wrote a brief for the court.66 
In December 1968, Justice Mack E. Barham delivered the 
Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion, tracing the history of Article 2315 
back to the Napoleonic Code.  Afterward, he wrote that the U.S. Supreme 
Court's actions had declared at least a portion of Article 2315 
unconstitutional, since judicial review could not change state legislation.  
He concludes, 
The members of this court may totally disagree with the 
reasoning and the result of the United States Supreme Court 
majority opinion and may agree with the dissent of Justice 
Harlan wherein it was said that the majority resolved the 
issue in this case "by a process that can only be described as 
brute force."67 
 
Although, on the surface, these words may appear to be aimed at 
furthering discrimination against nonmarital children, the fact that 
                                                 
66 Dorsen's papers, Letter from Melvin Wulf to AJ Levy dated 8/1/1968. Box 32, 
Folder 16; Norman Dorsen, email correspondence with author, 4/20/2010. 
67 Levy v State, 253 La. 79; 216 So. 2d 818, 1968. 
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Justice Barham began his opinion by tracing Article 2315's history back 
to the Napoleonic Code suggests that the court's actions remained rooted 
in their long-standing antagonistic relationship with the federal 
government.  Louisiana was proud of their French heritage and they saw 
the Supreme Court's actions as an attempt at forced conformity. 
 The Court's decision itself made few headlines.  Dorsen described 
the case as being "rather outside the usual run of litigation."68  The day 
after the Court's opinion was announced, The Times-Picayune, one of 
New Orleans' newspapers, ran a short column on page fifteen, section 
one, under the headline, "La. Illegitimate Children have Right to 
Lawsuits."  The column highlighted Douglas' argument regarding the 
personhood of nonmarital children as well as the dissenter's opinion that 
the decision was an example of brute force.  The New York Times' article 
of the same day suggested that Douglas' opinion "erected a barrier 
against anti-illegitimacy laws in general," while The Washington Post's 
article regarding the Levy decision hinted at the likelihood that 
Alabama's welfare regulations, which were based on "social policy," 
would also be struck down by the Supreme Court. 
While the struggle to provide equal treatment to nonmarital 
children continued after Levy, for the Levy children, their moment in the 
spotlight of history ended.  Despite the attempted appeal and the delay at 
the state level, they received $60,000 dollars for their mother's wrongful 
                                                 
68 Norman Dorsen, email correspondence with author, 4/20/2010. 
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death.  Given their young age and the fact that they never took part in 
the trial, it is unlikely the Levy children realized the important role their 
family's tragedy played in legal and childhood history. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LIFE AFTER LEVY 
In his tribute to Norman Dorsen, written upon Dorsen's retirement 
from the ACLU presidency, Stephen Gillers began by quoting his subject, 
"Well, there it is.  What does it all mean?"1  While Gillers' piece goes on to 
discuss Dorsen's philosophical and practical sides, Dorsen's question fits 
rather nicely at this point in the study of Levy v Louisiana.  From 
paterfamilias to filius nullius, the history of nonmarital children shows 
them consistently occupying a disadvantaged place in Western society.  
Although this project has focused on the United States and 
Revolutionary France, the Enlightenment contributed to a shift in 
perceptions regarding illegitimacy throughout Western Culture and this 
shift slowly improved the lives of these children and their parents.  Levy's 
history was woven from a variety of strands and each one continued 
beyond 1968. 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, as American culture continued to 
shift away from finding fault in nonmarital children, the problem of their 
birth became redefined as a problem of unwed mothers.  In addition to 
official government reports, the National Council on Illegitimacy worked 
through the decades to improve policy makers' understanding of 
illegitimacy, with the intention of improving laws related to nonmarital 
                                                 
1 Stephen Gillers, "Truth, Justice, and White Paper," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review 27 (1992), 319. 
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children.  In 1969, they released a series of reports entitled The Double 
Jeopardy, the Triple Crisis – Illegitimacy Today.  As part of this collection, 
Gertrude Leyendecker presented "Children in Double Jeopardy," which 
highlighted the continued belief that "illegitimate" children were a threat 
to family cohesion.  According to her, children of poor, single women 
lived in double jeopardy; the family was not intact and the family was 
poor.  Leyendecker felt that women stressed by economic issues would 
take that stress out on their children, her assumption being that 
children of unwed mothers were burdensome and only grudgingly cared 
for by family members.  Leyendecker concluded her research by 
summarizing the legal inequalities faced by illegitimate children, 
highlighting common practices that continued even after Levy.  In 
addition to those explored in earlier chapters, mothers of nonmarital 
children were compelled to begin paternity proceedings if the father did 
not voluntarily support the child and she needed public assistance.  In 
these cases, the court decided the amount of financial support without 
considering the father's, mother's, or child's needs.  Additionally, the 
fathers of these children had no custodial rights or visitation privileges.2 
Karl D. Zukerman also presented a summary of illegitimacy law, 
drawing primarily on Krause's work, as part of this report.  Zukerman 
wrote that there were two "true-but-not-true" statements related to 
                                                 
2 Gertrude Leyendecker, "Children in Double Jeopardy," in The Double Jeopardy, the 
Triple Crisis -- Illegitimacy Today.  (National Council on Illegitimacy, National Council of 
Social Welfare, 1969), 35-36, 42. 
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illegitimate children.  The first was that, "An illegitimate child is 
illegitimate because the law denotes him as such," and "An illegitimate 
child bears various burdens and suffers various disabilities as an 
illegitimate because the law says he should."  He called them "true-but-
not-true" because while the statements were technically true, the legal 
definition and legal burdens placed upon nonmarital children were not 
the only things that set them apart from marital children.  According to 
Zukerman, there were differences beyond the law that related to 
strengthening the traditional family.3 
Zukerman saw a common thread running through laws related to 
illegitimacy, namely, protection of the family unit.  Yet, he noted, "Clearly 
the laws affecting illegitimacy have neither deterred illegitimacy nor 
guaranteed the family as a social institution."  He also questioned 
whether the family unit deserved protection.  If it did, he asked, was it 
appropriate to punish one group of people in order to make another 
group feel guilty about their behavior?4  As the decades passed, a greater 
variety of family forms emerged in the United States, some of them, such 
as surrogate parenthood, contributing to the softening opinion toward 
illegitimacy.5 
                                                 
3 Karl D. Zukerman, "Social Attitudes and the Law," in The Double Jeopardy, the 
Triple Crisis -- Illegitimacy Today.  (National Council on Illegitimacy, National Council of 
Social Welfare, 1969), 69. 
4 Ibid., 76. 
5 For more on surrogate parenting and its legal complications see Marsha Garrison, 
"Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal 
Parentage," Harvard Law Review 113, no. 4 (Feb. 2000): 835-923. 
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In 1981, Francis Allen's The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 
Penal Policy and Social Purpose, touched upon the changing modern 
family of the United States.  "The reality of the modern American family 
is that its authority in the area of child rearing has been significantly 
displaced by the state, the schools, "experts," peer groups, and the 
market," Allen wrote.  Public policy increasingly allowed the state to 
interfere with the family.  Juvenile courts, public schools and child 
welfare agencies all participated in this interference with parental 
authority.  Additionally, the "post-Hiroshima, post-Vietnam, post-
Watergate" United States had become more cynical and pessimistic 
regarding many aspects of society.  This skepticism then combined with 
the "diminution of family authority."  Other changes in family authority 
could be traced to the rise of a youth culture along with market 
pressures and the advent of television.  Allen concluded that perceptions 
of the family were also changing from a "hierarchical structure 
characterized by mandatory mutual obligations to an arrangement of 
convenience designed to advance the personal satisfactions and self-
fulfillment of its individual members."6 
Steven Mintz, in Huck's Raft, also delved into this changing family 
structure.  He wrote, "It became part of the conventional wisdom that the 
student radicalism of the 1960s was largely a by-product of the military 
                                                 
6 Francis Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, Penal Policy and Social 
Purpose, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 18-22. 
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draft and that when the draft was replaced by a lottery and later a 
volunteer army, student militancy quickly dissipated."  But, as Mintz 
points out, many of the changing values associated with the radical 
1960s actually occurred in the 1970s.  These changes included increased 
drug use and younger children becoming sexually active, which led to 
controversial issues of access to contraceptives and abortions.  The 
1970s also saw an exponential growth in divorce rates, single parents, 
both married previously and unmarried, and fulltime working mothers.  
During these years, public panics erupted over teen pregnancy, stranger 
abductions, child abuse, illicit drugs, and juvenile crime.  Economically, 
wages of noncollege graduates fell, "leading many young people to 
postpone marriage."7 
Economics played an important role in the changing family 
pattern.  During the "stagflation" of the 1970s, two incomes were 
required to maintain a middle-class lifestyle.  This limited the number of 
children born.  Self-supporting women also chose to become mothers 
without marrying or chose to leave an unhappy marriage.  Men without a 
college education made poor wages, which translated into them being 
seen as undesirable marriage partners.8 
These changes and others led to, "A grossly inflated and misplaced 
sense of crisis," over children and their well-being.  Panics erupted 
                                                 
7 Mintz, Huck's Raft, 334. 
8 Mintz, Huck's Raft, 342.  
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through the last quarter of the twentieth century.  Many of them followed 
a similar pattern; the media reported an "epidemic" or a "growing 
number" of children facing a crisis.  As the story spread, the numbers 
became inflated.  For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, reports 
claimed that half a million children were kidnapped each year, with as 
many as 50,000 of them murdered by strangers.  Later research showed 
that the actual numbers were between 500 and 600 annual kidnappings 
by strangers, with approximately fifty of those ending in murder.9 
At this same time, a rising number of single-parent homes, many 
of them stemming from the increasing divorce rate, appeared to provide 
evidence of the decline.  However, more recent statistics highlight the 
positive aspects of the changes that occurred in the 1970s.  Families 
grew smaller, for example, allowing parents to devote more time to the 
children they did have.  Many of these children attended preschool, 
gaining important preparation for later education, while their mothers 
worked full time.  Studies showed that women who worked outside the 
home suffered from less depression than those who stayed home 
fulltime.10  However, these changing family patterns were not easily 
accepted by society. 
Questions related to who belonged in a family were not easy to 
answer and the legal history surrounding Levy suggests that the courts 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 336-337. 
10 Mintz, Huck's Raft, 341. 
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have not provided any definitive answers.  Illustrative of the difficulty 
surrounding changing family law and shifting definitions of "family," in 
Louisiana, after the state Supreme Court's attempted reinterpretation of 
Levy, laws related to nonmarital children remained basically unchanged.  
According to Robert A. Pascal, as of 1970, Louisiana allowed all 
legitimated persons equal protection from the day they were legitimated.  
Although the law still barred children of incest from gaining legitimacy, 
the process for legitimizing other children remained nearly the same.  If 
their parents married and if they acknowledged the child as their child, 
either formally or informally, the child became legitimate.  Also, if either 
parent acknowledged the child before a notary, the child would be 
legitimate.  However, these procedures still relied upon the action of the 
parents.11 
Yet, the Supreme Court's final opinion in Levy divorced nonmarital 
children from the actions of their parents and struck against centuries of 
long-held traditions that discouraged births outside of a traditional 
marriage by imposing disadvantages upon the children.  Even though its 
local impact was miniscule, Levy laid the groundwork for a series of 
cases that continued to expand legal protection for nonmarital children, 
including access to welfare benefits and paternal visitation rights and 
financial support. 
                                                 
11 Pascal, "Louisiana Succession and Related Laws and the Illegitimate," 167. 
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The first case influenced by Levy was Glona v. American Guarantee 
Company, 391 U.S. 73 (1968).  It was heard the same day as Levy 
because it argued against the constitutionality of the same Louisiana 
law, although Glona's argument approached the law from the other side.  
In Glona, Minnie Brade Glona, a resident of Texas, sued an insurance 
company for wrongful death benefits when her illegitimate son was killed 
in a car accident while in Louisiana.  In Texas, she would have been able 
to collect benefits.  However, because her son died in Louisiana, 
Louisiana's Article 2315 allowed the insurance company to deny her 
claim.12 
A few short years after the court handed down their decision in 
Levy, they heard a similar case, Labine v. Vincent 401 U.S. 532 (1971).  
However, in the intervening years, the make-up of the court had 
changed; Chief Justice Warren had retired to be replaced by Chief 
Justice Warren Burger.  Warren had tried to ensure his successor would 
be a liberal by resigning while Lyndon B. Johnson was still president.  
But scandal forced Johnson to withdraw his nomination of, Abe Fortas, 
who was later forced him to resign.  This gave Nixon the opportunity to 
name the next Chief Justice as well as an Associate Justice.13 
                                                 
12 Zingo and Early, Nameless Persons, 42; Glona v. American Guarantee Company 
(391 U.S. 73 (1968), found at Justia.com, 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/391/68/case.html, [Accessed on 4/25/10]. 
13 Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren, 4, 13-14. 
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Nixon wanted to appoint a strict constructionist, someone who 
would interpret the Constitution close to its literal intent, to join Justices 
Stewart and Harlan in an attempt to break Warren's liberal majority.  
Nixon saw Burger as a "voice of reason, of enlightened conservatism-firm, 
direct and fair."14  Burger, as a member of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, was described in The Brethren as, a 
"vocal dissenter whose law-and-order opinions made the headlines.  He 
was no bleeding heart or social activist, but a professional judge, a man 
of solid achievement."15  But, upon the announcement of Burger's 
appointment, an "unnamed judge who had worked with Burger on the 
Court of Appeals said, "[Burger] is a very emotional guy, who somehow 
tends to make you take the opposition position on issues.  To suggest 
that he can bring the [Supreme] Court together--as hopefully a Chief 
Justice should--is simply a dream."16 
Burger's legal skills were not well regarded.  He was among the 
least productive justices and, to quote Keith E. Whittington's "The Burger 
Court(1969-1986)," "[Burger] often frustrated his colleagues with his 
relatively weak understanding of the cases, and his opinions rarely won 
praise for either their reasoning or their style."17  After Nixon's 
appointments, many observers "expected that the Burger Court would 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 7, 13-14.  
15 Ibid., 6. 
16 Ibid., 19. 
17 Whittington, "The Burger Court," 302. 
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mount a counterrevolution against the Warren legacy.  Those 
expectations generally went unfulfilled."   Instead, Burger created a path 
for the Renquist court of the 1980s to follow.  Under Burger, criminal 
aspects of law were more often changed than the civil rights principles. 
At the same time, the Burger court attempted to protect state and 
local governments from the federal government.  Whittington writes, 
"Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court had given the federal 
government a largely free hand to take action without concern for the 
constitutional boundaries between state and federal powers."18  
Additionally, the Burger Court set new records for the number of 
dissenting opinions it produced, twice as many plurality opinions than 
had been produced in the entire history of the Court.  Decisions were 
usually made by one-vote majorities.19 
"Although appointed by Republican presidents, the members of the 
Burger Court were ideologically diverse, reflecting the political goals and 
contexts of the presidents who nominated them," Whittington wrote.  
Because of this diversity, swing votes held the power during the Burger 
Court and key opinions were written by centrists while Renquist and 
Brennan "did verbal battle from the wings."20 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 306, 319. 
19 Ibid., 320. 
20 Whittington, "The Burger Court," 320.  For more on the transition between the 
Warren Court and the Burger Court see Stephen L. Wasby, Continuity and Change: 
From the Warren Court to the Burger Court, (Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing 
Company, 1976). 
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Despite the fact that the Court's line-up had changed, the laws in 
question in Labine came out of Louisiana and the state's mixed 
jurisdiction.  But this time, the Court upheld Louisiana's viewpoint and 
Labine's decision contradicted Levy.21  Because Justice Douglas' 
reasoning in the Levy opinion was vague, and because Levy related to 
the mother-child relationship, there was room for a different 
interpretation when the father-child relationship lay at the heart of the 
case, as it did in Labine.  In Labine, an illegitimate child attempted to 
gain a share of her natural father's intestate property.  Rather than 
granting the child any inheritance, the Court decided that the estate 
would pass to the father's other relatives.  According to Justice Black's 
opinion for the court, it was within the state's power to create succession 
laws that strengthened the family.  Additionally, the Labine decision drew 
upon the provision of the Napoleonic Code that stated, in part, that 
illegitimate children could not claim the same rights as legitimate 
children.22 
For the Burger Court, the lack of a will passing part of the father's 
estate to his nonmarital child was not an "insurmountable barrier," like 
that presented in Levy.  Black wrote that because tort damages were 
involved in Levy, the Court had ruled it discriminatory to differentiate 
                                                 
21 Meeusen, "Judicial Disapproval of Discrimination against Illegitimate Children," 
123. 
22 Labine v. Vincent 401 U.S. 532 (1971).  Available from Justia.com 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/401/532/case.html [Accessed on 9/25/10]; Labine at 
534. Compare to "A natural child acknowledged cannot claim the rights of a legitimate 
child." Title III, section II, Napoleonic Code. 
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between legitimate and illegitimate children.  He continued, "Levy did not 
say, and cannot fairly be read to say, that a State can never treat an 
illegitimate child differently from legitimate offspring."23  Brennan, joined 
by Stewart, Marshall, and White, replied with a cutting dissent.  In it, 
Brennan chastised the court for ignoring Louisiana's discriminatory 
treatment of illegitimate children.  In his opinion, Louisiana's laws 
treated illegitimate children differently and that distinction was 
unconstitutional.  He went further, complaining about the court's 
dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment simply to, "[…] uphold the 
untenable and discredited moral prejudice of bygone centuries which 
vindictively punished not only the illegitimates' parents, but also the 
hapless and innocent children."  Brennan concluded, "Based upon such 
a premise, today's decision cannot even pretend to be a principled 
decision."24   What Labine and Levy show, however, is the fluid nature of 
legal interpretation.  Regardless of the theory that the fundamental 
principles of law are immutable, the fact remains that those principles 
will always be open to interpretation and as the interpreters change, the 
implementation of the law will also change.  However, despite the 
challenge from Labine and the changing make-up of the court, Levy 
continued to influence later cases. 
                                                 
23 Labine v. Vincent at 536. 
24 Brennan's Dissent, Labine v Vincent at 541. 
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The next case to draw on Levy was Weber v. Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 (1972).  In Weber, a father of four 
legitimate children and two unacknowledged illegitimate children died on 
the job.  His workman's compensation insurance paid the maximum 
amount of survivor benefits to each of his legitimate children, leaving the 
two nonmarital children with nothing.  Although the state insisted that 
Levy did not relate to the case, the Supreme Court found that relegating 
the two illegitimate children to a distinct class had no bearing on how 
workman's compensation benefits should be shared out to survivors, 
echoing the opinion espoused in Levy.25 
In 1973, both Levy and Weber served as precedent for voiding a 
New Jersey law that only provided welfare benefits to traditional families.  
In New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), 
nonmarital children sought support equal to that given to legitimate 
children.  This case revisited the argument that punishing children for 
the choices made by their parents was ineffectual. 26  However, many of 
the cases that followed Weber did not return to Levy, perhaps finding a 
more concrete decision in the later case.  Additionally, by not returning 
to Levy, these later cases avoided Labine's contradictory ruling.  Finally, 
cases such as Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) and Pickett v. 
                                                 
25 Zingo and Early, Nameless Persons, 60; Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company, found at Justia.com Supreme Court Center, 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/406/164/index.html, [Accessed on 4/25/10]. 
26 Zingo and Early, Nameless Persons, 61; New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. 
Cahill (411 U.S. 619 (1973), found at Justia.com Supreme Court Center, 
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Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983), explored various aspects of paternity and the 
rights of nonmarital children to collect child support from their fathers, 
which did not need to address the mother-child relationship that was 
central to Levy.27  Because of these combined factors, Levy slipped into 
obscurity and scholars have overlooked its influence. 
For Dorsen, who believed the case would be decided in his favor 
even before oral arguments were presented, Levy was almost a foregone 
conclusion.  Although he would have been unsure of the outcome a 
decade earlier, by 1968 the ACLU and its allies "had chalked up" several 
victories and the Supreme Court had often decided civil rights cases 
favorably.  Additionally, Dorsen felt that, "the facts of the case were so 
outrageous that they would appeal to a majority of the Court as an 
injustice that should be rectified."  Years later, he would describe Levy as 
a favorite among the cases that he argued, "because it involved a new 
issue [illegitimacy] for the Court and because the result would help so 
many people."28 
Dorsen's work on Levy provided much more than improved legal 
standing for illegitimate children, it touched off the creation of 
intermediate scrutiny, allowing the court to address discrimination of 
                                                 
27 Pickett v Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983), found at Justia.com Supreme Court Center, 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/462/1/case.html; Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 
(1982), found at Justia.com Supreme Court Center, 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/456/91/case.html, [Accessed on 4/25/2010]. 
28 Norman Dorsen, email correspondence with author, 4/20/2010.  Dorsen notes 
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at the Constitutional level. 
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"distinct and insular minorities" other than racial minorities.  The 
beginnings of intermediate scrutiny were only possible by rendering 
immaterial the fact that the Levy children were African-American.  By 
ignoring the argument for racial equality, Dorsen expanded civil and 
constitutional rights in new directions.  In his dissenting opinion for 
Oregon v Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970), which pertained to eighteen-year-
old voting rights, Justice Douglas supplied an appendix enumerating 
many cases related to improved civil rights.29  His appendix showed that 
the equal protection clause had been used to strike down statutes 
unrelated to race for years.  In addition to categories such as statutes for 
and against businesses and those related to taxes, Douglas' list included 
statutes related to the treatment of criminals, the poor, immigrants, and 
illegitimate children, under which he listed Levy v. Louisiana.  
Even though the argument in Levy avoided race, as seen in 
chapter four, racial stereotypes created an important backdrop for the 
case and informed the lives of Louise Levy and her five children. After 
Levy, despite the fact that stereotypes remained in place regarding poor, 
unwed, African-American mothers and the families they formed, legally, 
their children could not be held accountable for the choices their parents 
made.  The changing legal climate eased the taboo nature of illegitimacy 
and through the 1970s there was a sharp increase in both out-of-
                                                 
29 Oregon v Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970).  Douglas' dissent can be found at 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/400/112/case.html#135. [Accessed on 10/04/2010]. 
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wedlock births and divorce.  This led to an increase in female-headed 
households for both African-Americans and European-Americans.  
Although the rate of female-headed households increased for both 
African-American and European-American women, African-Americans 
were more likely to live in a single-parent household.  These single parent 
households were also more likely to suffer from poverty, making it more 
difficult to raise children in this family form.30 
Scholars began weeding racial stereotypes regarding African-
American families from their work in the 1970s and 1980s.  Harriette 
Pipes McAdoo theorized that a growing percentage of single-parent 
homes were caused by economic stress and both wrote and edited 
several works on the topic.  One of these, Black Children: Social, 
Educational, and Parental Environments, presented statistics from 1984 
that showed women headed 47% of African-American families.  That 
percentage remained stable through 1996.  In that year, 70.4% of 
African-American children were born to unwed mothers.31  In her work, 
McAdoo acknowledged that family patterns were changing in all U.S. 
families but single-parent households made up a larger percentage 
among African-American families.  McAdoo felt that this was because of a 
gender imbalance.  "There were simply not enough men available who 
                                                 
30 Suzanne M. Bianchi, Household Composition and Racial Inequality, (New  
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981), 3, 5, 30-31. 
31 Anderson J. Franklin, Nancy Boyd-Franklin, Charlene V. Draper, "A Psychological 
and Educational Perspective on Black Parenting," in Black Children: Social, Educational, 
and Parental Environments, 2nd ed. Harriette Pipes McAdoo ed.   (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2002), 124. 
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would make good husbands."32  This imbalance caused marriages to 
break, if they formed at all, she concluded. 
Economic stress was especially hard on single parents, regardless 
of race.  As support networks dwindled through the 1980s, single 
parents struggled to provide for the basic needs of their children.  "Many 
a single parent feels overwhelmed by the demands of everyday living," 
Nancy Boyd-Franklin wrote in an essay appearing in Black Children 
(2002).  This stress was magnified for African-American single parents 
because half of them lived below the poverty level, compared to 30% of 
European-American single parents.33  Bette J. Dickerson, writing in 
1995, took issue with African-American stereotypes that stemmed from 
the 1960s.  The Moynihan Report had labeled African-American single 
mothers dysfunctional.  In Dickerson's opinion, this came from a "culture 
of poverty perspective," the poor were resigned to their fate and little 
could be done for them.  This in turn was based on "the bias that 
considers two-parent families to be superior to single-mother-headed 
families."34  Statistics from 1989 showed that women who had never 
married headed one-third of all female-headed families.  Additionally, 
almost one million babies were born out of wedlock each year, a one in 
                                                 
32 Harriette Pipes McAdoo, "Diverse Children of Color: Research and Policy 
Implications," in Black Children: Social, Educational, and Parental Environments, 2nd ed. 
Harriette Pipes McAdoo ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002), 19. 
33 Franklin, Boyd-Franklin, Draper, "A Psychological and Educational Perspective on 
Black Parenting," Black Children, 125. 
34 Bette J. Dickerson, "Introduction," in African American Single Mothers: 
Understanding Their Lives and Families. Sage Series on Race and Ethnic Relations vol. 
10, Bette J. Dickerson ed.  (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995), xii. 
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four ratio.  According to Dickerson, divorce was the leading factor, not 
sex before marriage.  "Contrary to popular opinion," she wrote, "African 
Americans and teenagers do not account for the majority of out-of-
wedlock births.  European-American women actually have the majority of 
such births and are the fastest growing category of unwed mothers.35 
At the same time, K. Sue Jewell's Survival of the African-American 
Family: The Institutional Impact of U.S. Social Policy showed a steady rise 
in births to unmarried women of both races throughout the latter half of 
the twentieth century.  Jewell attributed differences in illegitimacy rates 
between racial groups to varying teen marriage rates.  If a teenage girl 
marries, her child is legitimate.36  This concern for single, teenage 
mothers can also be seen in Charles Murray's Losing Ground: American 
Social Policy, 1950-1980 (1984).  Perhaps symptomatic of the crises that 
erupted during these decades, Murray's work highlighted the overall 
increase in illegitimate children and then further emphasized the 
disparate numbers between "Black and other" versus "White" illegitimate 
births.37  His work implied the return of the stereotype that African-
American women were more promiscuous than other races.  He wrote, 
"The fertility rate among black teenagers that was so high relative to the 
rest of the developed world in 1980 had gone down by 28 percent since 
                                                 
35 Dickerson, "Introduction," African American Single Mothers, xiv.  
36 K. Sue Jewell, Survival of the African American Family: The Institutional Impact of 
U.S. Social Policy, (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 92-93. 
37 Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980, 10th 
anniversary ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1984, 1994), 126.  Figure 9.1 graphs the 
number of illegitimate births per 1,000 according to "white" and "black and other."  
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1971. […] If the [Westoff] study had been limited to illegitimate births, 
the fertility rate of U.S. black teenagers would have been much further 
out of proportion to the international range than it already was. (original 
emphasis)"38  Murray's work was "neither systematic empirical analysis 
by the author nor a balanced synthesis of research by others," Victor R. 
Fuchs wrote in his 1985 review.  He continued, "It is, rather, a polemic 
that uses data and quotations selectively in support of its arguments, 
while ignoring those data and research findings that point in the opposite 
direction."39  However, Murray's three conclusions made an impact on 
social policy during the Reagan administration.40  Those conclusions 
were, in part, that the social policies of the 1960s and 1970s had failed, 
that the failure was inevitable because "social programs in a democratic 
society tend to produce net harm," and that the programs had been 
morally wrong.41 
 As the numbers of children both born to and living with single 
parents has increased, the legal problems faced by nonmarital children 
have faded.  Most Western countries have removed many of the laws that 
discriminated against nonmarital children, including those related to 
                                                 
38 Murray, Losing Ground, 127. 
39 Victor R. Fuchs, "Review of Losing Ground," Population and Development Review 
11, No. 4 (Dec., 1985): 769. 
40 A New York Times article dated February 3, 1985, titled "Losing More Ground" 
opines that the Reagan "budget-cutters" took Murray's work as their Bible, citing its 
philosophy as the basis for proposals to cut education, child nutrition, and housing 
assistance programs. 
41 Victor R. Fuchs, "Review of Losing Ground," 769; Murray, Losing Ground, 218-
219. 
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property rights and financial support.  They are no longer filius nullius.  
However, with the loss of legal focus, these children have also faded from 
view, becoming as obscure as those in Levy.  Although laws had never 
completely stopped people from creating children out-of-wedlock, with no 
laws to dissuade them, the rate of nonmarital births has continued to 
grow.  According to Witte, now 38% of all American children, up from 
11% in 1970, and more than 69% of all African-American children, are 
born out-of-wedlock.  Most of these children continue to suffer poverty, 
poor education, deprivation and child abuse, juvenile delinquency and 
criminal conduct, he asserts.42 
For Witte, understanding how we treat children who were once 
nobody's helps us understand the fundamental importance of equality 
under the legal system of the United States.  Understanding how the 
argument was made in favor of nonmarital children helps us see further 
inconsistencies within the law as it now stands.43  One of the most 
persistent inconsistencies in the United States relates to the children of 
illegal immigrants, many of them born in the United States and therefore 
entitled to citizenship.  Also, many children of illegal immigrants who are 
not born in the United States grow up considering themselves citizens.  
An example of this similarity can be found in Plyler v. Doe 457 U.S. 202 
(1982), in which the court compared the treatment of the children of 
                                                 
42 Witte, The Sins of the Fathers, 7-8; Garrison, "Law Making for Baby Making," 839, 
note 9. 
43 Witte, Sins of the Fathers, 157-158. 
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illegal immigrants to those born illegitimate.  In ruling that children of 
illegal immigrants had a right to a public education, the court found little 
justification for denying an education to undocumented children and 
maintained that without a public education, the Texas statute in 
question "imposed the lifetime stigma of illiteracy" on the children.44  
Continuing the struggle over how to interpret the Constitution, Burger 
dissented in Plyler, citing his belief that by ruling in favor of the 
undocumented children, the Court was making policy, rather than 
judging it.45 
And what of Peter Stearn's call for increasing the presence of 
children in history by focusing on them as subjects of study, rather than 
objects discussed by others?  Children, as a rule, did not testify before 
the Supreme Court, so is it possible to read their voices into these 
documents?  Although they did not testify as children, many do share 
their experiences after becoming adults.  Additionally, by exploring the 
shifting definition of which children are worth protecting under the law, 
we increase our understanding of where children fit in what Christopher 
Tomlins refers to as "the facts of life," or the "institutional and 
imaginative contexts that give meaning to human action.  After the 
American Revolution, law became the main source for organizing how 
                                                 
44 Susan E. Babb, "Analysis of an Analogy: Undocumented Children and Illegitimate 
Children," University of Illinois Law Review (1983): 701. Plyler v Doe 457 U.S. 223. 
Found at http://supreme.justia.com/us/457/202/case.html [Accessed 9/25/10]. 
45 Burger's Dissent, Plyler v Doe at 242. 
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people viewed the world and human activity within it. 46  Because of this 
position, law was used to categorize society.  Children born outside a 
traditional marriage have always been a part of society.  The 
classification that they are different from those born inside a marriage 
speaks to the perceived foundational structures of Western society.  
Although the accepted truth is that marriage is preferred and children 
should be born to parents who are wed to each other, the existence of 
children born outside marriage suggests other possibilities.  However, as 
these laws show, the preferred ordering of society rejects those 
alternatives.  Finally, children who have traditionally been objects of legal 
discussion have increasingly become the subjects, especially as the 
definition of children's rights has expanded.  In this way, legal analysis 
does help illuminate the lives of children.  Moreover, by focusing on large 
categories of children, such as those born outside a traditional marriage, 
it is possible to gather enough minute sounds together to give them a 
voice in history. 
                                                 
46 Christopher Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 20-21. 
 181 
    
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Allen, Francis.  The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, Penal Policy and 
Social Purpose.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981. 
 
Asian Americans and the Law (vol. 2):  Japanese Immigrants and 
American Law: The Alien Land Laws and Other Issues.  Charles 
McClain ed.  A Garland Series.  New York: Garland Publishing, 
1994. 
 
Babb, Susan E.  "Analysis of an Analogy: Undocumented Children and 
Illegitimate Children."  University of Illinois Law Review (1983): 
697-729. 
 
Bell, Derrick.  Silent Covenants: Brown V. Board of Education and the 
Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform.  New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004. 
 
Bell, Winifred.  Aid to Dependent Children.  New York: Columbian 
University Press, 1965. 
 
Bianchi, Suzanne M.  Household Composition and Racial Inequality.  New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981. 
 
Bland, Randall, W.  Justice Thurgood Marshall, Crusader for Liberalism, 
His Judicial Biography.  Bethesda: Academica Press, LLC, 2001. 
 
Boswell, John. The Kindness of Strangers: The Abandonment of Children 
in Western Europe from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance.  New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1988. 
 
Brennan, William J.  "Tribute to Norm Dorsen."  Harv. Civil Rights – Civil 
Liberties Law Review 27, (1992): 309-311. 
 
Brewer, Holly.  By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, and the Anglo-
American Revolution in Authority.  Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005. 
 
Brinton, Crane.  French Revolutionary Legislation on Illegitimacy, 1789-
1804.  Harvard Historical Monographs, vol. IX (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1936. 
 
The Bureau of Public Assistance.  "Illegitimacy and its Impact on the Aid 
to Dependent Children Program."  Washington D. C. April, 1960. 
 
 182 
    
The Code Napoléon.  http://www.napoleon-
series.org/research/government/c_code.html. 
 
Chalmers, David.  And the Crooked Places Made Straight: The Struggle for 
Social Change in the 1960s, 2nd ed. Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1991, 1996. 
 
Chemerinsky, Erwin.  Federal Jurisdiction, 5th ed. New York: Aspen 
Publishers, 2007. 
 
Daniels, Roger.  The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in 
California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion.  Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1962, 1977. 
 
Dargo, George.  Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal 
Traditions.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975. 
 
Davis, Martha F. Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 
1960-1973. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. 
 
Dean, Anne L.  Teenage Pregnancy: The Interaction of Psyche and Culture.  
Hillsdale: The Analytic Press, 1997. 
 
Dickerson, Bette J. Dickerson.  "Introduction."  African American Single 
Mothers: Understanding Their Lives and Families. Sage Series on 
Race and Ethnic Relations vol. 10.  Edited by Bette J. Dickerson. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995. 
 
A Digest of the Civil Laws now in Force in the Territory of Orleans.  
http://www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?geaux=digestof1808.home.  
 
Dodson, Jualynne Elizabeth.  "Conceptualizations and Research of 
African American Family Life in the United States: Some 
Thoughts." Black Families, 4th ed.  Edited by Harriette Pipes 
McAdoo.  Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007. 
 
Drinan, Robert F.  "The Right to Counsel:  Who Can And Must Represent 
the Juvenile?"  Gault:  What Now For the Juvenile Court. Edited by 
Virginia Davis Nordin.  Ann Arbor: Institute of Continuing Legal 
Education, 1968. 
 
Foner, Eric.  Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877.  
New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1988. 
 
 183 
    
Franklin, Anderson J., Nancy Boyd-Franklin, Charlene V. Draper.  "A 
Psychological and Educational Perspective on Black Parenting."  
Black Children: Social, Educational, and Parental Environments.  
2nd ed.  Edited by Harriette Pipes McAdoo.  Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2002. 
 
Frazier, E. Franklin.  The Negro Family in the United States, revised and 
abridged edition forward by Nathan Glazer.  Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1966. 
 
Fuchs, Rachel.  Abandoned Children: Foundlings and Child Welfare in 
Nineteenth-Century France.  Albany:  State University of New York 
Press, 1984. 
 
Fuchs, Victor R.  "Review of Losing Ground.”  Population and Development 
Review 11, no. 4 (Dec. 1985): 768-770. 
 
Gans, Herbert J.  The War against the Poor: The Underclass and Anti-
Poverty Policy.  New York: Basic Books, 1995. 
 
Garrison, Marsha.  "Law Making for Baby Making:  An Interpretive 
Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage."  Harvard Law 
Review 113, no. 4.  (Feb. 2000): 835-923. 
 
Gillers, Stephen.  "Truth, Justice, and White Paper."  Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 27, (1992): 319-324. 
 
Gordon, Linda.  Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of 
Welfare 1890-1935.  New York: The Free Press, 1994. 
 
Gray, John C. Jr. and David Rudovsky, "The Court Acknowledges the 
Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & 
Liability Insurance Co."  University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
118, No. 1 (Nov., 1969): 1-39. 
 
Griffith, Robert.  The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate, 
2nd ed.  Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1987. 
 
Grossberg, Michael.  "Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United 
States, 1820-1935."  A Century of Juvenile Justice.  Edited by 
Margaret K. Rosenheim, et. al.  Chicago:  The University of Chicago 
Press, 2002. 
 
 184 
    
____________ .  Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-
Century America.  Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1985. 
 
Hall, Kermit ed. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United 
States 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Handler, Joel F and Yeheskel Hasenfeld.  The Moral Construction of 
Poverty, Welfare Reform in America.  Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications, 1991. 
 
Hartog, Hendrick.  "Pigs and Positivism."  Wisconsin Law Review vol. 
1985, (1985): 899-935. 
 
Hauser, Karen A. "Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children: New 
Science Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny add up to the Need for 
Change," University of Cincinnati Law Review 65, (1997): 891-962. 
 
Herzog, Elizabeth.  "Unmarried Mothers: Some Questions to be Answered 
and Some Answers to be Questioned."  Child Welfare, 41 no. 8 
(1962): 339-350. 
 
Horwitz, Morton J. The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice.  New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1998. 
 
Ichioka, Yuji.  "Japanese Immigrant Response to the 1920 California 
Alien Land Law."  Agricultural History 58, no. 2 (Apr. 1984): 157-
178. 
 
Irons, Peter.  Justice at War.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
 
Jewell, K. Sue.  Survival of the African American Family: The Institutional 
Impact of U.S. Social Policy.  Westport: Praeger, 2003.  
 
Jordan, Winthrop.  The White Man's Burden, Historical Origins of Racism 
in the United States.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. 
 
Judicial Cases concerning American Slavery and the Negro vol. III. Helen 
Tunncliff Catterall ed. Washington: The Carnegie Institution, 1926.  
Reprinted by Negro Universities Press, 1968. 
 
Justia.com Supreme Court Center.  http://supreme.justia.com/. 
 
Kammerer, Percy.  The Unmarried Mother, A Study of 500 Cases.  Boston: 
Little Brown and Company, 1918.  Available from Google Books at 
 185 
    
http://books.google.com/books?id=EUxJAAAAIAAJ&ots=v8knoeX
3tm&dq=Percy%20Kammerer&pg=PR3#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
 
Katz, Michael B.  In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of 
Welfare in America.  New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986.  
 
Krause, Harry D.  "Equal Protection for the Illegitimate."  Michigan Law 
Review 65, No. 3 (Jan., 1967): 477-506. 
 
_________.  "Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana: 
First Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity."  The University 
of Chicago Law Review 36, No. 2 (Winter, 1969): pp. 338-363. 
 
_________.  "Why Bastard, Wherefore Base?"  Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 383, Progress in Family Law 
(May, 1969): 58-70. 
 
Levy v. Louisiana Oral Arguments.  267-684 Case #508.  Oral Arguments 
of the Supreme Court, available from the Special Media Archives 
Services Division (NWCS) National Archives and Records 
Administration, Room 3360, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 
20741-6001. 
 
Library of Congress "Bicentennial" 
http://www.loc.gov/bicentennial/bios/democracy/bios_dorsen.ht
m. 
 
Leyendecker, Gertrude.  "Children in Double Jeopardy."  In The Double 
Jeopardy, the Triple Crisis -- Illegitimacy Today.  National Council 
on Illegitimacy, National Council of Social Welfare, 1969. 
 
Loewen, James W.  Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American 
Racism.  New York: The New Press, 2005. 
 
Madison, James.  Federalist 43.  Library of Congress. 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_43.html.  
 
Malone, Ann Patton.  Sweet Chariot: Slave Family and Household 
Structure in Nineteenth-Century Louisiana.  Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1992. 
 
Maltz, Earl M.  "Illegitimacy and Equal Protection."  Arizona State Law 
Journal.  (1980): 831-851.  
 
 186 
    
McAdoo, Harriette Pipes.  "Diverse Children of Color: Research and Policy 
Implications."  Black Children: Social, Educational, and Parental 
Environments, 2nd ed.  Edited by Harriette Pipes McAdoo.  
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002. 
 
McCloskey, Robert G.  The American Supreme Court, third edition, revised 
by Sanford Levinson.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2000. 
 
Meeusen, Johan.  "Judicial Disapproval of Discrimination against 
Illegitimate Children: A comparative study of developments in 
Europe and the United States."  The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 43, No. 1 (Winter, 1995): 119-145. 
 
Minow,  Martha.  Making all the Difference, Inclusion, Exclusion, and 
American Law.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 
 
Mintz, Steven.  Huck's Raft, A History of American Childhood. Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). 
 
Murray, Charles.  Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980. 10th 
anniversary edition.  New York: Basic Books, 1984, 1994. 
  
Norman Dorsen Papers; TAM 251.  Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner 
Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, 70 Washington 
Square South, New York, NY 10012, New York University Libraries. 
 
Novick, Peter. That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the 
American Historical Profession.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988. 
 
Oakes, James L.  "Norman Dorsen: A Tribute."  Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review 27 (1992): 315-318. 
 
The Oyez Project.  http://www.oyez.org/. 
 
Palmer, Vernon Valentine. "Introduction." In Louisiana: Microcosm of a 
Mixed Jurisdiction, edited by Vernon Valentine Palmer, 3-20.  
Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1999.   
 
____________ .  "Two Worlds in One: The Genesis of Louisiana's Mixed 
Legal System, 1803-1812."  Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed 
Jurisdiction, edited by Vernon Valentine Palmer, 23-40.  Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 1999.   
 
 187 
    
____________ . "The French Connection and the Spanish Perception: An 
evaluation of French influence on Louisiana civil law."  The 
Louisiana Civilian Experience: Critiques of Codification in a Mixed 
Jurisdiction.  Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2005. 
 
Pascal, Robert A.  "Louisiana Succession and Related Laws and the 
Illegitimate: Thoughts Prompted by Labine v. Vincent."  Tulane Law 
Review 46, 2 (Dec. 1971): 167-183. 
 
Powe, Lucas A. Jr.  The Warren Court and American Politics.  The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass, 2000. 
 
Quadagno, Jill.  The Color of Welfare.  New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994. 
 
Rainwater, Lee and William L. Yancey.  The Moynihan Report and the 
Politics of Controversy: A Trans-action Social Science and Public 
Policy Report  Including the full text of The Negro Family:  The Case 
for National Action by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, (Cambridge: The 
M.I.T. Press, 1967). 
 
The Remonstrance from Louisiana. 
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~landc/html/2075.html. 
 
Scheiber, Harry N. ed.  Earl Warren and the Warren Court: The Legacy in 
American and Foreign Law.  New York: Lexington Books, 2007. 
 
Schwartz, Bernard.  Super Chief, Earl Warren and His Supreme Court -- A 
Judicial Biography.  New York: New York University Press, 1983. 
 
Scott, Rebecca.  Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery.  
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. 
 
Shogan, Robert.  No Sense of Decency:  The Army-McCarthy Hearings: A 
Demagogue Falls and Television Takes Charge of American Politics.  
Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2009. 
 
Solinger, Rickie.  Wake Up Little Susie, Single Pregnancy and Race before 
Roe v. Wade, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 1992, 2000. 
 
Stearns, Peter N.  "Challenges in the History of Childhood."  Journal of 
the History of Childhood and Youth 1, no. 1 (2008): 35-42. 
 
 188 
    
Stier, Max.  "Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of 
the Parents Should Not Matter."  Stanford Law Review 44, No. 3 
(Feb., 1992): 727-757. 
 
Sullivan, Kathleen M. and Gerald Gunther.  Constitutional Law 15th ed. 
New York: Foundation Press, 2004. 
 
Tanenhaus, David S. ed.  Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  Macmillan Reference USA, 2008. 
 
Teichman, Jenny.  Illegitimacy, An Examination of Bastardy.  Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1982. 
 
Tomlins, Christoper.  Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American 
Republic.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 
Treaty of San Ildefonso. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ildefens.asp. The Avalon 
Project. 
 
Tunnell, Ted.  Crucible of Reconstruction: War, Radicalism and Race in 
Louisiana, 1862-1877.  Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1984. 
 
Urofsky, Melvin I.  “William O. Douglas as Common Law Judge.” The 
Warren Court in Historical and Political Perspective. Edited by Mark 
Tushnet. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993. 
 
Vincent, Clark E.  "Illegitimacy in the Next Decade: trends and 
Implications."  Child Welfare 43, no.10 (1964): 513-520. 
 
Wasby, Stephen L.  Continuity and Change: From the Warren Court to the 
Burger Court.  Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing Company, 
1976. 
 
Welke, Barabar Young.  Law and the Borders of Belonging in the Long 
Nineteenth Century United States.  New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. 
 
Wells, Robert V.  "Illegitimacy and bridal pregnancy in colonial America."  
Bastardy and its Comparative History.  Edited by Peter Laslett, 
Karla Oosterveen and Richard M. Smith.  Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980. 
 
 
 189 
    
White, John Valery.  "The Turner Thesis, Black Migration, and the 
(Misapplied) Immigrant Explanation of Black Inequality."  Nevada 
Law Journal 5 no. 6 (Fall 2004): 6-56. 
 
Whittington, Keith E.  "The Burger Court (1969-1986)."  In The United 
States Supreme Court, The Pursuit of Justice.  Edited by 
Christopher Tomlins.  300-326. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2005. 
 
Witte, John Jr.  The Sins of the Father, The Law and Theology of 
Illegitimacy reconsidered.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009. 
 
Woodward, Bob and Scott Armstrong.  The Brethren: Inside the Supreme 
Court. New York: Avon Books, 1979. 
 
Young, Leontine R.  Out of Wedlock: A Study of the Problems of the 
Unmarried Mother and her Child.  New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc. 1954. 
 
Yukins, Elizabeth Anne.  Bastard Claims: The Agency of Illegitimacy in 
Twentieth-Century American Literature. PhD Dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1999. 
 
Zingo, Martha T. and Kevin E. Early Nameless Persons: Legal 
Discrimination Against Non-Marital Children in the United States.  
Westport: Praeger, 1994. 
 
Zukerman, Karl D.  "Social Attitudes and the Law."  In The Double 
Jeopardy, the Triple Crisis -- Illegitimacy Today.  National Council 
on Illegitimacy, National Council of Social Welfare, 1969. 
 
  
 190 
    
VITA 
Graduate College 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
Sherrie Anne Bakelar 
 
 
Degrees: 
 Bachelor of Arts, History, 2008 
 Westminster College 
 
Special Honors and Awards: 
 Utah Historical Society Student Award, 2007 
 
Thesis Title:  From 'Baggage' to Not 'Non-Persons': Levy v. Louisiana and 
the Struggle for Equal Rights for 'Illegitimate' Children 
 
Thesis Examination Committee: 
 Chairperson, David Tanenhaus, Ph.D. 
 Committee Member, Sue Fawn Chung, Ph.D. 
 Committee Member, David Holland, Ph.D. 
 Graduate Faculty Member, John Valery White, J.D. 
  
